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Abstract 
 
This thesis employs the theory of political economy to examine the roles of 
the state and civil society in combating corruption in Zimbabwe. The thesis 
initially investigates whether and how the state-civil society relation 
influences or impedes Anti-Corruption management, and subsequently 
examines strategies deployed by the state and civil society organisations 
(CSOs) to combat corruption. Particular attention is paid to the role and 
impact of the state in designing and implementing Anti-Corruption policies, 
and the role civil society plays in influencing Anti-Corruption legislation and 
policy implementation.  
This study adopts the World Bank conceptualisation of corruption and 
Transparency International‟s (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as part 
of the guiding framework. In-depth interviews with fifty eight key informants 
drawn from different levels within the government and civil society in 
Zimbabwe were conducted between October and February, 2012. The 
interviews focused on obtaining the different actors‟  perspective on how 
corruption in Zimbabwe was being produced and reinforced, and the roles 
played by the different actors in its perpetuation or curtailment. Quantitative 
data is used to support and triangulate some of the claims raised. 
The findings of this thesis indicate that the prevalence of corruption in 
Zimbabwe is chiefly a consequence of a lack of political will to address the 
problem, and a myriad of complex factors. This reasons with the argument 
that the top political elite are perceived to be the primary beneficiaries of 
corruption. Thus, while there are concrete and noticeable developments in 
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establishing the legal and constitutional framework to fight corruption, there 
is a continued absence of a clear demonstration of political will to fight 
corruption. The thesis argues that political leadership and commitment to 
fight corruption is one of the most fundamental preconditions for success in 
the fight against it. Secondly, weak institutions have contributed to the 
proliferation of corruption in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has multiple Anti-
Corruption initiatives shared between the state and civi l society (to a limited 
extent) spearheaded by the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) 
and Transparency International-Zimbabwe (TI-Z). However, initiatives have 
achieved limited success in alleviating corruption as demonstrated by current 
data suggesting endemic corruption in Zimbabwe. While civi l society may be 
seen as lacking the policy and political space to articulate and influence 
policy formulation and implementation, it is equally important to understand 
the historical background between civil society and the state which has 
produced such an outcome, and how malpractices within CSOs in some 
cases has hindered progress in executing its mandate.  Anti-Corruption 
strategies are effective when they are participative and engaging of all 
stakeholders within society, but ultimately it is the level of power and ability to 
exercise agency that determines any real change. In the context of 
Zimbabwe, such all-inclusiveness has entailed building coalitions among 
stakeholders such as the state, civil society organisations, private sector and 
the general public in order to embolden the sustainability of strategies. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 CORRUPTION IN ZIMBABWE: AN EXAMINATION OF 
THE ROLES OF THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
COMBATING CORRUPTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the thesis by focusing on the research problematic 
issues of Anti-Corruption management in Zimbabwe. The thesis examines 
the roles of the state and civil society in combating corruption in Zimbabwe. 
This chapter provides a background within which corruption is being 
examined with particular reference to Zimbabwe. The chapter highlights 
some of the key arguments on the causes and drivers of corruption, and in 
particular why the roles of the state and civil society are critical. High 
corruption in Zimbabwe (TI-Z 2012) could be attributed to several factors 
acting together, such as lack of political will and weak institutions for 
managing the public sector. This study thus focuses on their roles in 
managing corruption, and seeks to make contributions to both the theory of 
corruption, and practice in terms of development of appropriate Anti-
Corruption policy instruments. In addition, the chapter justifies why an 
understanding of corruption is important, and why Zimbabwe in particular is 
an interesting case to study. A brief insight into the approach and methods 
used in this study is provided in this chapter, as well as a description of how 
the results were analysed. The chapter further details the layout and 
organisation of the thesis. 
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1.1 Statement of the problem 
 
Corruption is perceived by political and economic commentators such as 
Harrison (2004), Szeftel (2000b), and Uneke (2010) as being endemic in 
African countries, and increasingly being blamed for the inadequate 
economic growth in economies and the extant high socio-economic 
inequalities and poverty. Several scholars including political commentators 
such as Riley (2000), Robinson (2004), Mbaku (2007), and Devine (2010) 
have attempted to examine the factors that produce corruption, and 
especially why corruption is persistent in Africa. Others have looked at the 
measures that need to be applied, or that have been applied to address 
corruption in Africa and beyond. A substantial body of literature appears to 
argue that at the centre of corruption in Africa are weak institutions that fail to 
hold public officials accountable (Szeftel 2000b). Drawing on this 
perspective, this thesis argues that a stronger civil society is necessary for 
ensuring that the public and private sector are kept in check and operate in a 
transparent and just manner. This thesis seeks to interrogate this assertion 
by focusing on the case of Zimbabwe, a country that has recently 
experienced a surge in the level of corruption, increased state violence and a 
rapidly declining economy. The thesis is particularly concerned with 
examining the complex context within which corruption is produced and 
questioning whether the current understanding for corruption is sufficient as 
a basis of developing effective strategies to deal with it. 
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Zimbabwe‟s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) decreased from 42 to 20 
between the years 1998 and 2011 when the country experienced political 
and economic crisis over the last one and half decades.1  
The acceleration of the economic and social hardships as a result of the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) in the early 1990s, 
coupled with the increased greed as most of the political leadership and 
senior civil servants competed to accumulate riches through corrupt means 
led to the increase in the socio-economic hardships and an increase in the 
corruption trend. Among several other factors that have contributed to the 
increase in hardships and corruption are the struggle for power and politics 
of patronage, and the discovery of diamonds and other mineral resources 
which exacerbated the desire for private accumulation. Another important 
factor worth signposting is the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) civil war 
in which Zimbabwe took part between 1997 and 2000 spending 
approximately Z$25million per month (Pearce 2000: 3). Political scientists 
such as Makumbe (cited in The Financial Gazette, 25 July 2000) suggest 
that the main beneficiaries were a group of people associated with the army 
and the senior government Ministers rather than the national economy. 
Diamonds and gold dealing were the sphere of influence for Zimbabwe to 
participate in the war (Pearce 2000).  
                                                                 
 
 
 
1
 CPI is a composite of various corruption indicators, which ranks countries on a zero to one hundred 
scale, with a score of one hundred representing very low corruption (Thompson and Shar 2005). The 
CPI measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in countries worldwide. Based on 
expert opinion, countries are scored from zero (highly corrupt) to one hundred (very clean) (TI 
2012). 
 4 
Political commentators such as Makumbe (2011) argue that the emergence 
of „sick institutions‟ in the public sector, higher demands for increased 
government intervention in the indigenisation of the economy coupled with 
the escalation of a lack of transparency and accountability in the public 
sector, and the breakdown of the rule of law following the widespread 
invasion of white owned commercial farms since the year 2000 are factors 
contributing to high corruption in the country. Consequently, they are a 
challenge to Anti-Corruption movement. Makumbe (2011) concurs with 
Ncube (2010) and Bratton and Walle (1997) that a lack of transparency and 
accountability within Zimbabwean bureaucratic system has created an 
informational asymmetry which has allowed public service officials and 
politicians to siphon off an unaccountable amounts of public revenues and 
resources because the organisations deemed to be the watchdogs of the 
state have been incapacitated by the undemocratic government. 
This thesis deploys a political economy approach in order to investigate and 
examine the roles of the state and civil society in combating corruption in 
Zimbabwe. A political economy approach is: 
“... concerned with the interaction of political and economic 
processes in a society; the distribution of power and wealth 
between different groups and individuals, and the processes 
that create, sustain and transform these relationships over 
time” (Riley 2000: 237). 
This theoretical approach also entails critically analysing and evaluating the 
discourse about corruption in Zimbabwe vis-a-vis its effects on economic, 
social and political development. As argued by Szeftel (1998), corruption 
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should be understood as an outcome of fundamental political and socio-
economic structural factors. 
Using the political economy approach in this research will allow a critical 
analysis or an evaluation of how and why the socio-economic and political 
development influences the discourse on corruption in Zimbabwe with 
regards to the roles of the state and civil society in fighting corruption.  
Literature on controlling corruption in Zimbabwe has focused on state  
programmes (Mavuso and Merwe 2008).  Attention has often been given to 
the actions of the state and state institutions in the Anti-Corruption strategies 
while very little attention and recognition has been given to the position and 
potentially powerful contribution of civil society. Therefore, state sponsored 
Anti-Corruption strategies will be reviewed in order to locate the operating 
environment of civil society driven Anti-Corruption programmes. While 
acknowledging that efforts in controlling corruption in Zimbabwe have been 
fundamentally state-driven without much involvement from other 
stakeholders (Mavuso and Merwe 2008), this thesis will investigate and 
examine the extent to which civi l society plays a continuing role in fighting 
corruption alongside the state. 
In development discourse, corruption has been identified by political 
commentators such as Makumbe as a major obstruction to the promotion of 
sustainable economic growth and development in Zimbabwe (Makumbe 
1994). Moleketi  (2007) and Robinson (2004) argue that corruption is one of 
Zimbabwe‟s major developmental challenges alongside poverty, HIV/AIDS 
and governance. Corruption in Zimbabwe, as in the rest of Africa, is 
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perceived by Chabal and Daloz (1999), Mbaku (2007), and Falola (2008) to 
be a direct consequence of poorly developed and inappropriate institutional 
arrangements. Sibudubudu (2002) and Szeftel (2000a) argue that at 
independence Zimbabwe inherited the underdeveloped institutions which 
were conducive for the proliferation of corruption. This school of thought 
forms the basis of the problem to be investigated in this thesis. Eigen (2001: 
36) sees corruption as “a daunting obstacle of sustainable development” and 
a great impediment to the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) of reducing by half the number of people living in extreme 
poverty by 2015. 
The focus of this study covers the period from 1980 to 2011, drawing on the 
colonial epoch in order to understand factors that inform the genesis of 
corruption in Zimbabwe. A discussion on the colonial state and the post -
independent Zimbabwe will enable us to locate the state‟s position in relation 
to the development of corruption in the period after independence. Emerging 
evidence from literature locates the roots of corruption in Zimbabwe in the 
fabrics of colonial administration, nationalist politics and economic meltdown 
between the early 1990s and 2010. To understand the roots of corruption in 
Zimbabwe, there is a need to understand the way the post-colonial state 
draws on the colonial state and how it functions and sustains itself in the 
context of political economy.  
This thesis argues that Zimbabwe‟s comp lex political economy has 
presented to both the public and the private sector opportunities for 
corruption; it suffices here to demonstrate that it has also given rise to 
several forms of corruption. These forms include among others, political 
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patronage and clientelism. Given the fact that the political forces governing 
Zimbabwe have historically been excluded from the economy by the colonial 
government, therefore when they came to power this meant controlling a 
major mechanism of accumulation. Concerned with delivering services to the 
historically excluded and marginalised people, the political system got 
entrenched in political patronage and a clientele system.  
Political patronage and clientelism are hierarchal political and social relations 
binding leaders (patrons) and their followers (clients) based on complex 
mutual assistance and support (Szeftel 2000a). The relationships are 
founded on mutual material advantage; the patron supplies scarce resources 
such as jobs, business licences, money and contracts to dependants in 
return for their support and votes. It is a patron-client model of politics that 
permeates Zimbabwe‟s contemporary political systems. Political patronage 
and clientelism thrive in insecure political and economic environments like 
Zimbabwe (Midgal 1988). It is this political patronage and clientelist approach 
of distributing „spoils politics‟ which have sustained systemic corruption and 
manifested a culture of impunity. The next section defines corruption, a 
concept vital to this thesis and examines  how it is understood and 
contextualised. 
1.2 Defining corruption 
 
A study of corruption faces several problems from the outset, such as the 
definition of the concept itself. Parallel to numerous other complex 
phenomena, it is suggested by Obayelu (2007) and Freille (2007) that 
corruption is difficult to define in concise and concrete terms.  In support, 
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Devine (2010) demonstrates no consensus as to what exactly constitutes 
corruption. Definitions and perspectives vary from country to country and 
society to society in accordance with cultural, legal or other factors and the 
nature of the problem as it happens in each country. Obayelu warned that: 
“There is always a risk that several people may engage in a 
discussion about corruption while each is referring to or 
talking about a different thing completely” (2007: 13). 
This is best captured in Heidenheimer et al (1993) who assert that any 
attempt to analyse the concept of corruption must contend with the fact that 
in English and other languages the word corruption has a history of vastly 
different meanings and connotations. Therefore, scholars, socio-economic 
commentators and policy makers alike need to approach it with academic 
caution. 
When examining corruption, it is evident that it is a general phenomenon – or 
maybe a set of phenomena that are linked in different ways, but there is no 
solitary clinical definition which encapsulates it (Langseth 2002). 
Furthermore, if corruption is understood as a collection of phenomena, it then 
follows that understanding corruption requires an understanding not only of 
the individual phenomena, but also how numerous phenomena inter-relate. 
Such a general understanding is critical to developing effective control 
strategies. When one is able to define what corruption is, one can 
understand how to prevent it.  
Social science defines corruption in terms of three basic forms. Firstly, 
corruption is related to the performance of the duties of public office.  
According to this approach, Nye states that: 
 9 
“Corruption is behaviour which deviates from the normal 
duties of a public role because of private-regarding pecuniary 
or status gains: or violates rules against the exercise of 
certain types of private-regarding influence” (1967:  419). 
This includes such behaviour as bribery, nepotism and misappropriation of 
public resources for private uses. This is synonymous with bureaucrats in 
Zimbabwe who according to Tizor (2009) have turned the public office into a 
money-generating machine. Bribery and nepotism by public officers from 
Ministries and/or departments such as Immigration and Customs, registrar, 
education and health, the police force, and the judicial system are endemic in 
Zimbabwe (Makumbe 2011 and TI-Z 2010).  
Secondly, corruption is defined in terms of the public interest.  According to 
Friedrich (1990), the pattern of corruption exists whenever a power holder 
who is charged with doing certain duties that are a responsible functionary of 
office holder, is by monetary or other rewards such as the expectation of a 
job in the future, induced to take actions which favour whoever provides the 
reward and thereby damage the group or organisation to which the 
functionary belongs, more specifically the government. 
Thirdly, corruption is related to the notion of exchange deriving from the 
theory of the market. Klaveren argues that: 
“The bureaucrat views his public office as an enterprise from 
which to extract extra-legal income. As a consequence, the 
civil servants compensation package does not depend on an 
ethical evaluation of his usefulness for the common good but 
precisely upon the market situation and his talents for finding 
the point of maximal gain on the public's demand curve” 
(1990: 26).  
TI uses a focused definition of the term, which operationally defines 
corruption as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. TI further 
 10 
makes a distinction between “according to rule” corruption and “against the 
rule” corruption (TI 2010: 15). Byrne et al (2010) argue that facilitation of 
payments where a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment for 
something that the bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the 
former, while on one hand, the latter is a bribe paid to obtain services the 
bribe receiver is prohibited from providing.  
From all given definitions above, corruption encompasses undue influence 
over public policies, institutions, laws and regulations by vested private 
interests at the expense of the public interest.  
The World Bank defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private 
gains when an official accepts, solicits or extort bribes” (1997: 8). Central to 
this definition is that corruption is the abuse of public authority for private 
profit.  However, as the scope of corruption has widened, this definition has 
been enlarged to cover abuse of all offices of trust for private benefit (Doig 
and Theobold 1993 and Rose-Ackerman 1997).  
The United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP) also defines 
corruption as accepting money “... for doing something that one is under the 
duty to do or that one is under the duty not to do” (2000: 167). This 
demonstrates that corruption is a betrayal of trust resulting directly or 
indirectly from the subordination of public goals to those of the individual. 
Akcay (2004) argues that the official positions can be abused for personal 
benefits even if no bribe occurs, for example, through patronage and 
nepotism, the theft of state assets or the diversion of state resources for the 
benefit of one‟s family or associates‟ interests over those of the larger 
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society. The concepts of patronage and nepotism will be discussed further in 
chapters two and six. 
Klitgaard (1988) and Rose-Ackerman (1997) argue that corruption occurs 
when public officials have a direct responsibility for the provision of a public 
service or application of specific regulations. In the case of Zimbabwe, this 
applies to sectors and departments already listed earlier in this chapter. In 
this regard, corruption in Zimbabwe is widespread in institutions occupied by 
public officials who have monopoly over goods and supplies or services that 
generate rent, with discretionary powers to decide who receives it, and are 
not accountable. Those in public offices, according to Tizor (2009), the Wor ld 
Bank (1997) and UNDP (2000) also include the politicians who may be high 
level bureaucrats.  
Although there are multiple definitions of corruption, it is clear that corruption 
refers to the acts in which power and influence of the public office is used for 
personal gain which may be or may not be monetary at the expense of the 
common good and in violation of established laws, principles, regulations 
and ethical considerations. 
Given these definitions, this thesis deploys the World Bank (1997) and 
UNDP (2000) approach that defines corruption as an abuse of a position of 
power frequently typified by greed and a lack of transparency in the 
individuals or institutions involved for private gain. It is related to the 
performance associated with a public office, and deviations from the laws 
and procedures that regulate the conduct of public servants.  In addition, a 
lack of clearly defined roles within those organisations or institutions fuel 
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corruption within these settings (Bracking 2007). Therefore, this thesis 
analyses corruption in relation to bureaucrats and politicians‟ indirect or 
direct use of official positions or titles for private gain in violation of the 
governmental guidelines, established rules or ethical stanches, which furnish 
individuals‟ interests whilst setting aside the public or the common good. 
However, the thesis is aware of the flaws existing in definitions of corruption. 
Much writing on corruption is produced by, or influenced by international 
donors who concentrate of defining corruption in relation to public sector 
without considering corruption in the private sector. Ignoring corruption of the 
private sector is dangerous particularly when designing Anti-Corruption 
programmes, which focus on combating bureaucratic corruption while 
corruption within the private sector is also endemic (Harrison 2004). Precise 
definition needs to accommodate corruption within the private sector, which 
moves away from the tendency of portraying corruption as only happening in 
public offices. 
However, the thesis takes notice that the World Bank and the UNDP are not 
the only sources of knowledge when it comes to defining and debating about 
corruption, as there have been other entrants i nto the field of good 
governance focusing on corruption with varied definitions. For instance, in 
the Zimbabwean context, a growing number of organisations working 
towards reducing corruption are beginning to produce their own knowledge, 
for example, TI-Z and The Anti-Corruption Trust of Southern Africa (ACTSA) 
have carried some research and produced important reports on the causes, 
scale, effects and the nature of corruption together with Anti-Corruption 
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strategies. Chapter six discusses role of the TI-Z in Anti-Corruption 
management.  
Economic commentators such as Nye (1967), Huntington (1968), and 
Friendrich (1972) and Uneke (2010) argue that corruption enhances 
efficiency of the development process and facilitates economic growth and 
investment. This school of thought maintains that corruption speeds up the 
development machinery. They argue that corruption effectively „lubricates‟ 
the wheels of an otherwise rigid bureaucracy: 
“Making it more responsive to the needs of clients be they 
entrepreneurs or ordinary citizens, seeking services of a 
public agency. Corruption is said to minimise bureaucratic red 
tape, eliminating bottlenecks and facilitating a more efficient, 
flexible and responsive system” (Uneke 2010: 115).  
According to their understanding corruption facilitates bureaucratic 
procedures, making the system more responsive, flexible and competent to 
the demands of different clienteles.  
The perception that corruption greases a rigid bureaucracy is debatable. 
Frisch (1995) argues that corruption may be beneficial, but only to the 
privileged leaders and bureaucrats. In the case of Zimbabwe, this thesis 
argues that during the economic and political crisis years from 2000 to 2009 
corruption was functional; it kept the political and economic systems 
functioning. Corruption managed to keep the bureaucrats at work when 
inflation was as high as 231million per cent (Berger 2008) with salaries 
earned only enough for one way trip (transport) to work (Chagonda 2010, 
and Cox and Anderson 2009). Despite the economic hardships, bureaucrats 
remained in post and made extra-income from bribes and other corrupt 
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practices. Public officials went to work not because they wanted to work, but 
because they made extra-cash from their positions. Without corruption this 
would have meant the government would have collapsed as the economy 
crumbled. Drawing on the case of Zimbabwe, this thesis argues that to a 
limited extent corruption has been functional in Zimbabwe between the years 
2007 and 2009 given that it sustained a collapsing economy and supported 
the population that survived through corrupt means while it also allowed a  
government to survive. 
However, academics such as Uneke (2010) argue that although corruption 
has desirable effects on political, economic and social development, 
Zimbabwe, as is the rest of Africa, has experienced undesirable effects. 
Uneke further argues that the “bureaucrats probably mount bottle necks in 
the bureaucratic structures” (2010: 115) purposely for the reason of using 
them as bargaining chips to extort bribes from consumers seeking services. 
Indeed, bureaucratic bottlenecks symbolise needless additional costs to 
business enterprises and make efficient operations difficult. In the context of 
Zimbabwe, on many occasions people are willing to pay bribes to the 
bureaucrats in order to receive services, and/or minimise costs on their 
businesses. Bureaucratic roadblocks have become institutionalised as a 
permanent source of extra-legal income for corrupt public officials (Uneke 
2010 and Mbaku 2000). Despite the benefits of corruption cited by Nye 
(1967), Huntington (1968), Friendrich (1972) and Uneke (2010) its negative 
effects outweigh the supposed benefits. Thus the critique of the school of 
thought that corruption is beneficial is not very convincing. In the case of 
Zimbabwe (the focus of this study), corruption has not improved access to 
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the bureaucracy for most of historically marginalised groups such as the 
poor, rural inhabitants and the vast majority of the Ndebele people from 
Matabeleland (Gatsheni 2011). It is “a cancer that eats deep into the fabrics 
of the economy, politics and social life of the state”  (Harrison 2004:136). It 
hinders the socio-economic and political development of the country 
(Amundsen 1999).   
Prior to focusing on corruption in Zimbabwe, how it manifests itself, it is 
befitting to briefly make an examination of the literature on the wider 
perspectives of corruption in Africa. This will aid us to understand why 
corruption is perceived as being endemic in African countries. Doing this will 
facilitate in reviewing the contours of the contested and changing 
interpretations of corruption in Africa. This approach will enable the reader 
with a clear understanding of the nature of corruption in Zimbabwe, and 
permit a fluent evaluation of the roles of the state and civi l society 
organisations (CSO) in combating corruption. The following section 
discusses the relevance of this study. 
1.3 Relevance of the Study 
 
A study about the role of the state and civil society in fighting corruption is of 
great relevance to the current discourse on socio-economic and political 
development and good governance in Zimbabwe. The thesis further 
emphasises the significance of this research in understanding the role played 
by civi l society in influencing Anti-Corruption policy. This research is 
imperative to public policy making and implementation and most importantly 
to the Zimbabwean nation that is struggling to develop effective Anti-
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Corruption policies. It is envisaged that this research will serve as a 
theoretical and empirical framework for understanding and developing 
genuine and credible civil society as an instrument of development and 
governance in Zimbabwe since much policy effort at regional and 
international levels is increasingly diverted towards strengthening the civil 
society sector to be proactive and ensure that countries meet their MDGs. 
Corruption is a major impediment to the achievement of the MDGs, and civil 
society has a comparative advantage to succeed where the government 
have struggled to score major successes in social contemporary issues such 
as corruption (Chabal 1994).  
1.4 Objectives of the study 
 
This thesis has two major objectives that speak to several sub issues. These 
are: 
1) To evaluate the state and civi l society relations in tackling the problem 
of corruption. 
2) To examine strategies employed by the state and civil society in 
combating corruption 
The objectives will be achieved by exploring and analysing what the state 
and the civil society have done, and are currently doing in fighting corruption. 
Success and failure of the state and CSOs vis-à-vis Anti- Corruption 
strategies will be explored and analysed.  
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1.5 Research Questions 
 
In order to achieve the above objectives the following two research questions 
are asked. Each research question corresponds to the objective of the 
research. 
1. How do relations between the state and civil society influence the fight 
against corruption in Zimbabwe? 
2. What strategies do the state and civil society use in fighting corruption 
in Zimbabwe?  
To help in answering the major questions, the following auxiliary questions 
are proposed:  
1. How does civil society influence state sponsored Anti-Corruption 
strategies in Zimbabwe?  
2. How effective are the strategies used by both the state and civil 
society in fighting corruption (if there are any)?  
3. What is the public perception on the performance of the state and civil 
society in fighting corruption?  
4. How do the colonial legacies and the state formation process explain 
the prevalence of corruption in Zimbabwe?  
5. Can civi l society play an effective role in Anti-Corruption initiatives if 
given a political space and an improved relationship with the state?  
The thesis engages these auxiliary questions to interrogate the objectives of 
the study. 
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1.5.1 Methodological approach 
 
This section presents the research approaches of the thesis. The aim of the 
research approach is to elucidate why decisions were taken, how they were 
implemented, and with what results (Schramm 1971) to help in achieving the 
projected objectives of the research and answering the research questions.  
This research is a case study, which employs multiple qualitative methods 
such as interviews, documentary analysis and observation of the activities 
and the role of sampled subjects to collect data. These methods allowed the 
researcher to collect data from many different sources. This was vital for 
triangulating data collected through interviews and data from document 
evidence and observation. This thesis is largely theoretical and explores the 
academic literature on the Zimbabwean state, corruption within it, and the 
role of CSOs and organs of the state in combating corruption. This 
theoretical base is complemented by the use of the empirical data collected  
via structured and one-to-one semi-structured interviews with CSOs, 
government bodies, for example, The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare  
because this Ministry is directly linked to combating and dealing with 
corruption, while it is responsible for the civil servants – the bureaucrats and 
it oversees the regulation of civil society in Zimbabwe as chapters five and 
six will demonstrate. 
1.6 Overview of the Study 
 
This first chapter (chapter one) introduces the study and captures the 
perception of corruption in Africa critical for this thesis. As an introductory 
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chapter it lays down the problem to be investigated and defines corruption as 
a key concept of the study. It sets out the approach, objectives, and research 
questions of the study. 
Chapter two commences with a literature review concerning corruption in 
Zimbabwe and provides the conceptual and analytical framework of the 
research. The chapter contextualises corruption in Zimbabwe. The focal 
point of this chapter is on the political economy of corruption magnifying the 
magnitude of corruption as a crisis facing Zimbabwe. The inquiry this chapter 
is examining is why corruption has turned into an issue of critical importance 
to Zimbabwe‟s political economy in the last two decades. The chapter argues 
that in order to understand corruption and its damaging effects there is a 
need to understand the politics of the state. This is because corruption in 
Zimbabwe is embedded in its political economy. The chapter argues that the 
weak state institutions, which are further undermined by the economic 
problems, promote corruption. The chapter will not only offer a more 
encompassing explanation of corruption but also permit for the development 
of comprehensive strategies for the improvement of the problem.  
Chapter three describes and justifies the data gathering methods used in the 
research. Data gathering instruments discussed in this section include semi-
structured interviews, documentary analysis and observation. The chapter 
also outlines how the data was collected and analysed. Chapter four 
presents a narrative background of Zimbabwe. 
Chapter five addresses and presents the results from the fieldwork findings 
drawing on the first research question. Chapter six is a presentation and 
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analysis of the results of fieldwork that answer the second research question. 
Chapter seven concludes the thesis by pulling together the discussed 
fundamental issues in order to discuss the implications of themes that 
emerged from the study for the understanding of the roles of the state and 
civil society in combating corruption in Zimbabwe. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE STATE, CIVIL SOCIETY 
AND THE PARADOX OF CORRUPTION CONTROL IN 
ZIMBABWE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
“With the Zimbabwean economy in the doldrums corruption has 
become an accepted and almost expected way of doing business 
especially in the public sector. If a civil servant still goes to work 
today it is not because of the salary but the opportunities to 
enhance his paltry income with corrupt acts using the 
organisation‟s resources” (Tizor 2009: 26). 
 
This chapter reviews literature on the state of knowledge on corruption in 
Zimbabwe, particularly with regards to the roles of the state and civi l society 
in producing and reducing it. While this chapter focuses on literature on 
corruption in Zimbabwe, it also draws on examples from other countries in 
Africa and beyond. This chapter takes as one of its points of reference  
Riley‟s view of the “disastrous nature of corruption” (2000: 18) that impedes 
human development. The chapter pays interest to the bureaucratic forms of 
corruption in which public officials are involved, and analyses this with 
respect to broader issues including public perception of corruption, economic 
issues, historical and political linkages. 
In development discourse, corruption is observed as a major obstruction to 
the promotion of sustainable economic growth and socio-political 
development in Zimbabwe (Makumbe 1994, Robinson 2004, Moleketi 2007 
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and Falola 2008). Corruption is regarded as one of Zimbabwe‟s major 
developmental challenges alongside poverty, HIV/AIDS and governance. 
Therefore addressing the problem of corruption is a development priority 
because measures to reduce poverty, for example, are hindered if the poor 
end up paying more to access goods and services, which makes life too 
expensive for those at the fringes of society. Therefore, combating corruption 
has to be a major priority for the state 
2.3 An assessment of the political economy of corruption in 
Zimbabwe  
  
In order to understand why corruption has such destructive effects in 
Zimbabwe, there is a necessity to understand the politics of the state in 
which corruption is embedded. To understand the genesis of this corruption 
we need to be aware of the way the post-colonial state functions and 
sustains itself in the context of political economy. Corruption should be 
understood as an outcome of the fundamental political and socio-economic 
structural factors (Szeftel 2000a and Sibudubudu 2002). To facilitate the 
comprehension of how these political and socio-economic factors contribute 
to making corruption so destructive, we need to broadly contextualise how 
the politics of the post-colonial state functions. Ncube (2010) argues that it is 
important to understand how the socio-economic arrangements since 1980 
shaped the state-civil society relations and how these socio-economic 
arrangements influenced the state to isolate and attempt to eliminate civil 
society from the „spoils politics‟. This section aims to demonstrate that 
corruption in Zimbabwe is bui lt into the very character and legacy of the 
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colonial state through the processes of clientelism, nepotism, patronage and 
factionalism. 
Corruption in Zimbabwe is brought about and facilitated by several complex 
factors. Firstly, literature locates the roots of corruption in the nature and 
fabric of the government politics (Szeftel 1998, Bracking 2009, and Gatsheni  
2011). This thesis points to the fact that from the top echelons of the 
government flow various streams of corrupt practices that have spread 
throughout the country. Habtemichael and Cloete (2010) argue that this  
pattern has created a chaotic situation leading to systemic corruption.  
Secondly, the thesis traces the roots of corruption in Zimbabwe in the 
colonial history in which colonialism set a culture of the bureaucratic 
corruption when the public office was attained through favour as a reward for 
one‟s loyalty to the settlers rather than on the basis of merit and qualification. 
This has generated a culture of patronage and clientelism (Gatsheni 2009 
and 2011, and Tizor 2009) and the bureaucratic corruption that allowed 
corruption to thrive even after independence (Moyo 2002 and Mawowa 
2007). There is also a school of thought that argues that corruption in 
Zimbabwe, as is in the rest of Africa, is a direct consequence of the poorly 
developed and inappropriate institutional arrangements inherited by the post-
colonial state (Szeftel 1998 and 2000, Chabal and Daloz 1999, Mbaku 2007,  
Falola 2008, Sibudubudu 2002, and Gatsheni 2011). 
Alexander and Kenneth (2012) argue that colonial institutions are thought to 
be important determinants of post-independence levels of economic growth 
and public administration. They suggest that states that share the British 
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institutional and cultural colonial legacies are more conducive to human, 
economic, political and administrative development than say the French or 
other colonisers. This comparison allows us to test for colonial legacy and 
institutions that operate in different states. Alexander and Kenneth (2012) 
argue that the institutional package brought by the British to its colonies 
ultimately led to higher standards of administration after independence 
compared to the French former colonies. In addition, Abdou (2010) argues 
that French colonies are perceived to be more corrupt than the British 
colonies giving examples of states like Mobutu Seseseko‟s Zaire  
(Democratic Republic of Congo) and Guinea. Given Abdou‟s perception, 
would this mean that the British left better systems for institutional 
administration strong enough to prevent corruption? If this is the case 
questions would arise as to why countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana 
and Zimbabwe (to name a few) all former British colonies exhibit higher CPI 
than other French colonies.  What explains Zimbabwe‟s high CPI? Several 
factors acting together provide answers to this, but a common denominator is 
the weak institutions for managing public sector administration.  
Mhone (2000) argues that Zimbabwe‟s socio-economic and political 
background creates fundamental allocative and distributive inefficiencies. 
These inefficiencies are mostly an outcome of colonialism “which have been 
compounded and exacerbated by post-independence policies of commission 
and omission” (Mhone 2000: 102). Before independence the economy of the 
country was characterised by severe inefficiencies in allocating the labour 
market, and by the huge distributive inequalities in access to social services. 
Therefore, as argued by Munyae and Lesetedi (1998), the practices of post-
 25 
colonial Zimbabwe‟s political and bureaucratic leadership are purely an 
expansion of such colonial policies and practices which serve to entrench 
corruption. 
Gatsheni (2006) argues that the neo-liberal standpoint faultily reduces the 
catastrophe of corruption in Zimbabwe to a simple crisis of governance and  
traces the genesis to the year 2000 (when the state invaded white owned 
commercial farms) while ignoring earlier antecedents that are equally 
important. According to Gatsheni (2006), the neo-liberal perspective makes a 
critical error of the Zimbabwe crisis by focusing on the symptoms of the 
problem which surfaced in the year 2000 such as the economic 
disintegration and poor governance. There is a necessity for a deeper 
examination going beyond these symptoms of the crisis to comprehend the 
origins of corruption. 
Makumbe (1994 and 2011) rejects Gatsheni‟s assertion by pointing out that 
the problem of corruption in Zimbabwe is related to the climate of unethical 
leadership and bad governance which in turn has generated a situation in 
which corruption has flourished. Makumbe concludes that national leaders 
are „unethical‟ due to their roles and conduct in plundering national resources 
meant to benefit the country as a whole. Examples include the Willowgate 
car scandal of 1988, WVCF scandal of 1994, and the land repossession of 
the years 2000 to 2005 (Nyarota 2006, Shana 2006, and Bracking 2009). All 
of these scandals directly involved ZANU-PF senior government officials. 
In Zimbabwe corruption has influenced socio-economic and political 
development, the breakdown of good governance and democracy, and 
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adversely affected the economic growth and reduced the resources available 
for the development of infrastructure, the public sector and anti-poverty 
programmes. 
Despite a decreasing CPI score of Zimbabwe from forty two in 1998 to 
twenty in 2011 (TI 2012), the corruption crisis is far from being eradicated, 
hence the calls for a holistic approach in designing and implementing the 
Anti-Corruption strategies. To do so we need to understand the nature of the 
problem, its origins and how it manifests itself.  
To understand the roots of corruption in Zimbabwe, there is a need to 
understand the way the post-colonial state emerged from the colonial state, 
how it draws on the legacy left by the colonial state, and how it functions and 
is sustained. This thesis employs a political economy approach to analyse 
the underlying political and socio-economic structural factors inherited from 
the colonial state.  
Literature reviewed shows that once the colonial society was established 
after 1890, settlers occupied the dominant economic, political, and social 
positions. Frantz (1961) and Bayley (1966) argue that white settlers 
diversified their economy from mining to include manufacturing and 
agriculture, the latter setting the stage for a more aggressive mode of land 
appropriation (Mawowa 2007, Moyo 2006, and Bond and Manyanya 2002). 
This was followed by the adoption of discriminatory laws such as the Land 
Apportionment Act of 1930, the Cattle Levy (1931), the Maize Control Act 
(1931), and the Native Registration Act of 1936 (Mawowa 2007). These Acts 
created an advantage for white capital, increased the white settlers‟ access 
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to good land and ensured a reliable supply of the cheap black labo ur by 
dividing the economy along racial lines. The result was the consolidation of a 
white corrupt and accumulating class. According to Gatsheni (2009), 
colonialism became a terrain of corruption in the years to come as the post -
colonial state inherited this corrupt system. Conditions of extreme inequality 
became great incentives for corruption in years after independence. Szeftel 
(1999) argues that the post-independent state was seen to be the means to 
redress this past inequality; instead the ruling elites have used it as a means 
to promote their private wealth. The new ruling government inherited the 
state and its resources which were used to generate further illegal 
accumulation. The next section examines how the ruling government 
distributed resources and how this promoted corruption. 
2.3.1 Spoils politics: The state and economic distribution 
 
Bratton and Masunungure (2011) argue that the state is the most precious 
prize in Zimbabwe because its power can be used to generate opportunities 
for private gain. The private sector employment opportunities are limited; 
therefore, the occupation of the public office remains the most dependable 
means of accumulating wealth. Mandaza concurs with the above argument 
by putting his judgment arguing that:  
“The quest for power and wealth is expressed sometimes in 
open corruption and nepotism. The long years of colonial 
domination and deprivation, not to mention imprisonment and 
the hard days of the struggle, became almost the license-
albeit for only a few among the many who might claim such a 
license – to accumulate quickly; and the state ... appeared the 
most viable agency for such accumulation” (Mandaza 1986: 
57). 
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Political position is central in many ways to the process of private wealth 
accumulation and source of self-advancement. Rather than being motivated 
by the desire to achieve economic, social, and political development, after 
independence the ZANU-PF ruling elite immediately submitted to the 
predatory temptations and in the process transforming themselves into 
wealthy political benefactors. A large number of them have acquired massive 
properties in the form of farms and businesses from state resources. Ignatius 
Chombo, the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and Urban 
Development, who is allegedly said to own over fifty houses, and more than 
twenty private vehicles and numerous businesses, is one good example 
(ACTSA 2012). 
Corruption in Zimbabwe was deeply imbedded in the politics of the pre-
colonial state as well as in the economic problems that confronted the post -
colonial state after independence. Szeftel (1999 and 2000), Gatsheni (2006 
and 2011), and Ranger et al (2000) argue that Zimbabwe inherited 
underdeveloped institutions and economies that were characteristically 
skewed and susceptible to the international economic changes and 
fluctuations. Although Zimbabwe was politically independent, the economy 
was still dominated by minority whites and international corporate interests. It  
was not weaned from this Western dependency (Szeftel 1999). This was 
complimented by the fact that the means of production such as agriculture 
and manufacturing industries remained in the hands of the colonial settlers.  
David (2002) argues that Zimbabwe‟s great dependence on the development 
and expansion of the international economy was complemented by the level 
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of the unevenness in the national economic and social development. David 
argues that: 
“Uneven development took many forms, ..., the combination 
of declining peasant subsistence economies ..., extreme 
inequalities of income, the differential incorporation of different 
regions and ethnic groups into different roles in the economy 
and the state, and the exclusion of vast numbers of the 
indigenous population from ownership of property and market 
opportunities through institutionalised racism” (2002: 66). 
When independence came the new government had to ameliorate its 
response not only to the demands of the international and national capital, 
but it had to contend with the divergent expectations both from the 
burgeoning indigenous entrepreneur groups for the increased economic 
space and from the general population seeking at least tolerable living and 
working conditions (Dansereau 2000). It was apparent that the institution 
paramount to tackle such problems was the state. The state had to play a 
key role in this anticipated development because of the deep inequalities left 
behind by the colonial state coupled with high expectations of the 
Zimbabwean population. Sibudubudu (2002) also points out that the post-
colonial state assumed a fundamental position because the historical 
experience made it unlikely that the market forces which had shaped the 
underdevelopment and exclusion phase would reverse themselves once 
independence was attained without the state playing a key role in coercing 
change. 
Against this background, the state became central to most Zimbabweans‟ 
goals to succeed, and the political power was considered as the apparatus 
with which the development and personal opportunities for jobs and upward 
mobility would be accomplished. It is argued by Mokoli (1992) that the people 
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of Zimbabwe perceived the state as the machinery and the road to 
prosperity. Eventually the state became the means to promote private wealth 
for the ruling elite. It is this limitless expectation of the ruling ZANU-PF 
government to intervene in the economy to redistribute entitlements and to 
provide jobs, loans, contracts, business licences and favours through political 
patronage that drove them to enrich themselves in a corrupt fashion.  
The prospects of the state playing a leading role in directing the economic, 
social and political affairs together with the independence promises put a 
huge weight on the new state (Donna 1998). The independence pledges 
resulted in an excessively extended state in terms of its functions. 
Consequently, the state became the largest employer and emerged as the 
most powerful institution in Zimbabwean society (Mokoli 1992).  It grew in 
size and scale because of its political and economic preferences.  This 
provided the ZANU-PF-led government with the fundamental opportunity to 
maintain both the political and economic control and to a larger extent 
achieve remarkable wealth through a system of corrupt practices.   
The state has become an important source of resources as well as power to 
the ruling government. This has seen Zimbabwe gradually transform into a 
centralised, authoritarian and prebendal state based on personal rule 
(Tordoff 1993) and patronage and clientelist politics (Allen 1995 and Szeftel 
2000b). Nicholls et al  (2006) label Zimbabwe as a „kleptocracy state‟ where 
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the government has institutionalised theft at its heart.2 Bureaucrats and the 
civil servants recognised the importance of employment in the government 
sector which bestowed important privileges on them. The nationalist leaders 
became aware that political influence and personal wealth leaned heavily on 
the economic and political power with which without it none could 
accumulate wealth. As state resources diminished and became scarce, 
competition in the form of corruption among the ruling elite increased. This 
explains the emergence of a one-party state in the 1980s advocated by 
ZANU-PF in its ideological system that would eliminate rivals for the 
influence and consolidation of the governing party over the state resources 
and take them out of the „spoils politics‟ equation. Moyo (1993) explains  the 
one-party state adopted by ZANU-PF as an attempt to regulate competition 
and conflict over the division of spoils, a  desire for self-enrichment through 
political office. 
Within a decade after independence the state failed to sustain itself and 
lacked the capacity and sufficient resources to meet the demands placed on 
it by independence. Callaghy (1987) argues that high birth rates, increased 
education, rapid urbanisation and the expectations of rapid change strained 
the state and its liberal democratic structures. The institutions the state 
inherited at independence were designed to meet the limited economic 
                                                                 
 
 
 
2
 This is a form of political and government corruption where the government exists to increase the 
personal wealth and political power of its officials and the ruling elite at the expense of the wider 
population. This is often achieved by the embezzlement of state funds and resources. 
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interests of the colonial state. They were planned for the exploitation of 
export products and not to accommodate the democratic demands grafted 
onto it by independence (Szeftel 1998).  
In the race to meet the demands of the people and distribute the state 
resources by the ruling government, Zimbabwe shifted from a bureaucratic 
administrative system that emphasised good governance to the sovereignty 
of politics and this according to Hope (2000), led to a politicised bureaucracy 
who engaged in the centralised economic decision-making and 
patrimonialism. Sibudubudu (2002) argues that this comes with extremely 
frail formal institutions, personalised rule and prevalent clientelistic networks. 
The government of Zimbabwe dominates the state apparatus. Officials who 
occupy bureaucratic positions do so less to perform public service than to 
obtain private riches at the expense of the state. Tizor (2009) argues that the 
bureaucrats enjoy access to a range of forms of illicit rents, prebends, and 
petty corruption which constitute important entitlement of office. ZANU-PF 
undermines the effectiveness of the state administration by using it for 
“systematic patronage and clientelist practices in order to maintain political 
order” (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002: 25). Furthermore, political 
mobilisation in Zimbabwe was founded on a system of clientelist politics. This 
gave birth to parallel and unofficial structures such as Zimbabwe Liberations 
War Veterans Association (ZLWVA) (Mhanda 2011), and the Youth Militia (a 
group of people used by ZANU-PF to advance its political agenda) that also 
hold more power and authority on behalf of the ruling party than the formal 
administration (Bratton and van de Walle 1999 and Bracking 2009). This is 
seen by political commentators such as Makumbe (2011) as a form of 
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corruption that has come out of politicisation of the state by ZANU-PF. In 
return for showing the loyalty to the political elite these supporters gain 
access to the state resources, are awarded a range of payoffs, including 
jobs, loans, immunity to state laws and embezzlement of the state resources 
as sources of wealth accumulation (Robinson 1993 and Sibudubudu 2002). 
Drawing on this, the chapter is compelled to agree with Sibudubudu (2002 
and Szeftel (2000b) that clientelism promotes a form of factional competition 
which encourages the plundering of the state resources. 
ZANU-PF has successfully used the system of patronage and clientelism as 
a political tool in mobilising the poli tical support in exchange for access to 
state resources. The failure of ESAP in the early 1990s left the state on a 
weak economic foundation and the government who had assumed the role of 
the state failed to meet the demands of its clients. As the state resources 
shrank due to high demands of scarce commodities and competing factions 
of the ruling government, thus ESAP became a source of political corruption 
(Bond 1998). This economic crisis intensified corruption.  
The state controls imports and export licenses, access to foreign exchange, 
government grants and loans, and the payment of duties and taxes. This 
makes it an important institution for the party to control. The state generates 
capital that ZANU-PF government uses to obtain and maintain the regime 
security and also provides the framework through which these resources can 
be channelled to the regime‟s supporters. Doig (2006) argues that the state 
is a provider and an allocator of services and functions such as education, 
health and various lucrative contracts. It is this standpoint which makes the 
state a source of attraction to the ruling party. 
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The significance of the state on the economy makes corruption a tragedy in 
its effects on development. In the context of Zimbabwe, corruption is 
embedded in the politics of the state. Private wealth accumulation of the 
ruling elite is dependent on state power and access to state resources. 
Clientelism has been utilised as a vehicle of mobilising the political support 
by ZANU-PF. This presents a rise in competition for the state and public 
resources which leads to looting of the state resources. The following section 
examines state institutions and how corruption manifests itself within these 
institutions. 
2.3.2 Corruption in state institutions in Zimbabwe 
 
To understand Zimbabwe‟s state institutions, reference must be made to the 
structures inherited from the colonial settlers at independence. Between 
1923 and 1979 the settler administration bui lt a domineering state (Bratton 
and Masunungure 2011) with the objective of protecting the welfare of a 
racially defined ruling minority against the interests of a black majority 
population. The state institutions such as the judiciary and the police force 
were structured in a way that supported and protected the ruling colonial 
government (Gatsheni 2010). At independence the new government 
inherited a state that deeply infiltrated politics, economy and the society that 
offered various instruments of illegal accumulation and predatory rule. 
According to Uneke (2010), weak institutional structures adopted at 
independence gave the public officials almost unrestricted authority to 
intervene in the private economic activities and politicise the way public 
resources were allocated. Mawowa (2007) and Uneke (2010) argue that this 
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aided the emergence of corruption as a lucrative growth industry to those in 
positions of power. Political institutions shape the environment in which 
economic activities take place. Particular aspects of this understanding are 
the characteristics of the political system. Political corruption is often part of a 
set of exchanges within patron-client networks through which the incumbent 
elite constructs political compromises with the clients who would otherwise  
threaten the political stability of the system (Szeftel 1998). Since 
independence ZANU-PF has captured the rural traditional leaders (the 
influential vi llage chiefs) through the distribution of luxury vehicles, farms and 
putting them on the payroll as a way of gaining rural electoral support 
through their influence as village leaders. 
When corruption is systemic, political repression and suppression of the 
political opposition and regime critics becomes the most characteristic 
feature of the political life (Makumbe 1994 and Nyarota 2009). This has led 
to police and military interventions in the political process of the country, with 
the MDC supporters recently becoming targets of political violence, torture 
and discrimination (Bracking 2009). As a result, Zimbabwe‟s political and 
economic development process and stability has been impaired. 
Doig (2006) argues that since independence ZANU-PF has dominated major 
state institutions and manipulates them for partisan purposes. The civil 
service, officials in law enforcement and state security, armed forces and the 
judicial system have been turned into ZANU-PF functionaries. Doig argues 
that: 
“Most senior army, civi l servants and police posts were 
opened to party members who in turn had access to the deals 
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and contracts that were perks of office but also cemented 
their loyalty to the regime” (2006: 36). 
Most of these assimilated members particularly in law and justice systems 
have been largely involved in corrupt conducts. In addition, Sokwanele 
(2009) argues that they are responsible for the „mess‟ Zimbabwe is in. 
Consequently, this has led to the inflation of contracts and economic 
mismanagement which has seen the channelling of scarce state resources 
into uneconomic projects at the expense of more vital infrastructure projects 
as a result of the breakdown of rule of law. This has distorted competition 
and fair market structures, deterring both local and foreign domestic 
investments. 
Pepys (2000) argues that corruption within the justice system is a serious 
crime because it is the institution designed to correct the injustices of the 
society. It is a serious crime that “results in the improper delivery of judicial 
services and protection for citizens” (Pepys 2000: 13). Corruption in 
Zimbabwe has infected justice and law institutions in which the powerful and 
the wealthy can escape arrest, prosecution and conviction through literally 
„buying justice‟ (Tizor 2009), whereas the underprivileged are excluded from 
their rightful access to a fair justice service. Chief actors in this trap include 
the judges, public prosecutors, the police, court clerks and the prison 
wardens. Munakiri (2009) and Tizor (2009) argue that for a good bribe the 
Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) can hold back files of reports, distort, or 
destroy evidence. For the right price they can completely destroy a case file.  
In some cases they do not bother to investigate or worse, even protect the 
alleged perpetrators if they are politically influential or wealthy. Tizor (2009) 
points out that corruption within the civil processes are widespread because 
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prosecutors and court clerks have powers to speed up or delay a case. Tizor 
argues that some cases do not go to court as they are unlawfully settled by 
police officers without the knowledge of the magistrate or judge. 
The judiciary‟s responsibility is to protect human rights and civil liberties by 
guaranteeing the right to a fair trial by a competent and impartial tribunal 
(Newburn 1999, Ayres 1999, and Tizor 2009). By right, the public is entitled 
to equal access to the court of law and equal treatment of the investigative 
bodies and prosecutorial authorities regardless of their political affiliation and 
position in the society. 
Freille (2007) demonstrates that weak state institutions such as corrupt 
police force and the judicial system encourage corruption. They encourage 
corruption as lack of punishment of offenders encourages offences while  
making pillaging the state resources more likely. According to Tizor (2009), 
the judiciary in Zimbabwe has lost both its independence and ability to 
prosecute and give deserving sentences to those individuals involved in 
corrupt practices, particularly the ruling elite and the wealthy. The legislative 
framework and the judicial system of Zimbabwe cannot be viewed as 
inadequate and/or too weak to give corruption an extended ground to thrive; 
but it is rather suggested by Tizor (2009) and Makumbe (2011) that they are 
just corrupt and therefore cannot be trusted to combat corruption. This is 
influenced by political interferences (Tizor 2009). Rose-Ackerman argues 
that “... a politically dependent judiciary can facilitate high-level corruption” 
(1999: 151).  
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When the judiciary is part of the corrupt system, those with means to pay 
bribes operate with impunity, confident that a well-placed payoff will deal with 
any legal problems. Kpunde (2000b) interprets this school of thought from 
the perspective of interest oriented actors. This suggests that most of the 
political and economic actors prefer to have judiciary institutions that work in 
favour of their special interests. Drawing on this perspective, an interest-
based understanding of politics is simply not a good solution to the problem 
of how impartial and uncorrupted government institutions can be created in 
Zimbabwe. 
Goredema (2001) argues that Zimbabwe‟s judiciary system is by and large 
competent and credible, but Tizor (2009) rejects this claim arguing that 
concerns have been raised about the alarming role of ZANU-PF‟s influence, 
interference and its manner in appointing the ruling party members to the 
judiciary positions who consequently become partisans. Certainly, the 
Attorney-General has not been independent of the ruling party influence. 
There are cases such as with the WVCF in which non deserving 
beneficiaries, most of them high-ranking members of the executive, have 
been in prosecution boxes, but the prosecution‟s ability to exercise a free 
hand has been ineffectual. Other examples include cases such as the 
Willowgate scandal in which high profile political leaders have been involved 
in grand corruption but managed to escape censure. The Presidential pardon 
of the Willowgate car scandal in 1988 demonstrates how the legal system is 
guarded by the ruling party. In the case of the Willowgate car scandal 
Nyarota (2006) argues that the courage of the President in setting up the 
resulting Sandura Commission of enquiry was supposed to be matched by 
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the freedom with which the investigations, the media and the enquiry would 
operate. Only then the nation would be sure that the prosecution results will 
leave them a cleaner nation. However, Ministers found guilty and charged by 
the Commission were immediately granted a Presidential pardon. The 
President undermined the work of the Sandura Commission, the judiciary‟s 
effectiveness and the investigative abilities by pardoning those found guilty. 
In many corruption scandals that were to follow where Ministers were 
implicated, their cases were not investigated. This reinforces Nicholls et al  
(2006) and Tizor (2009) who suggest that with political connection to the 
ruling party one is guaranteed immunity from persecution no matter how 
guilty one is.  
Svensson (2005) concurs with other scholars such as Szeftel (2000b) who 
argue that corruption is an outcome and a reflection of a country‟s legal, 
economic, cultural and political institutions. Corruption is not an independent 
phenomenon, but a sign of broader governance problems. Zimbabwe‟s 
political, economic and social crisis is seen as the outcome of the follies of its 
governors who, having weakened the judiciary system and abused their 
political power for their own benefits, have squandered their colonial 
inheritance and restricted their subjects from equal benefits. Furthermore, 
political and economic corruption can get interlocked since the resources to 
finance political corruption are often generated from the national economy. 
There is, therefore, a destructive vicious circle in which corruption and the 
economy, corruption and judiciary, and police force weaknesses feed off 
each other and the cost of corruption becomes enormous. 
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While economists have looked at the economic incentives which state 
intervention creates for some types of corruption (Sibudubudu 2002), they 
have typically not looked closely at the political conditions which also 
generate incentives for a related political corruption. Political corruption in 
Zimbabwe has often been an unavoidable part of maintaining political control 
in the unstable political environments in which Zimbabwe finds itself. An 
analysis of corruption which incorporates the political dimension is important 
in this thesis for the reason that this approach allows us to critically evaluate 
civil society‟s relationship with the state in fighting corruption, and it is this 
which particularly interests this thesis. 
Political corruption undermines the political legitimacy and democracy as this 
creates instability. It embeds authoritarianism and the arbitrary use of power. 
Political corruption comprises a handicap to the democratic processes and 
institutions. It usually flourishes in situations where institutional checks and 
accountabilities are absent or weak. Bad leadership, together with the 
absence of a punishment system through which a framework of controlling 
corruption would have been instituted, has made possible the tragedy of 
corrupt enrichment and wastage of public resources (Uneke 2010).   
According to Mbaku (1992), corruption is related to the concept of exchange 
derived from the theory of the market. Mbaku argues that civi l servants, 
bureaucrats and the incumbents view their public office as an enterprise from 
which to extract extra-income. In an economy pervaded by high levels of 
government regulations, government employees devote some of their time 
and effort to assisting entrepreneurs in evading state laws and statutes in 
order to supplement their low salaries. In exchange, they are paid extra-
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income for the assistance rendered. Tizor (2009) argues that the civil 
servants have continued to receive very low salaries (table 2), which has 
forced them to supplement their salaries through corrupt activities. The 
question that arises is: Can low salaries explain the bureaucratic corruption 
in Zimbabwe? 
With the very low salaries, the majority of bureaucrats have sought ways of 
sustaining themselves. The principal way is through corruption, perhaps 
more accurately, clientelism, a kind of “Tammany Hall” style patronage, 
dependent on personal, family, and similar networks of interest (Davidson 
2005: 10).3  In so far as it is a system, corruption has become a way of life. 
However, given the fact that the Willowgate car scandal and the WVCF was 
dominated by the Ministers and Members of Parliament (MP), Nyarota 
(2006) suggests that these people came from the war in 1980 without 
anything (materially). Almost everyone expected too much from the state. 
The very success and impetus of anti-colonial struggles certainly gave 
strength to these expectations. With this in mind, they wanted to benefit from 
the state‟s resources and the opportunity presented itself in the form of the 
Willowvale car enterprise and the WVCF. It is debatable whether their 
                                                                 
 
 
 
3
 Tammany Hall was the name given to a powerful political organisation that essential ly ran New 
York City in the 19th century. Corruption in the administration of the organisation of the City 
became a running theme of the Tammany organisation. Corruption ran throughout New York law 
enforcement, legal and political systems, judges, lawyers and politicians. Family, relatives and 
friendship ties mattered most in administrative favours (Riper, P. (1983) The American 
Administrative State: An unorthodox view, New York; E.P. Dutton. 
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salaries were too minimal to satisfy and match their liberation struggle‟s 
contribution or too high and influenced them to buy luxury vehicles.  
However, drawing on table 2.1, there are other civil servants whose salaries 
were far below those of Ministers and MPs but were not part of the 
Willowgate scandal. This could be explained by the fact that they did not 
have access to the resources unlike the Ministers and MPs who through their 
offices were privileged to access the resources directly. Other civil servants, 
except for editors of the state-owned newspapers, were getting low wages 
which could not afford them vehicles. This supports Mauro‟s (2004) 
argument that too high salaries can also influence corruption rather than 
preventing it as demonstrated by Cabinet Ministers and MPs in the 
Willowgate car scandal.  
In developing a common understanding and approach to corruption as a 
practice, this thesis identifies different forms of corruption prevalent in 
Zimbabwe which the elite and bureaucrats engage in. The following section 
takes a close look at these forms and types. 
2.3.3 Forms and typologies of Corruption prevalent in Zimbabwe  
 
Doig and Theobold (1993), Rose-Ackerman (1997), and Goudie and 
Stasavage (2004) use a variety of approaches to analyse and explain the 
discourses of corruption, its nature, causality and consequences. Their 
approaches to analysing corruption rely on adopting economic, social, and 
political understanding of the parties involved in corruption.  
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In explaining and analysing corruption, this thesis details the basic elements 
involved, and moves on to explain the way in which the external and internal 
factors at the national and institutional levels determine the actions of players 
involved in corruption. Drawing on the identified forms, there is what Goudie 
and Stasavage (2004) call the „principal‟ and the „agent‟ for the corrupt 
behaviour to occur. 
The principal refers to the highest level of government, for example, 
politicians and government Ministers and MPs. The agents are government 
officials employed to fulfil a specific role, such as civi l servants. The basic 
premise rests on defining who plays the role of the principal and who the 
agent is. Although this model suits examples of corrupt activities by the 
officials, definitions should be adjusted when applied to scenarios of high-
level corruption. In this situation, the general public become the principal and 
the agent role is adopted by any government official who perpetrates the act. 
If this approach is examined in more detail, several areas are found to have 
influence over the actions of the agent in perpetrating corrupt acts. These are 
said to occur at the institutional level, the national level, including at 
international level. 
Corruption may exist in one or many forms, or in a more complex 
combination, at various levels of administration with varying degrees of 
acceptance of the population subject to the corrupt institutions (Rose-
Ackerman 1997, Klitgaard 1988, and Obayelu 2007). Uneke (2010) argues 
that in terms of organisation and structure, the form of corruption can take 
place in a vertical way where it links subordinates and superiors in a system 
of payoffs. It can also be structured horizontally where it connects several 
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agencies or branches of the government in a web of dishonesty. This 
involves collective abuse by public officials through embezzlement and 
nepotism as it links up private and public sectors through bribery, extortion 
and fraud. Corruption manifests itself in many forms. Figure 2.1 shows the 
most common forms of corruption prevalent in Zimbabwe. 
  
Figure 2.1 Forms of corruption prevalent in Zimbabwe 
Source: Makumbe (2009) 
 
This thesis places institutional level conditions into four distinct areas as key 
determinants of the way in which corruption progresses in Zimbabwe. The 
first relates to relationships between the government and the civil service, the 
second focuses on the judicial system, the third relates to civil society. The 
final arena concerns the government‟s approach to economic development 
(David 2005 and Jaques 2006). 
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Falola (2008) argues that the approach taken by the Zimbabwe government 
with regards to civil servants‟ salaries influences the prevalence of corrupt 
activities. David (2005), Jaques (2006), and Falola (2008) concur that civil 
servants get meagre salaries which drive them to seek extra income from 
services they provide. During the 1990s civil servants' wages had fallen to 
below the levels at independence, and by 2000 approximately eighty per 
cent of civil servants were said to be living below the poverty datum line 
(Dansereau 2000). Demonstrations by the public sector employees at the 
end of the 1990s reflected a growing dissatisfaction with the government with 
demands for increased salaries and improved economic conditions. The 
tables below show civil servants‟ salaries between 1984 and 1990, and 
immediately after the formation of Government of National Unity (GNU) 
following a protracted political and economic crisis between 2000 and 2008. 
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Table 2.1: Zimbabwe civil servants‟ salaries for 1984-1990 
Zimbabwe’s civil servants’ annual earnings, 1984 – 1990 
Sector 1984 1986 1988 1990 
The editors (state 
papers) 
Z$5,500 $5,500 $5,700 $5,900 
Ministers and MPs Z$4,200 $4,200 $4,400 $4,500 
Magistrates/prosecutors Z$3,500 $3,500 $3,600 $3,700 
Nurses Z$3,400 $3,400 $3,500 $3,700 
Police force Z$3,100 $3,300 $3,300 $3,500 
Teachers Z$3,200 $3,200 $3,300 $3,500 
Army Z$3,400 $3,600 $4,100 $4,100 
Source: Author‟s version based on figures collected during fieldwork 
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Table 2.1.1: Zimbabwe civil servants salaries after the economy recovered 
following political and economic crisis, 2009 to 2011 
Zimbabwe’s civil servants’ annual earnings, 2009 -2011 
Sector 
 
2009 2010 2011 
The editors 
 
US$2,000 US$5,000 US$8,000 
Ministers and MPs 
 
US$2,000 US$4,000 US$6,400 
Magistrates/prosecutors 
 
US$1,800 US$3,500 US$4,700 
Nurses 
 
US$1,800 US$3,000 US$4,500 
Police force 
 
US$1,800 US$3,100 US$4,500 
Army US$1,800 US$3,300 US$4,800 
Teachers 
 
US$1,800 US$3,000 US$4,500 
Source: Author‟s version based on figures collected during fieldwork 
Transparency International (TI) (2000) rejects David (2005), Jaques (2006), 
and Falola‟s (2008) argument that poor civil servants‟ salaries are a cause of 
corruption. TI (2000) argues that the poor salaries are not the major cause of 
corruption in Zimbabwe because it is those in high offices who perpetuate 
corruption. While low salaries may act as incentives to engage in corrupt 
activities, they do not account for the fact that much of the highly damaging 
corruption that occurred, and still remains visible in Zimbabwe, is a result of 
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the actions of those powerful ruling elites who are already receiving high 
salaries. Examples would include the Willowgate scandal in which several 
government Ministers such as Maurice Nyagumbo, Enos Nkala, Sydney 
Sekeramai, to mention a few, were receiving high salaries compared to other 
civil servants (figure 2.1) as Ministers and occupied strong positions of 
political influence but easily abused trust for their private gain (The Chronicle 
1987).  The former Minister of Finance, Chris Karuneri, who embezzled one 
hundred and fifty million dollars (US$) from the state, and the Minister of 
Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development, Ignatius Chombo, 
who is alleged to be owning four farms, numerous businesses and more than 
twenty houses (ACTSA 2012) have succumbed to corruption despite owning 
several business empires. Therefore, the argument pointing at low salaries 
as a cause of corruption in Zimbabwe is no longer robust despite petty 
corruption going on within public service institutions.  
The strength of the linkages between civil service and political parties in 
Zimbabwe is highly debated by Falola (2008). Falola argues that ZANU-PF‟s 
political appointments are made from the civil service. Examples include 
Anias Chigwedere, who was elevated from being an education officer, to 
eventually become Minister of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture in 2001.  
At institutional level, Goudie and Stasavage (2004) suggest three aspects of 
institutional organisation that influence the extent to which officials engage in 
corrupt activities. Firstly, it lies in the degree of monopoly of power held by 
public officials. Such officials include those from various departments 
processing and issuing mandatory documents such as passports, driving 
licenses, business contracts etc. and other departments such as the 
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Immigration and Customs, education and health. Officials from these 
departments have solitary responsibility for the provisions of goods or 
services. They are in positions where goods and services may be in short 
supply, or may have created this shortage themselves to benefit out of this 
shortage. Nicholls et al (2006: 147) refer to this as “corruption without theft”, 
the shortage creates higher demand consequently raising the prices the 
official can demand. The official transfers the customary sum of money to the 
government, but an excess will be kept. For instance, the Minister of Finance 
Mr Tendai Biti (cited in Bulawayo24news, 13 May 2013) raises concerns that 
the Ministry of Home Affairs and every department in it are not remitting to 
Treasury. The passport office is said to collect an average of one and half 
million dollars (US$) a month but they only remit eight hundred dollars, while 
traffic police collect two million dollars (US$) a month from roadblocks with 
only less than a million remitted to the Treasury. Biti argues that the rest is 
kept by the corrupt elite. 
Secondly, the institutional factor relates to the degree of discretionary 
influence held by the public officials (Falola 2008). In institutions where the 
agent is given many powers over the supply of government goods or 
services, the opportunity for engaging in corrupt conducts rises. For 
example, such institutions include the Zimbabwe Inland Revenue Authority 
(ZIMRA) and other departments already listed here.  
Thirdly, opportunities for the agent to abuse their position and engage in 
corrupt activities are higher in those institutions where there is little or no 
transparency, where suitable systems of monitoring and accountability are 
not in place (Nicholls et al 2006). Without checks and balances agents are 
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not held accountable for their actions, and this gives them extra incentives to 
continue to engage in activities that do not benefit the institution.  
The third institutional factor according to Goudie and Stasavage (2004) rests 
with the relationship between the government and the legal bodies that 
operate within the state. Three specific areas of concern are identified: firstly, 
the independence of the judiciary from the government, secondly, the 
efficiency of the legal bodies in enforcing the law and morality, and the 
organization of those bodies concerned with direct enforcement of the law, 
and thirdly, the freedom of expression bestowed to the media and the pub lic. 
Scholars, socio-economic and political analysts agree that to a great extent 
these factors play a major role in determining how corruption manifests itself 
within different institutions. 
Having explained the notion of principal and agent in the discourse of 
corruption, the following section outlines and analyses the types of corruption 
ensuing in Zimbabwe. These are: systemic corruption; grand and political 
corruption, and bureaucratic or petty corruption. There are several types of 
corruption but this thesis has interest on the listed three types.  
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2.3.3.1 Systemic or endemic corruption in Zimbabwe  
 
Figure 2.2: Types of corruption prevalent in Zimbabwe 
Source: Based on report by Transparency International-Zimbabwe (2010) 
Systemic corruption is when corruption is an integrated and crucial aspect of 
the social, political and economic system when it is embedded in a wider 
situation that helps sustain it (Byrne 2007). Systemic corruption is when 
processes of the state and key institutions are: 
“Routinely dominated and used by corrupt individuals and 
groups, and in which many people have few practical 
alternatives to dealing with corrupt officials” (Johnston 1997). 
In the context of Zimbabwe, systemic corruption is so difficult to combat 
because it is embedded in a wider economic and political situation that 
sustains it. Within it are other types of corruption that nurture themselves 
through systemic corruption (figure 2.3). The relationships between systemic 
corruption and the broader state of the situation or environment are 
reciprocal. Corruption contributes to weakening competitive processes and 
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major institutions, delays and distorts socio-economic and political 
development (Johnston 1997) because that environment renders people 
more vulnerable to corrupt exploitation as they are dependent upon its 
bureaucratic recompenses in the absence of better economic opportunities 
and therefore less able to resist it. 
Systemic corruption is generally brought about, encouraged and promoted 
by political and socio-economic factors. It occurs where bribery on a large 
scale is routine. Nicholls et al (2006) argue that in many cases causes are 
brought about by the inefficiency of the civil service, high demand for 
services and laxity in political and economic systems, and a shortage of 
basic commodities. The collapse of the economy from the year 2000 to 2008 
led to widespread instances of corruption as the public adopted every means 
for survival due to shortages of basic commodities and high inflation. 
Between the years of 1991 and 1995 ESAP caused massive economic 
difficulties to a large number of the population. In addition to the effects of 
ESAP, Zimbabwe witnessed a prolonged drought which resulted in massive 
shortages of the basic commodities. The drought worsened the country‟s 
economic crisis adding misery on top of what ESAP had caused. 
Consequently, corruption became a survival means for many people as the 
scramble for the diminishing basic commodities increased. 
Nicholls et al (2006: 4) argue that systemic corruption flourishes where 
institutions are weak, and is strongly related to poor governance where there 
are “inadequate legislative controls, no independent judiciary and where 
independent media and civil society agencies are absent or not effective”. It 
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follows then to point out that systemic corruption has permeated 
Zimbabwean political, social and economic institutions with equal measure. It 
is no longer restricted to a few dishonest individuals as traditionally narrated 
in the literature (Chabal and Daloz 1999). In this system, corruption has 
become an acceptable culture of doing everyday business in the country. 
This is further emphasised by Tendai Biti (Zimbabwe‟s Minister of Finance) 
who when asked about what the government was doing to contain 
corruption, admitted that the government has failed to do anything  
(newzimbabwe.com  2010), which explains why corruption has become a 
tradition of doing everyday business. This draws us to argue that Zimbabwe 
has legitimised corruption and the culture of impunity.  
Cultural theorists such as Ellis (2001) and Robinson (2004) contend that 
systemic corruption is embedded in Zimbabwe‟s socio-political structures. Its 
values and social organisations are normative traits that are conducive for 
corruption to thrive. Supporting Ellis and Robinson is Gatsheni (2011) who 
argues that Zimbabwe‟s cultural mode of social relations of kinship and the 
extended family system encourages patron-client relations in which the 
political power is habitually misappropriated to benefit the family, group, 
political and ethnic ties. Top civil servants and the private sector executives 
seem to put the family and personal welfare first, political and ethnic interests 
second and the corporate interests last. The President is the prime example; 
he has filled top military, security, and the ZRP posts with his close allies 
(Sokwanele 2000, and Financial Gazette, 2002). Corruption thrives in this 
social milieu. 
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The issue of culture in corruption is widely debated by several commentators 
such as Makumbe (1994), Nyarota (2006), and Shana (2006) arguing that 
corruption has become a culture in Zimbabwe. However, this perspective is 
criticised by Mamdani (2008) and Gatsheni (2011) who point out that what 
becomes significant is to look at the way in which a culture of corruption can 
emerge. This rests on the idea that persistent corruption can become so 
entrenched in everyday life that the systemic argument takes on a new form. 
This highlights the manifestation of the prevalent practices such as 
patronage and nepotism. They suggest that if activities such as nepotism 
and patronage were such important cultural factors, there would be no 
reason for these practices to be illegal at all.  
It is, however, interesting to observe that whilst critics suggest that systemic 
corruption results from the traditional cultural practices, many scholars, 
commentators and the public often cite corruption as a consequence of the 
political and economic structures that play a major role in its proliferation 
(Szeftel 2000b). However, whichever way it is looked at, corruption is a major 
factor in hindering Zimbabwe‟s economic development (Makumbe 1994, 
Shana 2006, Munakiri 2009 and TI 2010). If corruption is such a culturally 
accepted practice, it is doubtful that the general public, scholars, social and 
political commentators would demonstrate such concern. Ellis argues that if 
corrupt activities were indeed a cultural phenomenon, there would be no 
need for the “actions of the corrupt officials to be shrouded in secrecy” (2001: 
74). 
Chabal and Daloz (1999) argue that systemic corruption is a routine aspect 
of many of the African social systems. They argue that systemic corruption is 
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merely seen and understood as part of a complex network of redistribution 
driven by particularistic social pressure for a selfish additional source of 
income. Chabal and Daloz (1999) and Chikulo (2000) understand systemic 
corruption as an integral part of the fabric of social life. It is understood as a 
habitual part of everyday life and an expected element of everyday social 
transaction. 
The procurement of the public goods and services is an important factor in 
the discourse of systemic corruption because this is where the public and the 
private sector corruption meet through the awarding of contracts, tenders, 
services and favours. The bureaucrats and incumbents feature regularly in 
the independent print media in Zimbabwe such as The Daily News, The 
Zimbabwe Independent, The Standard, and The Financial Gazette creating 
an impression that they are the drivers of corruption. Goredema (2001) 
posits that this leaves us with questions arising about the structures of the 
state and the government, the integrity of the public sector functionaries, the 
capacity of the non-state sector and the direction and capability of the law 
enforcement institutions. 
The patronage system of “Big Man-Small Boy” politics (Chabal and Daloz 
1999: 87) was institutionalised during the colonial period as a way to govern 
through the chiefs and headmen, but still remains salient in contemporary 
Zimbabwean politics, which to a great extent contributes to corrupt practices 
(Le Vine 1980, and Nugent 1995). Gatsheni (2010) argues that the ZANU-
PF-led government borrowed the same systems by strengthening its 
relations with traditional chiefs as a way of monitoring and capturing rural 
electoral support.  
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Following an argument by Chabal and Daloz (1999), the ethnic based 
patron-clientelism and „prebendalism‟ gives the office holders and the 
bureaucrats the opportunity to use official decisions as vehicles for personal 
or clan enrichment. The case of Matabeleland as a  marginalised region 
testifies Chabal and Daloz‟s argument. The region has not been developed 
as much as other regions (Sokwanele 2008), purely for political reasons 
because it is perceived to be anti-ZANU-PF (Bracking 2009 and Matshazi  
2009). The viewpoint is that Matabeleland is a strong hold of PF-ZAPU and 
the MDC political parties opposing the ruling party. Consequently, the ruling 
government has isolated Matabeleland from the national development 
programmes. Where the government pledges to carry out a development 
project, it collapses or is never implemented. The Matabeleland Zambezi 
Water Project (MZWP) has taken nearly thirty years to take off having been 
proposed and initiated in the year 1982.4 People from Matabeleland view the 
government‟s procrastination as political punishment (Sokwanele 2004). This 
has led to de-industrialisation of the city with many industries relocating to 
Harare, a situation that worsens unemployment in Matabeleland.  As a result, 
the people of Matabeleland have continued to call for devolution of power 
and cessation measures to help the region out of the „de-development‟ 
government agenda. 
                                                                 
 
 
 
4
 The MZWP is a project that was proposed by the government in 1982 to end the perennial water 
shortages faced by Zimbabwe’s second city of Bulawayo by bringing water from the mighty Zambezi 
River to the city. 
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The next section looks at grand and political corruption and how it has 
affected Zimbabwe. 
2.3.3.2 Grand and political corruption in Zimbabwe 
 
Grand and political corruptions go hand in hand. These involve high level 
corruption which involves political decision-makers. Political or grand 
corruption takes place at the high levels of the political system when 
politicians and state agents entitled to make and enforce the laws in the 
name of the people are using their authority to sustain their power, status 
and wealth (Byrne 2007). Consequently, this leads to the misallocation of 
resources and perverts the manner in which decisions are made. In political 
corruption, in particular, the laws and regulations are abused by the rulers, 
ignored, side-stepped, and tailored to benefit their interests. According to 
Byrne (2007) and Rose-Ackerman (1994), grand corruption is at the top 
levels of the public sphere, where rules and policies are formulated in the 
first place.  
Rose-Ackerman, a prominent guru in corruption studies, defines  grand 
corruption as “the misuse of public power by the Heads of the state, 
Ministers and senior government officials for private pecuniary gain” (1994: 
83). It arises mostly where high officials have great influence and power over 
the granting of large public contracts to i ndividuals, agents or companies for 
a commission. Political elites exploit their political power to make economic 
policies that benefit them as individuals at the expense of the public. This 
form of corruption is exemplified by four high-profile cases. Firstly, the 
Minister of Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development, Mr 
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Ignatius Chombo, whose company Augur Investment was controversially and 
corruptly awarded contracts to construct the Harare Airport road and Joshua 
Mqabuko Airport in Bulawayo (Musanzikwa 2012). Secondly, Anias 
Chigwedere, the former Minister of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture, who 
is also a Zimbabwean historian whose four series of history text books 
(Dynamics of History 1- 4) are „compulsorily‟  used as regulated history books 
for highs schools (Sokwanele 2006). As a Minister overseeing education 
administration, he used his influence to recommend his books for the 
national school history syllabus. In such decisions a conflict of interests is 
clear. 
A thirdly example involved vice President, Joice Mujuru. She allocated her 
company the contract to make and print new number plates for all vehicles 
replacing the old number plate system (newzimbawe.com 2010 and 
Sokwanele (2008). The vice President used the company she owns to 
misappropriate state resources to enrich herself having proposed to update 
the vehicle registration process (Parliamentary Debates, 23 October 2002). 
This demonstrates that in Zimbabwe the political elite can change either the 
national policies or their implementation to serve their own interests at the  
tax payers‟ cost (Donna  1998 and Nyarota 2004). Hope (2000) argues that 
politicians serving as wealth brokers easily obtain the resources they need to 
purchase influence, security, power, wealth and continue to monopolise the 
supply of legislation.  
A fourth example involved the former Minister of Finance, Chris Karuneri, 
who embezzled one hundred and fifty million dollars (US$) from the state 
treasury through externalising the foreign currency between 2002 and 2004 
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when the state desperately needed foreign currency for development 
purposes during his term of office (newzimbabwe.com, 2008). As selected 
officials or in the government‟s role of benevolent social guardians, 
politicians are supposed to make resource allocation decisions based 
exclusively upon the interest of their people. Therefore, there are several 
questions that are of interest in this thesis that have to be addressed.  
1. What explains this „greediness‟ from the ruling party?  
2. How did this come about?  
3. Where did the liberators go wrong?  
4. Do the leaders care about the development of Zimbabwe more than 
their personal enrichment? 
This chapter interrogates these questions to explain manifestations of grand 
and political corruption in Zimbabwe. Without any doubt, the desire for wealth 
accumulation by politicians and legislators supply some answers to the 
questions, and have their abrasive part in the story. While ZANU-PF‟s 
corrupt conduct is always the spotlight, this can seldom reveal the root of the 
matter. Primarily, this is a crisis of institutions as argued earlier in this 
chapter. 
Statistics show that between the years 1990 and 1998 grand and political 
corruption cost Zimbabwe an estimated six billion dollars (BBC 2009). The 
figure is not restricted to money but includes the lost opportunities for 
investments, human capital, trade and other necessary projects for national 
development diverted to individual projects. 
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The Society of Advanced Legal Studies, Anti-Corruption Working Group 
(cited in Nicholls et al  2006) point out that grand corruption involves key 
activities such as bribe payments, embezzlement and misappropriation of 
state assets. The bribe can either be a direct payment in return for showing 
favour or payment of part of the proceeds of a contract granted as a result of 
the bribe, which Goudie and Stasavage (2004) call a „kickback‟.  
The African development literature tends to focus on grand corruption to the 
detriment of other types, the reason being that international development 
organisations perceive the cross border and international trade related 
practices as having a larger impact on the growth of the economy of the 
developing nations than those internal corrupt activities which could be dealt 
with by the citizens of the country (Moody-Stuart 1997). With the international 
community moving away from economic growth as the main target of 
development towards policies promoting poverty reduction and access to 
resources, Heidenheimer et al (1993) and Eigen (2001) argue that the weight 
given to grand corruption debates has gained momentum. This is fuelled by 
the funds nations receive as aid that studies by TI (2010), Uneke (2010), and 
the World Bank (2010) reveal as much as a third having been diverted to 
private accounts by the ruling elite in Africa.  
2.3.3.3 Bureaucratic or Petty Corruption in Zimbabwe 
 
Bureaucratic or petty corruption refers to the “soliciting or extortion of small 
payments by low level officials in order to expedite business by cutting 
through red tape” (Tizor 2009:36). Jain (2001: 89) argues that in bureaucratic 
corruption officials solicit and extort payments “to  do what they are supposed 
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to do”. Bureaucratic corruption, small in scale, is an everyday corruption that 
takes place at the implementation end of politics where the bureaucrats meet 
the public. Byrne (2007) argues that petty corruption is bribery in connection 
with the implementation of existing laws, rules and regulations. Modest sums 
of money are commonly involved when people pay for services in their 
encounter with public administration and services such as local licensing 
authorities, schools, hospitals, police force and taxing authorities. 
A key distinction from grand corruption is that an official may be paid for 
doing what he is lawfully required to do. Tizor (2009) points out that there is 
high acceptance and cooperation of the public in the society as it is seen as 
the alternative way of getting a service particularly from institutions such as 
the ZIMRA, Customs and Immigration, judiciary or justice system, registrar 
department that processes mandatory documents, the ZRP, education and 
health services. It has become a common routine in Zimbabwe to find public 
servants extorting bribes for services or using public facilities and materials 
for their own marginal personal gain. 
In most cases, the public now assumes that services required would not be 
obtained without the additional payments, making corruption a normative part 
of doing business in their everyday life. The sums paid or involved are 
usually small compared to those of the grand corruption. Tizor (2009) 
contends that bureaucratic corruption has become common and an 
acceptable „culture‟ because it is in most cases carried out in the open. 
Nicholls et al (2006) concur that bureaucratic corruption is usually used, 
however, to describe „facilitation‟ or „greasing‟, payments sought by officials 
for the services the public are entitled to free of charge. For example, bribes 
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are paid to Immigration and Customs officers to pass goods through 
immigration ports of entry without paying any duty, traffic police officers 
solicit for a small amount of money to let vehicles not road worthy and traffic 
offenders through at roadblocks (TI-Z 2011).  
Bureaucratic corruption is perceived to arise from the clash of and conflict 
between traditional values and the imported norms that accompany 
modernisation and social-political development (Tizor 2009). 5  Theories of 
modernisation and political development have renewed discussions on 
bureaucratic corruption and the role of the laws and institutions in economic 
growth and development. Mbaku (1992) argues that bureaucratic corruption 
is the opportunistic behaviour related to the scope and extent of the 
government regulation of the economic activities. 
The issue of bureaucratic corruption providing civil servants with the 
opportunity to raise their earnings above what the law prescribes is 
extensively discussed by Falola (2008) who argues that bureaucratic 
corruption is an unavoidable system in any developing country. Falola 
argues that government would rather divert what is supposed to be 
increments for civil servants‟ salaries to private projects that would protect 
their political power and business acquired using corrupt means. For 
instance, the ruling party has always rewarded its senior military personnel 
                                                                 
 
 
 
5
 Modernisation is the process of change towards those types of social, economic and political 
systems that have developed in Western Europe and North America. It produces economic growth, 
structural and cultural changes in economic and political administration (Armer, J. and Katsil lis, J. 
(2001) Modernisation theory, Encyclopaedia of Sociology, 3. 
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and the related state security agents, the police and prison commissioners, 
and the Attorney-General‟s team with increased salaries (Sokwanele 2008). 
Meeting the demands of these institutional elite serves to protect the ruling 
party from any impending threats from political opposition, CSOs and vocal 
pressure groups.  
Using their official positions, the bureaucrats are able to capture and 
maintain monopoly positions in the economy. Mbaku (1992: 49) argues that 
“corruption allows inefficient producers to remain in business”, and 
encourages the governments to pursue pervasive economic policies which 
provide the opportunities to the  bureaucrats and politicians to enrich 
themselves through extorting bribes from those seeking government favours. 
Kpunde (2000b) and Mbaku (2007) note that the incentive for bureaucratic 
corruption is usually provided by the high levels of funds and resources 
under the discretionary control of the officials coupled with limited 
accountability and transparency. Other contributing factors to rising 
bureaucratic corruption include the limited extent of auditing and monitoring 
within government institutions. Makumbe (2009) argues that this has been 
the case with Zimbabwe since the 1980s; many government institutions are 
rarely audited. According to Sokwanele (2008), one of higher education 
institutions spent eleven years (1990 to 2001) without any official auditing by 
the state Auditor‟s office. This explains why corruption is endemic in some 
government institutions and further suggests that corruption within several 
institutions has been going on due to a lack of checks and monitoring 
mechanisms. 
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Neo-Marxist scholars such as David (2005) and Falola (2008) suggest that 
bureaucratic corruption is the problem of the state‟s economic and political 
structural organisations as they are embedded in the capitalist commodity 
production process and their social relations woven around it. They argue 
that as long the state is based on a capitalist mode of production the menace 
of bureaucratic corruption will be a permanent feature of the economy. 
Therefore, Falola (2008) argues that bureaucratic corruption in Zimbabwe is 
an unavoidable outcome of modernisation and development. It is a system 
within state institutions. The Sandura Commission (1989), a report on the 
Willowgate car scandal, proposed several solutions to bureaucratic and 
grand/political corruption, among them are that: firstly, Zimbabwe has got to 
„modernise‟ its traditional culture and social values to make them conducive 
to social and economic development. Secondly, the role of Anti-Corruption 
watchdogs must be strengthened to monitor similar corrupt practices. Thirdly, 
the state needs to work with other organisations outside government 
structures to monitor corruption. This third recommendation links us to the 
following section that examines civil society as part of a watchdog body that 
can monitor corruption in Zimbabwe. 
2.4 An assessment of civil society in Zimbabwe  
 
Studying and talking about civi l society and its role in Zimbabwe is a 
methodological challenge. The practice of civi l society and theorising about it 
mirrors the influence of the neo-liberal framework that promoted it from the 
early 1990s, which perceives it to be anti-state (Ncube 2010). Since then, the 
conventional perspective is that civil society is meant to oppose the state. In 
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this context, civil society is theorised in a Weberian institutional sense as 
institutions or organisations that oppose the totalitarian state, without 
organically locating it in society and the wider concept of the state.  Ncube 
(2010) argues that the mainstream thinking is that the state is extremely 
bureaucratised therefore cannot efficiently deliver, which explains why 
resources such as development aid are diverted from the state to CSOs or 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The implication is the creation of 
friction between the state and civil society. Consequently, instead of working 
to complement each other the Zimbabwean state and civi l society have 
become adversaries which has led to CSOs working towards providing 
possibly alternative centres of political power. This has led to a tendency of 
branding and counter-labelling other groups as civi l society and others as 
not. Equally important is that this is a function of the neo-liberal definition of a 
civil society as it was correspondingly promoted by the state discourse on 
civil society since 2000. The state has been excessively negative of some 
sections of CSOs as it perceives them to be unpatriotically anti-ZANU-PF 
(Ncube 2010). 
Civil society is a slippery concept, decorated with a long range of definitions. 
What makes it slippery is its constantly shifting space, set of actors and set 
of rules of engagement making it a challenge to define (Raj 2004). This has 
resulted in multiple definitions. When scholars look at civil society they focus 
on organisations and resources that they mobilise (Tarrow 1998). Others 
look at civil society as a public space in which social engagements occur 
(Ehrenberg 1999, Raj 2004, and Kaldor 2003). The irony about civil society is 
that it envelops a huge array of activities and yet it is very hard to define. 
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Different writers emphasise different dimensions of civil society, whether 
material (Marx and Angels), organisational (Ferguson and Tocqueville) or 
ideological (Gramsci and Werber). 
Gramsci, whose ideological framework is applied in this thesis particularly in 
chapter five, views the central role of the civil society as the contributor of the 
cultural and ideological capital necessary for the control of the hegemony of 
capitalism. He sees it as a site for problem solving. It is assigned a vital role 
in defending people against the state and the market and in asserting the 
democratic will to influence the state (Ehrenberg 1999 and Edwards 2004). 
London School of Economics‟ Centre for Civil Society (CCS) defines civil 
society as an arrangement of diverse approaches that epitomises continuous 
contestability of how different groupings seek to deal with issues of the day. 
According to CCS, 
“Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action 
around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its 
institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family 
and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, 
civil society, family and market are complex, blurred and 
negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of 
spaces, actors, and institutional forms varying in their degree 
of formality, autonomy and power” (2004: 4)  
 
Somers (2008: 20) defines civil society as the site of citizenship and 
discusses it in terms of “the fragile centrality of the social”; where as many 
empirical studies of civil society portray it as a status constructed out of a 
two-party relationship between the individual and the state . Somers (2008: 
21) argues, by contrast, that:  
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“Civil society is essentially the name we use for a triadic 
assemblage of shifting institutional and discursive 
relationships and struggles for power among state, market 
and civil society”  
Civil society is considered as the realm of association between the 
household and the state. Through its many functions and throughout its 
history some sections of civil society in Zimbabwe have put pressure on the 
government for policy reform and improved governance as well as explicitly 
monitoring the state‟s actions on development discourse. However, this has 
since changed with the introduction of the Private Voluntary Organisation Act 
(PVOA) of 1995 and the 2004 NGO Bill which changed the nature, character 
and political space of CSOs operating in Zimbabwe. The 2004 NGO Bill, 
states that it is “for the registration of non-governmental organisations to 
provide for an enabling environment for the  operations, monitoring and 
regulation of all non-governmental organisations” (2004: 2). It is a far-
reaching law clearly intended to exert full and complete control over the 
operations of CSOs and NGOs in Zimbabwe. The thesis discusses the 
PVOA in detail in chapter five. 
According to Fratton (1992), civil society is the collection of institutions and 
networks whose existence is independent of the state and official 
organisations that are competent to develop their own impulsive visions on 
national or local issues. Fratton argues that views of these institutions do not 
essentially oppose the state, but exist in contrast to state organisation's 
guidelines and enjoy some degree of autonomy. Fratton (1992) further 
argues that civi l society is neither benign nor harmonious, but constitutes a 
terrain of the struggle and resistance. It is seen as a private sphere of 
materials, cultural, and political activities resisting the incursions of the state. 
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Civil society is subject to “constant colonisation by the state” which strives to 
maintain its grip and maximising its own supremacy (Fratton 1992: 3).  
Civil society is potentially a highly subversive space, an area whe re new 
norms and structures can seize the opportunity to challenge the existing 
state order (Ncube 2010). However, this is not to argue that civil society is 
essentially revolutionary, on the contrary it may be the prime institution and 
disseminator of the  reactionary forms of information and codes of conduct 
that impound “subaltern classes either too old, unchanging behaviour, or too 
ineffective, disorganised patterns of collective resistance” (Fratton 1992: 6). 
This thesis aims to test Fratton‟s hypothesis in the context of civil society in 
Zimbabwe. 
Zimbabwe‟s civil society is populated by parochial organisations such as 
registered charities, development NGOs, community groups, women‟s 
organisations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, 
social movements, business associations, the media and advocacy groups 
(Ncube 1993). Scholars concur, however, that civil society has an 
institutional core represented by voluntary associations outside the sphere of 
the state and the economy. The 2008 National Association of Non-
Governmental Organizations‟ (NANGO) directory lists  over 1280 
CSOs/NGOs that are operating in Zimbabwe (NANGO 2009). Sibanda 
groups them into three categories: 
“Welfares CSOs providing free goods and services to the 
disadvantaged population, the developmental CSOs which 
aim to assist in the up-liftment of living standards of various 
sectors of the society, and the Environment NGOs that deal 
with natural resources” (Sibanda 2009: 8) 
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There are some CSOs that operate within all three categories. It is not 
possible to study all the organizations despite the fact that corruption is a 
phenomenon likely to crisscross all sectors. To this end, the study has 
chosen as its subject only CSOs which deal with corruption and/or the issues 
of good governance that may relate directly with corruption.  And even so, 
not all such organizations will be the subject of study. It is those CSOs based 
in the cities of Harare and Bulawayo who are the subject of the study. 
Since independence, Zimbabwe has experienced a profound series of 
political and economic changes that pose analytical difficulties when carrying 
out a study on civil society. It has not been clear, for instance, how to specify 
the contours of actors, terrain and rules of engagement within the field of civil 
society in Zimbabwe due to the political polarisation (Gumbo 2002, and 
Ncube 2010). This is due to the fact that since 2000 the ZANU–PF-led 
government imposed strict operational rules against NGOs and CSOs 
operating in the country, this is discussed in detail in chapter five. Robert 
Mugabe and ZANU-PF officials accuse the civi l society constituency and 
NGOs of waging a hate campaign against a „democratically elected 
government‟ over its policies, including the seizure of white owned 
commercial farms for redistribution to the landless blacks in which Bracking 
(2009) argues that the implementation process was abrupt and corrupt. Thus 
the imposed operational rules weakened the strength and coherence of civil 
society and created a state-civil society relationship which Gatsheni calls “a 
forced marriage ...” (2006: 3). Gatsheni argues that CSOs lost their powers 
and were left with no option besides following what the state wanted in 
relation to national rules, policies and development issues. Therefore, this 
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research aims to test to what extent Gatsheni is correct in this argument 
when examining the case of the state and civil society‟s relationship in 
combating corruption in Zimbabwe.  
Fratton (2007) posits that the cultural model of civil society theory illustrates 
an understanding of Zimbabwean society that depicts a simple dichotomy 
between the state and civil society. It portrays a “decaying authoritarian state 
stuck in a deadly struggle against an emerging and democratic civil society” 
(Fratton 2007: 89). This understanding argues that the two realms are 
distinct, unconnected and antagonistic spheres of institutional and social 
activities. However, Moyo (1993) interprets the state-civil society relations 
differently arguing that as a starting point, the state-civil relations should be 
understood as intertwining parts of the same reality because both 
components belong to one public realm. On the other hand, Taylor argues 
that the dichotomy between the state and civi l society “is based on a false 
dualism which negates the historical fact that civil society means the same 
thing as the political community” (1990: 98). 
Bowden (2006) argues that civil society in Zimbabwe is not in isolation from 
the state; rather, it functions in a balanced inter-dependence with the state. 
Civil society was a creation of the colonial state, and governed by the state . 
As posited by Mamdani (2008), Zimbabwean civi l society in its primary sense 
contains and constrains the scope and action of the state. The state and civil 
society relate to each other in what Antonio Gramsci called a “balanced 
opposition” (Bowden 2006: 158). In the same vein, this relationship is best 
captured by Mbembe who argues that the state-civil society relationship is: 
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“Not primarily a relationship of resistance or of cohabitation 
but can best be characterised as illicit cohabitation, a 
relationship made fraught by the very fact of sharing the same 
living space (1992: 4). 
According to Mbembe (1992: 5), the relationship has resulted in the “mutual 
zombification” of both the dominant and those dominated.  This means the 
state and civil society have robbed each other of their vitality and has left 
them both impotent. Mbembe argues further that it would be wrong to 
interpret the state-civi l society relationship in terms of absolute domination of 
one institution by another. Therefore, this research aims to explore and 
examine the validity of the arguments by Fratton (2007), Bowden (2006), and 
Mbembe (1992) in relation to the state-civil society relations in Zimbabwe, 
and their collaboration in fighting corruption.  
Civil society in Zimbabwe is most commonly considered in terms of political 
discourse of spreading democracy around the country (Baker 2002). It is 
defined internally and entirely by its associational social practices, and 
externally by its constituted opposition to state rule (Somers 2008). Somers 
(2008: 26) argues that the associational power of its institutions and 
practices “empowers it to continually resist and patrol against the invasive 
designs of the state into the site of the social”. Somers further argues that by 
contrast:  
“A „triadic‟ (third) approach to civil society is best 
characterised by those who include the market in the 
investigative model, while preserving civi l society as the 
space of social solidarity and on-going non-contractual 
relations” (2008: 44).  
The implication here is that civil society represents  a “third sphere” in 
between both the state and the market, and is continuously engaged in 
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resisting and opposing „forced‟ policies of the market in as much as they do 
with the state. Given that civil society is the only site in which people 
organise themselves as citizens and as “a people” (Somers 2008: 40) thus a 
strong and free civi l society is necessary for situating the social movements 
that are called upon to defend society as a whole.  
Kagoro (2005) argues that relations between the state and civil society in 
Zimbabwe have always been contentious. This dates to the Rhodesian era 
when the Ian Smith regime banned civic organisations that were advocating 
for democratic governance. This further reinforces the argument made earlier 
in this chapter that the post-colonial state inherited the colonial legacy. 
Due to the nature of the post-colonial state, it is argued in this thesis that the 
imbalances between the state and civil society does indeed exist and persist 
in contemporary Zimbabwe (Fratton 1992), but Gatsheni (2004), Sibanda 
(2009), and Etzioni (1993) postulate that the respective large amount of 
literature has poorly theorised the state-civil society relationship.  
Whilst Graham (2004: 147) argues that “the state and civil society‟s 
relationship is contradictory”, Gatsheni (2004) and Sibanda (2009) argue that 
the state-civil society relationship highlight a broadly congruent paradigm that 
pits the two institutions together. However, since independence civil society 
in Zimbabwe has continued to face restrictions imposed on them by the  
ZANU-PF-led government (Dorman 2003 and Chene 2007). Zimbabwean 
state-civil society relationship is not in a much more integrated and 
interactional way, but a separate „state versus civil society‟ framework which 
informs the traditional literature by scholars such as Fratton (2007).  
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The literature reviewed demonstrates that the Zimbabwean government and 
some sections of CSOs are not working together in development and policy 
issues. In fact, the state so far has displayed a repressive and authoritarian 
form of politics that has isolated certain CSOs from the political space. In 
2004 the ruling ZANU-PF, through its Minister of Public Service and Social 
Welfare, Paul Mangwana, passed the NGO Bill that imposed the strict 
operational rules on NGOs and other civil society groups. He was quoted 
saying: 
“Some NGOs and Churches are causing too much confusion 
in the country because they are converting their humanitarian 
programmes into politics .... The government cannot allow 
that to happen, so we are saying they should go under 
scrutiny where we revise all modalities of their operation in the 
country” (Kagoro 2005: 3) 
Since the passing of the NGO Bill in 2004 there have been occurrences of 
intimidations and the state sponsored harassments on individuals and the 
rudiments of civil society. Goredema (2001) and Kagoro (2005) argue that 
some government Ministers have threatened certain sections of civil society 
groupings for political reasons. Examples of organisations threatened include 
the independent media and CSOs targeting human rights and good 
governance issues. Given the intense political polarisation, some CSOs were 
consistently forced to re-orient their programmes to make them more 
responsive to the requirements of the government. More importantly, some 
CSOs have been forced to shift their activities because of the limited and 
monitored operating space engendered by the 2004 Act. It is this 
government stance that forced many CSOs to pursue what Ncube, (citing 
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Raftopoulos 2000), calls the “entryist approach” (2010: 81) that evaded 
speculative politics by the government.6  
Whaites (1998) argues that a democratic state is a prerequisite for civil 
society, in turn; civil society emerges to balance a strong and democratic 
state acting as a protective buffer for the people. Democracy is mandatory 
for the organisational frame of and activities of civil society. Whaites (1998: 
243) contends that CSOs operating in undemocratic states have a slight 
opportunity to influence the government, “their interests are not likely to be 
served by state involvement in community involvement”. CSOs are not only 
more likely to serve the interest of the deprived but they are capable of 
initiating schemes that increase the organisational power and subsequently 
the political pressure that can be exerted by the poor people. In this regard 
the state becomes an incentive to civil society for groups to lobby, influence 
and secure policy changes. 
Media in the early years of independence demonstrated that its freedom 
could play both an investigative and monitoring role particularly in combating 
corruption. Goredema (2001) argues that without the media the public would 
not have known about Paweni‟s GMB fraudulent claims as a private 
contractor with the collusion of a Minister and public officials in respect of 
food deliveries during the 1982 drought. It was the media that exposed the 
                                                                 
 
 
 
6
 Many civil  society organisations preferred to maintain a low-profile and complementary approach 
in dealing with the strong interventionist state to avoid direct confrontation 
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Willowgate car scandal of 1988 where Ministers were involved in an illegal 
acquisition and resale of motor vehicles for exorbitant profits. The media also 
played a major role in exposing the National Housing scandal in which funds 
for constructing houses for public officials were diverted to influential ruling 
elite such as judges and Ministers. The WVCF scandal with Ministers and 
former freedom fighters - including the president‟s brother-in-law exploiting 
loopholes in the claims system was also brought to light as a result of the 
media. This thesis develops the narrative and analysis of these scandals in 
chapter six. Under a censored platform, the media has played an active 
watchdog role which has further infuriated the ruling government, leading to 
the banning of all the independent media outlets.  
By exposing corruption the media established itself as civil society machinery 
in the struggle against corruption. This has since then created a thin line 
between the independent media and the government. ZANU-PF has 
demonstrated intolerance towards free media and incapacitated its printing 
presses. Journalists have been subjected to physical violence, harassment, 
and do not enjoy easy access to information. Foreign journalists are required 
to apply for accreditation. This friction between the government and the 
media impedes the discovery and dissemination of useful information on 
fighting corruption, particularly when it involves government functionaries 
(Goredema 2001). 
Drawing on an argument by Sibanda, if civil society can be reinforced, “and 
in some cases liberated from the chains of the autocratic government” (2009: 
47) and its efforts at monitoring the state encouraged, it is hypothesised that 
this would contribute to the ultimate control of corruption (Khan 1998). While 
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it may be unrealistic to expect an immediate or total elimination of corruption 
in Zimbabwe, the involvement of the civil society in fighting corruption is 
argued in this thesis to be of vital importance in controlling endemic 
corruption. 
This section has discussed civi l society in Zimbabwe, and how deeply fragile 
and vulnerable the state-civil society relations are. That said the study 
proceeds to discuss the state-civil society Anti-Corruption strategies. 
2.5 The state and civil society: Complexities of corruption 
control in Zimbabwe  
 
In designing and implementing the national Anti-Corruption programme, the 
initial step of securing a strong commitment to fighting corruption is often the 
most difficult hurdle (Nicholls et al 2006). When corruption is widespread, 
particularly where it involves the political establishment, it comes with its 
severe political risks, despite popular support from cleaner government 
members – if ever there are any cleaner ones. Sibudubudu (2002) and 
Nicholls et al (2006) argue that the most powerful force in fighting corruption 
is the widespread resentment of corrupt practices and popular support for 
solid action from the government institutions. Double standards in Anti-
Corruption management erode all efforts intended to control the 
phenomenon.  Nicholls et al (2006) argue that the Anti-Corruption project 
needs to be designed in line with the expectations of the nation and with 
public participation. Anti-Corruption strategies are likely to be more effective 
when they are built on the foundation of popular empowerment, nationally 
owned and designed to meet the national circumstances. 
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Szeftel (2000a) argues that Anti-Corruption proposals are in most cases a 
threat to the state and its employee‟s dependency on state power and 
resources for access to personal wealth, opportunities for accumulation and 
an affluent lifestyle. Anti-Corruption initiatives undermine the capability of a 
corrupt government to distribute the patron-clientelist resources thereby 
affecting the very foundation of the state. It is in this sense that Anti-
Corruption agencies are a threat to the positions of Zimbabwe ‟s ruling elite 
and the political establishment itself. Subsequently, Anti-Corruption 
strategies become a casualty of the political process. 
Scholars such as Mavuso and Merwe (2008) and Olowu (1999) suggest that 
since 1988 the government has been central in driving the Anti-Corruption 
programmes. The irony is that it is the same government elite who have also 
been allegedly implicated in one or more corruption scandals. Thus a 
contradictory situation exists, and why this is so is an interesting part of the 
research. Mavuso and Merwe (2008) argue that within ZANU-PF there are 
some incumbents committed to derailing Zimbabwe‟s Anti-Corruption project 
because they see them as a threat to their positions and benefits. This 
explains Makumbe‟s (1994) notion that some Zimbabwean incumbents are 
the major recipients of corruption. 
The last two decades has seen a plethora of both national, regional and the 
international Anti-Corruption initiatives that culminated in the United Nations 
Convention against Transitional Organized Crime and Corruption held in 
Palermo (Italy) in 2000 (Goredema 2001 and UN 2004), the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) Protocol Against Corruption of 2001 (TI 
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2006), and later the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) 
of 2005 (Nicholls et al 2006). To compliment these regional and international 
Anti-Corruption tools, Zimbabwe has its own Anti-Corruption chapter, the 
Prevention of Corruption Act of 1996 (Government of Zimbabwe 2009). This 
Act paved the way for other local Anti-Corruption instruments such as the 
Ministry of State Enterprises, Anti-Monopolies and Anti-Corruption; and the 
ZACC of 2004 and 2011 respectively. 
Zimbabwe committed itself to take steps to sanction the Conventions which 
protect the initiatives to develop effective Anti-Corruption strategies. The 
three Conventions set standards for the domestic regulations towards 
reducing and eventually eliminating the differences among national legal 
systems which impede co-operation in combating corruption (Nicholls et al  
2006). The UNCAC has become an important project whose global support 
demonstrates the necessity for a systematic, worldwide effort to combat 
corruption in both the public and private sector. The UNCAC requires the 
state parties to establish and maintain their Anti-Corruption instruments. 
These are to enjoy the necessary independence and appropriate resources 
to enable them to carry out their functions effectively and free from any 
undue influence. Nicholls et al (2006) argue that the coming into force of the 
UNCAC and its approval by Zimbabwe had considerable implications for the 
fight against corruption in the country. The principle reason behind the 
Convention was to promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat 
corruption, to promote, facilitate and support national cooperation and 
technical assistance in preventing and combating corruption including assets 
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recovery, promoting integrity, accountability, and appropriate management of 
the public affairs and public property. 
Consequently, this has seen the genesis of some CSOs such as the TI-Z 
and ACTSA operating at national levels that are involved in an array of Anti-
Corruption programmes. The accumulated expertise of these organizations 
has led to their active involvement in the development of several Anti-
Corruption instruments such as research and surveys that inform the public 
on the causes, nature, effects and possible steps to curb the pandemic. The 
fight against corruption has been given the impetus by various 
developments, among them the formation of the Ministry of State 
Enterprises, Anti-Monopolies and Anti-Corruption in 2004 and the creation of 
the 2004 and 2011 ZACC.  
Goredema (2001) argues that the formation of the Ministry of State 
Enterprises, Anti-Monopolies and Anti-Corruption had its own implications. 
Firstly, the capacity of institutions outside the central government to make an 
input into the formulation of the Anti-Corruption legislation was diminished. 
Secondly, the political neutrality in implementing and enforcing Anti-
Corruption laws was compromised with the limited space for other actors 
such as CSOs. And thirdly, it is barely expected that a legislative body which 
is monopolized or governed by a monolithic group and insulated from the 
pressures of competitive politics would be an efficient watchdog on behalf of 
the public. This dangerously weakened the capacity of the government to 
deal with corruption particularly when it stems from or is associated with the 
functionaries of the government. The designing and execution of the Anti-
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Corruption legislation has been dominated and monopolized by the central 
government as Mawewe and Merwe (2008) demonstrate. When the 
government determines the content of such legislation drawing on its 
perceptions, as is the timing and the way of implementation, consequently, 
the result is that in many cases the legislation fails to achieve the intended 
objectives. Successful and effective Anti-Corruption legislation requires inter-
sectorial co-operation with institutions outside the central government.  
The state‟s direction and success of the strategies to control corruption need 
to be linked to the degree of participation of civil society in designing and 
implementing Anti-Corruption strategies (Biti 2012 unpublished). Controlling 
corruption is more than a matter of creating the Anti-Corruption strategies, 
laws and policies of the state; it has to be rooted in the involvement vis-à-vis 
activities of civil society and its relations with the state. 
Kagoro (2005) argues that separate from an unreliable judiciary system, 
other sectors would also be important in Anti-Corruption management. These 
would include an autonomous and functional free media, a network of 
institutions to monitor democratic accountability together with the Anti-
Corruption agencies, and a vigilant and effective civil society. 
Anti-Corruption strategies in other parts of the world (particularly the Western 
democracies) recognise the role of a vigilant civil society in preventing and 
exposing corruption (Nicholls et al 2006). However, in the case of Zimbabwe, 
this was nearly the same in the early 1980s when The Chronicle exposed the 
Willowgate car scandal and The Herald exposed the Grain Marketing Board 
(GMB) food distribution scandal before corruption became endemic. The 
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Palermo Convention (Goredema 2001) and the UNCAC (Nicholls et al 2006) 
may be directed at organs of the state, but implementing them involves other 
stakeholders such as CSOs. According to Goredema (2001) and Sibanda 
(2009) if CSOs are given the platform or political space for designing and 
implementation of the Anti-Corruption policy (which the state has not 
accorded them) they can play an active function in combating corruption.  
Nicholls et al (2006) argue that the freedom of the press and other media 
contributes to the public awareness of corruption. The commitment of the 
government to the freedom of expression and association is therefore a 
critical factor in creating the conditions that are conducive for civil society to 
participate in Anti-Corruption projects, which could lead to effective 
corruption control.  
The empowerment of CSOs in Zimbabwe is hostage to the current turmoil in 
the political and economic situation (Goredema 2001, Mhone 2001, and 
Kagoro 2005). The political environment is not ideal for the strengthening of 
some sections of civil society structures to participate in the Anti-Corruption 
strategy formulation and implementation because the ZANU-PF government 
sees them as agents of the imperial agenda whose objective is to overthrow 
the government (Mamdani 2008). In addition to the less conducive political 
restraint by ZANU-PF are the financial and administrative difficulties that limit 
the operation of organisations. Therefore paying attention to issues beyond 
immediate bread and butter matters such as corruption control is 
challenging. And more so, those that focus on corruption avoid confrontation 
with the government functionaries or individuals implicated in corrupt 
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practices for fear of victimisation. Furthermore, ZANU-PF has been generally 
critical to the emergence of a vocal civil society (Kagoro 2001, Mawewe and 
Merwe 2008). It is therefore argued in this thesis that the ruling government 
has obstructed the development of a strong and vocal civil society for fear of 
exposition. For these reasons, it would be tempting to suggest that civil 
society is put in a dysfunctional mode in the designing and implementation of 
the Anti-Corruption strategies. 
Due to the influence corruption has upon the distribution of wealth, privilege 
and power within the society; it has presumably become a conservative form 
of influence. Since corruption depends on the use of scarce and unevenly 
distributed resources, the corrupt act in their own interests, and are therefore 
more likely to safeguard existing advantages than to change them (Fratton 
1992). This scholarship explains why Anti-Corruption strategies have failed 
to take shape in Zimbabwe, even that which has taken shape fails to produce 
effective results. 
Deininger and May (2000) argue that corruption in Zimbabwe has become a 
test-case of the neo-liberal Anti-Corruption policies, with the World Bank in 
particular determined to assert that despite the government‟s socio-economic 
and political dismal record, its representations about market-led Anti-
Corruption reforms are the ones to which there is no alternative. The 
following section discusses the World Bank and IMF neo-liberal policies as 
instruments to ameliorate the skewed economic policies. 
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2.6 An assessment of the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (ESAP) and its implications for corruption 
 
In this section the thesis examines the impact of ESAP on the living 
standards of the people and draws some parallels between the impact of 
ESAP and the rise of corruption. This section also captures the increase of 
CSOs, consequently because of the neo-liberal policies of the World Bank 
and IMF. The IFIs sought to use neo-liberal policies to contain corruption and 
improve economic development of the state. The IFIs and the bilateral donor 
community assumed that ESAP would promote good governance and 
democracy, which are vital conditions for tackling corruption (World Bank 
1988). Accordingly, in 1991 Zimbabwe was driven to introduce ESAP. 
Therefore, this thesis seeks to test the validity of the IFIs‟ hypothesis whether 
ESAP was a remedy to the problem of corruption in Zimbabwe.  
While the introduction of ESAP marked the temporary retreat of the state‟s 
role in determining the economic decision making, this phase witnessed the 
rise of more CSOs which temporarily became powerful before the state took 
over and co-opted some civil society institutions such as the ZNLWVA (war 
veterans association) (Kagoro 2000). This is particularly true for the period 
immediately after the failure of ESAP in the mid-1990s (Mhone 2001). 
Nyarota (2006) argues that the failure of ESAP coincided with national 
drought that led to substantial shortages of basic commodities with the 
bureaucrats seizing this opportunity to engage in corrupt activities. 
Mawowa (2007) argues that Zimbabwe‟s first five years of independence 
saw an economic boom although this was not sustained. It recorded four per  
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cent average annual growth which was one per cent higher than the 
country‟s population increase. It is argued by Mawowa (2007) and Boafo-
Arthur (1998) that during this time Zimbabwe enjoyed economic success with 
the population receiving free education, health support, and a subsidised 
agricultural and welfare system. Years following this boom witnessed a high 
population increase eclipsing the economic growth, lower export growth, 
shortage of foreign exchange and lower investments (Carmody 1998). 
According to Mawowa (2007), it is this retarded growth that tempted the state 
to succumb to the pressures and persuasion of the World Bank and IMF and 
eventually introduced the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP), known 
as ESAP. They were introduced as conditionality for the loans by the IMF 
and the World Bank. MaClean et al (1998: 345) argue that SAPs were 
“designed to restore macro-economic balance” which was thought to be a 
result of inappropriate policy choices by the government. Sibudubudu (2002) 
contends that it was believed by the IMF and the World Bank that SAPs 
would reduce the size and role of the public sector in economic issues and 
thus further help to control rent-seeking practices and corruption. However, 
this thesis argues that far from combating corruption, ESAP facilitated 
corruption during the privatisation process as many benefited from the 
bidding process and obtained valuable state resources at a lesser cost 
through collusion between the state officials and the private buyers. 
Privatisation led to resource capture and mismanagement of privatised 
companies by the ruling elite. 
Major features of ESAP pursued included trade liberalisation and labour 
retrenchment that eventually saw unemployment rising to approximately sixty 
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per cent in the year 1992 due to massive retrenchment of labour in the public 
sector (Bond 1998). The budget deficit rose to above twenty five per cent of 
what it was at independence. It has been noted by Mhone (2001) and 
Mawewe and Dibie (2000)  that ESAP led to record levels of local currency 
devaluation, government subsidy withdrawal and an increase in user fees 
which rendered the basic services like health and education unaffordable to 
the average worker. This resulted in a sharp shrinkage of income 
opportunities and simultaneously further marginalised the poor. According to 
Ncube (2010), Zimbabwe found itself trapped in the economic reform 
crossroads - between the World Bank and IMF requirements and the mass 
protests due to the overwhelming impoverishment aggravated by ESAP. 
The thrust of ESAP and the negative effects thereof set in motion a trend 
towards a more informal mode of wealth accrual. According to Gibbon (1995: 
24) the high levels of unemployment and the accompanying “ liberalisation of 
production saw the redundant workers being accommodated into the 
informal economy” thereby widening the prospects of corruption.  Many 
people reverted to informal trade for survival. This saw an increase of 
bureaucratic corruption as they capitalised on diminishing resources, 
particularly those who had access to allocating and awarding trading permits 
and business licences to family or relative vendors, the Immigration and 
Customs officers extorting bribes from the cross border traders, and 
eventually all those in offices extorting bribes to do what they are employed 
to do. The public fell prey to the corrupt practices by the officials and 
eventually accepted this as a way of doing business in Zimbabwe. 
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Mawowa (2007) demonstrates that the unregulated sale of consumer 
products in the informal markets was exacerbated by the persistent 
shortages of basic commodities as a result of manufacturing companies 
closing down. According to Mawewe and Dibie (2000), the closure of many 
small industries was due to high operating costs and interest rates on loans, 
consequently, the development of the grassroots and small business sector 
was constrained by high interest rates on bank loans and the high inflation 
leading to massive shortages of basic commodities. It would be beneficial at 
this point to illustrate how the economy of shortages in the period after the 
failure of ESAP years to post 2000 has contributed to the proliferation of 
corruption and the dominant mode of wealth accumulation it has produced. 
The gradual swelling of the informal sector from the ESAP years noticeably 
increased what Mawowa (2007: 43) calls „private acquisitive instincts‟ and 
the use of the state resources guided by the politics of patronage. This set 
the stage for the development of an accumulating class drawn mainly along 
patronage and clientele lines. It is therefore, noticeable that overcoming the 
legacy of ESAP is an intricate process.  
The decision to liberalise in the early 1990s shifted the contours of the 
economy in favour of the import sector, neglecting domestic production and 
resulting in rising unemployment, falling wages and currency devaluation. 
This saw a massive rise in corruption activities and the steep rise of 
development and humanitarian and welfare NGOs and CSOs taking over 
particularly in welfare services where the state has been failing. Whaites 
(1998) argues that the effects of ESAP and the very weakness of the state in 
dealing with the ESAP casualties and its failure to provide services or to 
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engage in the local development process, stimulated a thriving voluntary 
sector and, with it, a strong and vocal civil society.  
The effects of the structural adjustment reforms and the economic 
contraction were complex. It weakened the capability of the government to 
distribute the state resources to the party‟s clients, and thereby 
compromising the stability of the centralised-bureaucratic state (Allen 1995). 
The ruling elite needed sufficient resources to distribute clientelist resources 
to ensure regime acceptance as well as accumulating clients. In a way the 
neo-liberal reforms and economic crisis threatened the very political 
establishment of ZANU-PF as they “undercut the usual advantages of being 
the party distributing national resources to mobilise electoral support” 
(Burnell 1998: 13). This also threatened the nature of the state which 
functioned on the basis of patronage-client networks. ESAP undermined the 
ability of the state to distribute the clientelist resources. Thus the IFIs‟ neo-
liberal policies were unlikely to be prolonged and supported by the ruling 
government whose systemic patronage is central to its survival. The neo-
liberal programmes failed to attain the Western planned objectives of 
restoring macro-economic balance and controlling rent-seeking practices and 
corruption because of the intrinsic obstacles in the political system 
(Sibudubudu 2002).  
MaClean et al (2000) interpret the SAPs as a manifestation of the 
established dominance of orthodox economic ideology and policy, and the 
hegemony of neo-liberalism in an era of intensified globalisation of 
institutions and relations. Some critics of ESAP such as Sydney Malunga 
(late MP) (cited in The Financial Gazette, 10 March 1994), Bond et al (2003) 
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and MaClean et al (2000) argue that the list of the problems which ensued 
from its implementation is not disputable. The economic reforms introduced 
by the World Bank and the IMF adopted by the Zimbabwe government 
spelled mass economic disaster, and exacerbated contemporary problems 
such as HIV/AIDS devastation of the most productive population of the 
society (Mawewe and Dibie 2000).  
ESAP inflated poverty, worsened the conditions of the already poor, 
decreased the country‟s capacity to widen a vibrant diversified domestic 
economy and increased the exploitation of workers through deregulation. 
Bond (1998) argues that ESAP is listed as a cause of poverty and corruption 
in Zimbabwe. The combination of retrenchment on a large scale, with a 
sharp increase in the price of basic goods and having to pay for educatio n 
and health drove many people into corruption. Among some of the outcomes 
of ESAP are disinvestment, de-industrialisation which consequentially 
decreased employment and increased social inequality (MaClean et al 2000). 
With these outcomes in mind, it is debatable whether this ESAP could have 
promoted sustainable economic growth in Zimbabwe.  
Given these negative outcomes, it is equally unlikely that it was politically 
possible to implement ESAP. Many economic, academic and social 
observers such as Donna (1998), Bond (1998), Bush (2007), and Perry 
(2009) contemplate whether ESAP was morally justifiable, given that it was 
imposed by the already industrialised or developed countries on developing 
countries. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the political economy of corruption in the context 
of Zimbabwe. While this thesis focuses on the role of the state and civil 
society in combating corruption, this chapter examined literature on the 
contours and dynamics of corruption as a result of pre and post-
independence politics that characterises continuities and discontinuities in 
the politics of Zimbabwe.   
This chapter demonstrates that corruption is pervasive in Zimbabwe and 
Africa at large because it is a wilfully concealed activity, making  it difficult to 
control and measure accurately. The thesis examined the perception of 
corruption in Africa which permitted an examination of corruption in 
Zimbabwe using indicators of TI-Z as a benchmark. Since 1996 TI-Z has 
conducted research and surveys to establish the causes, effects, nature and 
perception of corruption in Zimbabwe commonly known as the CPI. The 
chapter demonstrates that immoral conducts in the form of corruption have 
become one of the greatest challenges to Zimbabwe‟s Anti-Corruption 
initiatives, which threatens to undermine economic growth, democratic 
stability, sustenance and general development efforts.  
The cost of corruption to Zimbabwe‟s progress was discussed. Literature 
assessed has argued that corruption has the effect of distorting public 
expenditures, increasing the costs of running business and diverting 
resources from national development projects to individuals. Corruption 
deters investment because it is a disincentive to prospective investors 
thereby inhibiting economic growth. It undermines programmes designed 
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specifically to aid the poor. The thesis identified the public sector particularly 
state institutions, being the largest employer as the pinpoint of most corrupt 
conducts. 
Defining corruption raises theoretical and empirical questions as it means 
different things to different societies. Corruption is defined as the misuse or 
the abuse of public office for private gain (World Bank 1997and UNDP 1999). 
It comes in a variety of forms and a wide range of illicit behaviour, such as 
bribery, extortion, fraud, nepotism, theft, embezzlement, falsification of 
records and kickbacks. While corruption is frequently attributed to the public 
sector, it also exists in other aspects of governance such as private business 
sector and political parties.  
The thesis has defined the concept of civil society and how political 
environment influences the operations of civil society. A strong civil society is 
argued here to be a necessary entity that can check upon officials‟ conducts 
and accountability because transparent and accountability procedures mean 
little if no one outside the state can demand a meaningful accounting backed 
up by threats of legal or political sanctions. Without a vibrant civi l society, 
institutions will not produce accountability. By contrast, where civil society is 
weak, fundamental social support for fighting corruption is lost. It should 
suffice for now to note that a free and strong civil society is important in 
fighting corruption 
The chapter has demonstrated that consensus by scholars and socio-
economic commentators have emerged regarding the harmful effects of  
ESAP on the life of the poor. An emerging parallel view in this thesis 
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although less than a consensus, identifies ESAP as having contributed to the 
proliferation of corruption. The IFIs had targeted liberalisation of the economy 
as the basic prescription for controlling corruption, instead ESAP essentially 
manifested corruption through privatisation as politicians and the ruling elite 
captured resources and companies, which they eventually mismanaged. 
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Chapter 3  
 
RESEARCH PARADIGMS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the research paradigms, an uncommon change from 
the frequently employed methodology heading to show that a methodology is 
one of many primary aspects of a research project (Carter and Little 2007). 
Drawing on Guba‟s narrative, a paradigm is “a basic set of beliefs that guides 
actions” (1990:17), and such beliefs have been pointed out by Denzin and 
Lincoln (1994) and Crotty (1998) as making particular demands on a 
researcher. These demands guide and influence the research. This chapter 
places emphasis on data gathering methods, the analysis undertaken and 
the beliefs and empirical knowledge, that play an imperative role throughout 
the research. The chapter explains why and how decisions were taken and 
implemented, and with what results in order to answer research questions 
and achieve the objectives of this research.  
This research is based on a qualitative case study. It uses semi-structured 
interviews, document analysis and observations as instruments for data 
collection. The choice of such an approach was made on the basis of the 
nature of this study, which sought to understand perception, beliefs and 
meanings attached to everyday experiences, of which the qualitative tools 
were most appropriate for understanding issues being studied. A case study 
approach is ideal for this research because it provides a systematic way of 
 93 
collecting data, analysing and recording the results. The researcher gains a 
sharpened understanding of „why‟ and „how‟ incidences of corruption 
happen, and „what‟ roles the state and civil society play in combating 
corruption. This involves an in-depth, longitudinal examination of a case 
(Tellis 1997).   
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 3.2 analyses the 
methodological perspective of the research. Section 3.3 discusses the 
research design and sampling strategy. Section 3.4 describes the methods 
and process of data collection, and the final section, 3.5 is reflections of the 
fieldwork experiences to highlight some limitations and other issues that 
need to be taken into account in interpreting the findings of this thesis.  
3.2 Methodological Perspective 
 
A qualitative approach was selected for the present study based on a 
number of ontological and epistemological influences. The qualitative 
research paradigm, a perspective that has gained unprecedented popularity 
and has secured a berth in mainstream methodology (Barbour 2001, Denzin 
and Lincoln 1994, and Guba and Lincoln 1994), has become a central 
element of the methodological repertoire of social research (Mckenzie et al  
2005). Its reputation has greatly expanded and secured a  strong position in 
conventional methodology (Barbor 2001).  
The research draws on the context of Gramsci‟s theory of hegemony and his 
interpretation of ontology that views human thinking as a product of a 
conscious “organised collective will” (Gramsci 1971:  464) by people through 
hegemony in the superstructural sphere. Gramsci argues that the 
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superstructural sphere is dialectically interconnected to the dominant ideas 
about social reality in a given time, which is acknowledged with a conscious 
appreciation of how they were historically developed through human action. 
Drawing on Marx and Angel, Gramsci argues that:  
“In every epoch the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling 
ideas, that is, the class that is the ruling material power of 
society is at the same time its ruling intellectual power. The 
class having the means of material production, has also 
control over the means of intellectual production, so that it 
also controls, generally speaking, the class of those who lack 
the means of intellectual production” (quoted in Femia 
1981:32) 
Gramsci‟s interpretation of Marxism is ontologically interpretive. Social reality 
attached to it is, as Bryman (2001) and Blaikie (1993) argue, are linked to the 
actions of social actors. Bryman (2001: 13) argues that people “act on the 
basis of the meanings that they attribute to their acts and to the acts of 
other”. Therefore, to understand and interpret the fashion in which both the 
state and civil society in Zimbabwe maintain and transform a hegemonic 
social reality requires that the researcher understands the world view (Ncube 
2010). To examine and comprehend the organisational determinants of 
counter-hegemonic politics in Zimbabwe and how it affects social actors‟ 
struggle for social change requires an in-depth discussion with the actors 
involved or observing the actors in action in their natural setting. Thus, the 
idea of how social actors act to maintain and resist hegemony is, in an 
interpretive ontology (ibid). Therefore, the Gramscian language of hegemony 
is employed in this thesis as the theoretical and analytical framework . The 
theory of hegemony is applied here in an inductive sense given that the 
inductive study does not always entail theory generating. This is applied to 
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permit the conceptualisation of the Gramscian theory of hegemony in order 
to understand the relationship between the Zimbabwean state and civil 
society in Anti-Corruption management. 
Ontological views of the researcher influenced the assumptions about the 
nature of social reality being studied (Hay 2002). Ontology is defined by 
Blaikie as “the claims about what exists, what it looks like, what units make it 
up and how these units interact with each other” (1993: 6). This in turn 
influences the researcher‟s epistemological views (Hay 2002). Blaikie defines 
epistemology as:  
“The claims or assumptions made about the ways in which it 
is possible to gain knowledge of this reality, whatever it is 
understood to be; claims about how what exists may be 
known” (1993: 7).   
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that different epistemologies and 
ontological opinions incline the researcher towards different methodologies. 
This embraces discussions of how theories are generated and tested, “what 
criteria they have to satisfy, what theories look like and how particular 
theoretical perspectives can be related to particular research problems” 
(Blaikie 1993: 7). In relation to positivism, the researcher aims to test 
universally applicable theories in a deductive manner. That is, one starts with 
theory, collects data and uses it to interrogate the same theory that informed 
data collection. If theory was animate, one could talk of it as attempting to 
self-regenerate so that it remains to have an instrumental value to the social 
world.  
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In contrast, interpretive research aims to create theory around the social 
world in an inductive fashion. The researcher starts with observations or 
findings and seeks to draw “generalisable inferences” (Bryman 2001: 10). 
The inferences by the researcher come at the backdrop of interpretations by 
the social actors being studied. In this case, “the social world is already 
interpreted before the social scientist arrives” (Blaikie 1993: 36). The 
difference between deductive and inductive methodology are however far 
from a strict dichotomy. As Bryman (2001) argues, it is still possible to use a 
positivist epistemology in an interpretive study. Furthermore, Bryman 
observes that interpretive studies do not always aim to generate theories. 
Instead, interpretive studies can also aim to test a theory, especially where 
existing literature on a topic is used as a proxy to theory. Bryman thus 
cautions against “hammering a wedge between them (approaches) too 
deeply” (Bryman 2001: 21).  
Thus this thesis‟ ontological position recognises the existence of a social 
reality only subjectively understood by social actors under study. Snape and 
Spencer (2003) argue that the position requires an open minded 
engagement with different perspectives about the subject. The importation of 
positivist features of objectivity and neutrality in data collection, reliability and 
validity, interpretation and presentation, and reflexivity are in congruence 
with the priority given to respondents‟ interpretations and perspectives in 
interpretive research. The researcher‟s focus is to be able to triangulate the 
respondents‟ world views and analyse them in our own “language, 
conceptualisation and categorisation”  (Snape and Spencer 2003: 21) without 
altering the projected sense.  
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A qualitative researcher studies phenomena and the processes in natural 
settings, giving due regard to meanings, experiences as well as participants‟ 
views (Hallberg 2006, and Pope and Mays 1995). The thoughtful concern is 
to understand what is being done or said by human beings (Schwandt 2000), 
qualitative research is in general taken to be “the world of individuals‟ 
experiences and their socially constructed realities” (Hallberg 2006: 141). In 
making sense of behaviour, it is ultimately an interpretation (Thomas and 
James 2006). As an interpretive practice, qualitative research does not 
privilege any methodology or any methods over others (Denzin and Lincoln 
1994). Crotty (1998) argues that case study is a type of methodology with 
interviews, document analysis and observation being instruments of data 
collection.  
The fundamental facets of research have a bearing on qualitative 
perspectives.  Mantzoukas (2004) argues that whatever or whoever is 
represented in a qualitative enquiry has a direct correlation with ontological 
and epistemological assumptions of that researcher. The three facets are 
explained, thus:  
“Epistemology asks „How do we know the world?  What is the 
relationship between the enquirer and the known‟? Ontology 
raises basic questions about the nature of reality. 
Methodology focuses on how we gain knowledge about the 
world” (Denzin and Lincoln 1994: 99). 
 
 
Qualitative methods are argued by Creswell (2003) to be best suited to the 
study of the meaning and purpose of human action because knowledge 
claims are derivative from the different constructed and interpreted 
perspectives of the research participants. These methods can enable a 
“delicate and responsive questioning” process (Ritchie 2003: 32) that 
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unpacks a complex phenomenon such as corruption. It is argued by Boulton 
and Hammersley (1996) that qualitative methods facilitate easier collection of 
perspectives from different people. It enables easier triangulation of data. 
According to Miles and Huberman, 
“Good qualitative data are more likely to lead to serendipitous 
findings and to new integrations; they help researchers get 
beyond initial conceptions and to generate or revise 
conceptual frameworks. The findings from qualitative studies 
have a quality of undeniability. Words, especially organised 
into incidents or stories, have a concrete vivid, meaningful 
flavour that often proves far more convincing to a reader – 
another researcher, a policy maker, a practitioner – than 
pages of summarised numbers” (1994: 1).  
 
Moores (1993) argues that the qualitative research paradigm was 
established in the social sciences to permit researchers to study social and 
cultural phenomena. The inspiration to employ qualitative methodology as 
opposed to quantitative research derives from the observation that one thing 
that distinguishes humans from the natural world is their capability to talk. 
Thus researchers are enthused to use qualitative research by the desire to 
understand people, cultural and social context within which they live (Moores 
1993). According to Priest (1996), when the researcher‟s aim is to 
understand people, the social and cultural context in which they live, one 
ought to use qualitative research methodology because it is an inductive and 
holistic approach which provides the opportunity to develop a rich 
understanding, descriptive and perception into the subject‟s or individual‟s 
lifestyles, beliefs, concerns, aspirations, and culture. This thesis preferred to 
use qualitative research paradigm other than the quantitative research 
paradigm given that quantitative research tends to view events from the 
outside and to impose empirical concerns upon social reality. Since this is a 
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study of people, their socio-economic and political environment, and how 
they influence events in the everyday business, qualitative research 
becomes more appropriate than quantitative research. This is because in 
qualitative research, actual talk, gesture and other social actions are the raw 
materials of analysis, which lead to an in-depth understanding of the 
phenomenon under study (Lindloff 1995). This is opposed to the quantitative 
research method, which rests its evidence on the principles of numbers, logic 
of mathematics, or the methods of statistical analysis. 
3.3 Research Design 
 
This section describes the research design and research methods adopted 
for this study. Research design is a “framework for the collection and 
analysis of data” (Bryman 2001: 29). A research method is a strategy of 
enquiry which moves from the fundamental philosophical assumptions to 
research design and data collection. Various philosophical perspectives 
inform qualitative research paradigms. The fundamental research 
philosophical assumptions and the epistemology that guide this case study 
research are imperative and interpretative research. While these research 
epistemologies are philosophically distinct, in the practice of social research 
these distinctions are not always clear cut (Orlikosky and Baroodi 1991). 
Consequently, Bryman (2001), Orlikosky and Baroodi (1991), and Denzin 
and Lincoln (1994) concur that these research paradigms can be housed 
within one study because they are not certainly divergent.  
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3.3.1 The case study approach  
 
A case study is defined by Gerring (2007: 20) as “the intensive study of a 
single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part, to shed light 
on a larger class of a population”. According to Yin (2003: 13), it is an 
empirical inquiry that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident …” Yin further argues that a case study “relies on multiple 
sources of evidence and prior development of theoretical propositions to 
guide data collection and analysis” (2003:14). The methodology places 
emphasis on detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or 
conditions and their relationships. This research method is mostly used in 
examining contemporary real-life situations and provides the basis for the 
application of ideas and extension of methods. A case study can therefore be 
described as an in-depth investigation into the lives of individuals and is used 
to reconstruct the major aspects of that case. Thus according to Yin (2003), 
a case study is frequently answered by „why‟ and „how‟ questions. Robson 
(2002) argues that the „what‟ questions also play a part, especially in an 
investigative approach. The researcher has no influence over events. Lewis 
(2003: 51) argues that in a case study, methods of collecting data such as 
interviews, documentary analysis and observation are of a qualitative nature. 
Thus to understand the practice, it is necessary to use a case study research 
method because it is a detailed examination of a single example which can 
also provide reliable information about a broader class.  
Drawing on Yin‟s definition of a case study, one of the research questions of 
this thesis is set as a „what‟ question in an investigative way, while the other 
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is set as „how‟. Sub-questions have the „how‟ and „why‟ questions that 
support to answer the two main research questions of the thesis. This 
allowed the researcher to describe, analyse and provide investigative 
explanations that are critical in explanatory research. The use of a case 
study permitted this researcher to examine deeply and evaluate how the 
state-civil society relations in Zimbabwe facilitate or impede the Anti-
Corruption management and analyse strategies employed by the state and 
CSOs to combat corruption. Using a case study, this thesis aims to examine 
the role of the state and civil society in combating corruption in a „real-life 
(Zimbabwean) context‟. Following on from Yin‟s definition, it is therefore 
necessary to point out that there are contested „boundaries‟ between the 
state and civil society as will be shown  in chapter five of this thesis. The 
selection of the state and civil society as representatives of a larger 
population is in line with Gerring‟s definition of a case study, that a case 
study can be viewed as a small case that mirrors a larger population. Burns 
(2000: 461) argues that a case study such as this one has a potential for 
“assisting in refocusing the direction of future investigations in the same 
area” while setting a stage for potential forthcoming comparative study.  
Interviews, document analysis, and observation as data collection methods 
reinforce Yin‟s definition of employing multiple qualitative methods in a case 
study. The methods allowed the researcher to collect data from various 
sources using various data collection methods. This played a key role in 
triangulating data collected through interviews with evidence collected 
through document analysis and observation. The term triangulation 
originated from the term “multiple operationalism” coined by Campbel and 
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Friske meaning multiple measures (cited by Huberman and Miles 1994). 
According to Neuman (1994: 141), triangulation is the use of two or more 
“data collection techniques in order to examine the same variables” and then 
apply the evidence collected “to build a coherent justification for themes” 
(Creswell 2003: 196) such that findings can be compared (Bryman 2008, and 
Mays and Pope 2000). Thus Denzin and Lincoln argue that triangulation in 
qualitative research is a strategy “that adds rigor, breadth, and depth to any 
investigation” (1994: 2). Critics such as Barbour (2001) and Mays and Pope 
(2000) are in agreement that triangulation is a means to ensure that data is 
comprehensive since different qualitative methods produce different data that 
defies direct comparison, such as interviews and observation.  
Case study research methodology has had its critics who have claimed that it 
is subjective and it gives too much room for the researcher‟s own 
interpretations and therefore lacks validity. Some of the general limitations 
associated with the case study approach are outlined in the following sub-
section.  
3.3.1.1 Limitations of a Case Study Approach 
  
A case study has its own weaknesses like all other research design 
approaches. However, Flyvbjerg (2004) argues that these weaknesses are 
misunderstandings about case study research. These misunderstanding are 
that the case study contains a bias towards verification, thus a tendency to 
confirm the researcher‟s preconceived notions. It is often difficult to 
summarize and develop general propositions and theories on the basis of 
specific case studies, one cannot generalize on the basis of an individual 
 103 
case and as such the case study cannot contribute to scientific development. 
This criticism levelled against the case study research method by natural 
scientists that one cannot generalise on the basis of a single case has been 
dismissed on the grounds that it is very possible to generalise from a single 
case as this depends upon the selection of the case and how it has been 
selected.  Giddens (1997), a critic of the case study research method, argues 
that apart from the fact that one cannot generalise from a single case, the 
case study method maintains a bias towards verification and can be 
understood as a tendency to confirm the researcher‟s preconceived notions 
and as a result the study lacks scientific value. Flyvbjerg (2004) however, 
contends that the case study is useful for generating hypotheses, that is, in 
the first stage of a total research process, while other methods are more 
suitable for hypotheses testing and theory-building.  
Yin identifies numerous weaknesses of a case study approach such as a 
lack of rigor as a result of a researcher‟s bias and use of unsystematic 
procedures, and “little basis for scientific generalisation”  (2003: 11). It is 
argued by Yin (2003) that one of the criticisms of a case study research 
method is that it takes a long time to get the results which come in 
incomprehensible documents. Critics such as Tellis (1997) argue that a case 
study is intended to enhance time and understanding of the case studied, 
thus it should not be confused with prolonged research strategies such as 
ethnographies. Yin (2003) argues that these criticisms are unsurprising 
because they are a common feature to other research strategies. The issue 
of a lack of rigor arises out of the misunderstanding that exists between the 
use of a case study as a teaching instrument and the use of a case study in 
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research. Tellis (1997) argues that if goals and methodology of the study are 
set from the onset rigor and validity of the study cannot be doubted.  
Flyvbjerg (2004) traces the use of case study research method to successful 
teachings and researching, and dismisses these misunderstandings arguing 
that the case study is important for the development of a nuanced view of 
reality, including the view that human behaviour cannot be meaningfully 
understood as simply the rule-governed acts at the lowest levels of the 
learning process. A research grounded within an interpretive philosophy 
targets at generalising theoretical propositions and therefore should not be 
confused with studies that aim to enumerate scientific frequencies. These 
criticisms are based on the debate between qualitative and quantitative 
research methods. In addition, they are about the extent to which a case 
study research can be “scientifically generalised beyond producing a 
microscopic study” (Yin 1993: 13). On the basis of this understanding, and of 
alternative research designs, this study adopts the case study approach, and 
then sets out to design and define the sample population.  
3.3.2 Sampling 
 
Mason (2002) and Ritchie et al (2003) argue that sampling is identification 
and selection of appropriate sources of data for the research such as people, 
organisations and settings giving reasons for choosing them. A researcher 
cannot study all cases that make up the study population (Kitzinger 1994), 
therefore, it is necessary to design a sample population to be representative 
of the study population. An important way for designing and identifying a 
sample population is that the procedure must “stand up to independent 
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scrutiny” (Ritchie et al 2003: 80). Sample population are chosen due to their 
key characteristics which are imperative for the exploration and 
understanding of the fundamental themes researched. 
The thesis employed the purposive sampling model to select the sample 
population. It is criterion-based sampling or strategic sampling (Kitzinger 
1994). The research questions and the objectives of the research determine 
the criterion for choosing samples. It is important to mention here that 
purposive sampling has been used to select sample population owing to 
such factors as the individual or organisation‟s responsibility and knowledge 
of Anti-Corruption issues. This has also been used against the background 
that this is a case study research and the aim is to generate an in-depth 
analysis of the researched issues. According to Priest, the intention is to:  
“Gain a „window‟ on a particular worldview, whether 
represented by one or a few human informants or by a limited 
set of media messages selected by the researcher” (Priest 
1996: 114).  
 
As a result, fifty eight candidates were sampled for interviews in Harare and 
Bulawayo. Social players representing the state, political parties, civil society, 
social and political commentators (particularly the academia) were selected 
to be the research respondents. Actors from these groups constitute the 
main players in the project of Anti-Corruption. Other organisations such as 
service delivery NGOs were not drawn into this research because they do 
not necessarily work towards combating corruption or any of the good 
governance issues.  
Some state actors were drawn from government institutions such as the 
ZACC, and the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare. This 
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Ministry was selected because it regulates the institutional channels that are 
vital for the legal operations of CSOs. In many and different ways, it 
oversees the operations of civil society in Zimbabwe. Other state actors 
sampled include the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of 
Higher and Tertiary Education, and the Ministry of Local Government, Rural 
and Urban Development. Interviewing these organs was helpful in answering 
the research questions. This also reflected on the state‟s discourse 
concerning civil society‟s role in wider policy formulation and implementation.  
Some of the social and political commentators are University lecturers from 
the University of Zimbabwe (UZ) and National University of Science and 
Technology (NUST) sampled for their particular knowledge and 
understanding on the subject of corruption. Most of these academics have 
their feet in both civil society and in academia. For instance, alongside their 
lecturing roles some of them hold senior positions in CSOs such as 
Professor John Makumbe, a Board of Trustees member of  TI-Z, and 
Professor Lovemore Madhuku, chairperson of the National Constitutional 
Assembly (NCA). This had an advantage of providing this researcher with a 
balanced and critical interpretation and understanding of the role played by 
CSOs in policy formulation, implementation and Anti-Corruption initiatives.  
Other respondents were also drawn from political parties and politicians 
representing ZANU-PF, MDC-T, MDC-N and PF-ZAPU. Although there are 
over one thousand five hundred CSOs registered and operating in 
Zimbabwe, thirty two of them were interviewed alongside eight government 
Ministries, eight state organs and six individuals deemed knowledgeable 
within the area of research. Of these thirty two CSOs, TI-Z, ACTSA, 
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Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), NCA, and the independent 
media sector (both print and broadcast) emerged as organisations with direct 
interest and to a greater extent linked to Anti-Corruption policy and 
implementation.  
The people and organisations interviewed were chosen for their positions of 
authority and specific knowledge on Anti-Corruption management. The 
purpose of interviews was to gain opinions of, or perceptions on Anti -
Corruption initiatives vis-a-vis the role of the state and civil society in 
combating corruption, and challenges they face in controlling corruption. 
Data collected through interviews was recorded and supported by the taking 
of field notes, as some respondents preferred not to be recorded.  
3.3.3 Data collection instruments 
 
While this thesis embodies an analysis of a wide range of secondary work on 
corruption, much of the information presented in this thesis was obtained 
mainly from primary sources, both written and unwritten. The written primary 
sources of information assessed are listed in the bibliography of the thesis. 
Unwritten primary data was collected mainly through face-to-face interviews 
using semi-structured interviews as a guide (see Appendix 5 for the 
questions used). Secondary data, in the form of published books and journal 
articles informed the conceptual framework of chapter two, the analysis of 
the role of the state and civil society in combating corruption, and in clarifying 
the ontology and epistemological positions of the researcher. Primary data 
which included interviews, documentary analysis and observation were 
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engaged to empirically examine the two research questions and objectives of 
the thesis.  
3.3.3.1 Semi-structured interviews 
 
Strongly claimed to be the most used research method by Fielding and 
Thomas (2001), qualitative interviewing purportedly aims to gain access to 
the participants‟ feelings, experiences and their interpretations of their social 
worlds (Hewitt 2007). An interview can be perceived as a neutral process or 
an interpretive process in which the researcher identifies „objective truths‟ by 
being objective (Hand 2003). The basis of it is the interaction between the 
researcher and participant (Hand, 2003). The ontological and 
epistemological positions of a case study that informs this research requires 
a researcher to situate his thoughts in contemporary thought in both 
qualitative research and interviews (Mills et al 2006). Tellis (1997) takes the 
researcher and participants as co-constructors of meaning through the 
emphasis put on subjective meanings and interpretation of social reality by 
research participants. Interviews are conversations which attempt to uncover 
people‟s lived world prior to scientific explanations (Kvale 1996). Semi -
structured interviews allow interviewer-interviewee interaction that has great 
potential to generate new revealing data on a subject (Legard et al 2003). 
Within the realm of case study, interviewing is the primary data collection 
method (Creswell 2013 and Stern 2007). Different forms of interviewing exist 
(Fontana and Frey 1994), however this research used a face–to-face semi-
structured interviews, a strategy used in numerous case study researches 
(Chiovitti and Piran 2003 and Charmaz 2007). Data was collected through 
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one-to-one semi-structured interviews because they have predetermined 
questions which can be re-worded, modified, clarified to the respondent, or 
left out if suitable to do so (Robson 2002: 270). 
This thesis used qualitative semi-structured interviews to understand 
concepts from the sample population‟s points of views (Kvale 1996). The use 
of semi-structured qualitative interviews is important to this research in that 
the researcher and respondents were allowed flexibility because qualitative 
interviewing tends to be flexible, responding to the  direction in which 
respondents take the interview and perhaps adjusting the emphasis in the 
research as a result of fundamental issues that arise in the course of 
interviews. Interviewers have the flexibility to use their knowledge, expertise, 
and interpersonal ski lls to explore interesting or unexpected ideas or themes 
raised by participants.  
This study deploys qualitative interviews because they a llow the interviewee 
to describe what is meaningful or important to him or her using his or her 
own words rather than being restricted to predetermined categories such as 
in surveys and as a result participants may feel more relaxed and therefore 
willing to talk. It also provides highly credible results and also allows the 
evaluator to probe for more detai ls and ensure that participants are 
interpreting questions the way they were intended.  
Since the issue under investigation in this study is sensitive, face-to-face 
individual interviews become more appropriate as opposed to, for example, 
focus group interviews because they allowed the interviewees to speak in 
confidence and say even controversial things without fearing what other 
people present might say afterwards about what one said. It is also vital to 
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mention that there are ethical issues that one has to consider when 
undertaking qualitative interviews. Patton (1990) says that the very personal, 
conversational nature of interviews makes it mandatory to consider ethical 
issues like confidentiality. Precisely because the subject under discussion is 
sensitive, it is important for the researcher to consider issues of 
confidentiality and assure the respondents that the material collected is for 
scholarly purposes only.  
In qualitative research, the interview is usually recorded and transcribed. 
According to Heritage (1984: 238), tape recording and transcribing is done 
so that it helps correct the natural limitations of our memories and the 
instinctive glosses that we might place on what people say in interviews. 
Recording also allows repeated examinations of the interviewees‟ answers 
and it also opens up the data to public scrutiny by other researchers who can 
evaluate the analysis. The other advantage with the recording of interviews is 
that it helps to counter accusations that an analysis might have been 
influenced by the researcher‟s values and or biases. It also allows for the 
data to be re-used in other ways different from those intended by the original 
researcher. The procedure of recording and transcribing is, however, time 
consuming and expensive as this involves the use of good and expensive 
equipment if quality of sound is to be achieved. Whilst recording is good for 
this research in that it frees the interviewer so that he is alert to what is being 
said so as to make follow up questions rather than concentrating on noting 
down what the interviewee is saying, the use of recorders may disconcert 
respondents who might become alarmed or scared at the prospect of their 
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words being preserved. This was evident in my research as some of the 
respondents were very unwilling to be recorded.  
Like any other types of interviews, semi-structured interviews as a data 
collection technique have their own disadvantages. One of them, according 
to Mikkelsen (1995), is that small sampling can distort the objectivity of a 
wider population as a result of a prejudiced selection of respondents. 
Mikkelsen argues that in some situations the researcher may misinterpret 
data given by informants owing to his or her preconceived viewpoint about 
the subject of research. The second disadvantage as argued by Creswell 
(2003) and Legard et al (2003) is that there is the risk of the researcher 
asking leading questions which may compromise the quality and validity of 
the research. To guard against these disadvantages Robson (2002) argues 
that the researcher should be professional and follow strict interviewing 
techniques. To overcome the problems identified above, the researcher of 
this study used the „topic guide‟ approach during the interviewing process. 
An interview „topic guide‟ is a framework that identi fies a subject or broad 
topics to be examined (Arthur and Nazroo 2003). The importance of this is 
that it ensures that appropriate topics, concerns and issues are 
systematically attended to with some uniformity “while sti ll allowing flexibility 
to pursue the detail that is salient to each individual participant” (Arthur and 
Nazroo 2003:115). To recompense the use of semi-structured interviews, the 
researcher also used documentary sources due to their importance in aiding 
a critical analysis and exploration of the political and socio-economic 
exposition that shapes the nature of the political space, state -civil society 
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relations and the position of civil society in Zimbabwe. The following section 
discusses documentation as data gathering instrument. 
3.3.3.2 Document analysis  
 
Published and unpublished documents served as both primary and 
secondary sources of data for the present study. These sources of data were 
particularly imperative for the identification of the state-civil society‟s 
documented activities and strategies for combating corruption. The 
researcher assessed episodic type of secondary data relating to the role of 
the state and civil society in combating corruption and the challenges 
encountered by some CSOs in fighting corruption. Episodic documents 
comprised of published academic literature. As primary sources of 
information, running documents such as speeches by politicians, 
Parliamentary debates (Hansard), official records, policy papers, pamphlets 
and manuscripts, news from mass media sector and other mass media 
material such as newspapers and radio broadcast played a major role in this 
research. The analysis of political statements and speeches helped the 
researcher to interpret the sampled individuals‟ and institutions‟ role and 
strategies of combating corruption. Some of the episodic documents were 
accessed during fieldwork whilst most of them were accessed during the 
initial preparatory phases of the study through the online services and 
various libraries within the UK.  
As Howarth (1995: 115) argues, an analysis of “the role of meaningful social 
practices and ideas in political life” as expressed in the political discourses of 
various actors is crucial in unpacking the salient structures of the struggles 
for social change. Documentary sources of data used in this thesis allowed 
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access to data usually impossible to reach through interviews. According to 
Johnson and Joslyn (1995) the use of documentary sources is important in 
saving time, particularly when they are available and easy to access. The 
combination of episodic and running documents allowed the researcher to 
empirically advance theoretical statements which further shed light on the 
details of continuities and discontinuities on the role of civil society in 
influencing policy.  
According to Johnson and Joslyn (1995), the use of written documents as 
sources of data has its shortcomings. They point out that there is a process 
of “selective survival” (Johnson and Joslyn (1995: 187) that determines what 
material to read and what not to read. Thus issues of bias of the contents of 
documents cannot be ruled out (Creswell 2003, and Hay 2002).  Therefore, 
there was need for critical selection of documents and info rmation to use in 
this thesis.  
3.3.3.3 Observation  
 
Observation as a method of gathering data is an unavoidable process, 
particularly when the researcher engages directly with research subjects. Yin 
(2003) argues that by visiting the site of the study the researcher situates 
himself in an observing position on what he/she intends to research. While 
on fieldwork in Zimbabwe, the researcher was able to observe state 
institutions and their employees and civil society actors for significant Anti-
Corruption organisations, which were validated or further interrogated during 
interviews. The researcher attended public discussions, meetings and 
seminars organised by several CSOs such as TI-Z and Bulawayo Agenda 
with an objective of observing the tone of Anti-Corruption discourse. These 
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groupings brought together representatives from different CSOs, private 
sector, political parties and the general public. The debates and discussions 
were focused on the political and economic challenges that emanated from 
the economic and political crisis that began in 2000. Interesting for this 
research was that corruption frequently featured in the debates and 
discussions as the cause of the crisis. The discussions were very informative 
in terms of how different participants rationalised the effects of corruption in 
slowing down sustainable development in ways that clearly positioned them 
within Anti-Corruption discourse. This, as direct observation, was very 
important as the researcher was able to interpret the opinions of different 
people and organisations on Anti-Corruption programmes, the role of the 
state and civil society and strategies employed to combat the phenomenon.  
According to Robson (2002: 310), observation is not so much a distinct data 
collection method that requires planning, designing and executing; rather it is 
a “technically in-built” process that happens parallel and simultaneously with 
data collection techniques such as documentary analysis and interviews. The 
importance of this is that issues that relate to the research study can be 
identified or acknowledged as they occur and then implied to illuminate on-
going interviews as concrete referral points or themes.  
Ritchie (2003) argues that observation as the method of gathering 
information is often associated with ethnography and anthropology 
researchers when the objective is to observe people‟s behaviour or way of 
life over a long period of time. Since this research is a case study, time 
accorded ethnography and anthropology designs were not accorded the 
researcher of this thesis. 
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3.4 Fieldwork Reflections 
 
This study was conducted over a period of six months from September 2011 
to February 2012. This period coincided with a peaceful phase in 
Zimbabwe‟s otherwise volatile political situation. However, in December 2011 
political parties and some sections of CSOs‟ attention was focused on 
ZANU-PF‟s annual conference (held in December 2011 in Bulawayo). They 
were concerned with what ZANU-PF has achieved or how it has undone the 
economy, and their assessment of corruption was potentially influenced by 
these realities.  
Researching corruption in Zimbabwe can be a complex academic mission, 
particularly when examining the performance of the state in fighting 
corruption. While researching corruption is often seen as integral in the 
discourses of good governance and democratisation processes, it renders 
the phenomenon and the research alike a politically sensitive subject. It can 
be difficult to get access, let alone gaining permission to carry out the 
research of relevant government information that reveals corrupt government 
activities and the effectiveness of the state sponsored Anti-Corruption 
programmes. Being a sensitive issue, the public and organisations with vital 
information were not willing to give out as much information as they perhaps 
could have done. However, the assurance given to research participants that 
this research is apolitical and is about the development of Zimbabwe, 
although very critical of the political system which is allegedly responsible for 
the proliferation of corruption, made the interviewees more willing, opening 
up, and giving as much information as they could. Much of this research 
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focuses on corruption by the state, senior government employees and 
politicians despite claims by Tendai Biti the Finance Minister that everyone is 
corrupt in Zimbabwe (Moyo 2010). 
The researcher had a pre-arrangement with the TI-Z to use its offices as an 
operation base, and the University of Zimbabwe (UZ) agreed to let the 
researcher use its library facilities. The use of both institutions was very 
helpful to the researcher given that TI-Z is the Anti-Corruption civil society 
which informs this thesis, while the UZ is an academic institution. The TI-Z 
created an email account for the researcher and allowed this researcher to 
use the office telephone to arrange interview appointments. The researcher 
was given an official letter by the TI-Z (Appendix 3), which was supported by 
another official letter from the University of Central Lancashire (UCLAN) 
(Appendix 2). Both letters identified the researcher as a registered student 
with UCLAN and an attaché of the TI-Z during the time of fieldwork. The 
letters explained the purpose of the research. They were important in 
building trust with the respondents and convinced them to agree to be 
interviewed given the sensitiveness of the study and often harassment and 
intimidation of civil society by the state security organs. Trust was 
established with research informants, and interviews became a good source 
of in-depth information.  
 
While being housed by the TI-Z could raise issues of bias, the researcher 
had to maintain neutrality and research professionalism such as adhering to 
research ethics. The researcher was better off with the TI-Z than elsewhere; 
it would have been difficult to visit CSOs and the government institutions as 
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an independent researcher. CSOs and key government organs that are main 
informants in this research trust institutions such as the TI-Z, hence the 
choice to be housed by the TI-Z. It must be emphasised that the use of the 
TI-Z offices permitted easier access to numerous CSOs, civi l society 
meetings and seminars where it became possible to be an observer. This 
could have been difficult if the researcher was coming in as an independent 
researcher or coming from say the UZ. However, the use of the UZ also 
allowed the researcher access to lecturers deemed knowledgeable and 
active within CSOs. The other importance of these bases was that it 
presented the researcher with an opportunity to meet and network with 
different people and organisations, some of them eventually became 
respondents of the research or directed the researcher to people 
knowledgeable in the study. This draws on the notion of „snowballing‟ where 
those already known research participants direct the researcher to other 
knowledgeable participants (Mason 2002). Seventy three interview requests 
were sent by email (see Appendix 1), telephone and through physical visits 
to the offices of some CSOs, government institutions or offices and 
individuals identified as key informants (see Appendix 4). Of the seventy 
three interview requests sent fifty four agreed to be interviewed, and a further 
five were interviewed through telephone upon returning to the UK. The 
interview topic guide was also attached with emails to give the respondents 
an idea of what the research was all about (see Appendix 5).  
 
Those who turned down interviews gave various reasons, some of them 
citing issues of security given the sensitivity of the research topic, while some 
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turned down the invitation citing that they had limited time given that it was 
towards the end of year arguing that they were busy rounding up their work. 
For example, five individuals refused to be interviewed citing fear for their life 
after the interviews despite the assurances of anonymity. However, the 
researcher was able to replace the five individuals with other informants from 
the same organisations. People have a history of loss of freedom after 
speech – even on corruption given that the state does not have a whistle 
blowers‟ protection policy. Perhaps being at TI-Z presented the researcher 
(to some CSOs) as an „undercover state urgent‟ or (to state institutions) as 
someone representing the interests of the Western governments, people 
may not have been very free to talk to the researcher. 
 
Prior to interviews with the respondents consent of all those sampled to be 
respondents was obtained by giving as much information with regards to the 
study and the researcher in order to meet the UCLAN‟s ethical code of 
conduct. Consent to record interviews was sought. Guarantees of anonymity 
and confidentiality in the use of information were professionally observed in 
order to protect both the respondents and the researcher from harm or ill -
effects (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). This was important particularly given that 
corruption is a sensitive area of debate.  
 
Although the researcher had introductory letters issued by UCLAN and TI-Z, 
there were always suspicions that the researcher could be a state agent 
camouflaged as an academic researcher, given the fact that the state was 
suspicious of the activities of some sections of CSOs. This was a major 
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challenge that the researcher experienced. However, on numerous 
occasions some organisations and individuals had to telephone the TI-Z to 
verify my identity and research. The use of the TI-Z offices and the letter was 
very helpful in this regard. 
Notwithstanding these challenges, the researcher managed to collect 
sufficient data for the research from the sampled participants. Despite public 
perceptions that Ministers and senior government officials are corrupt 
(discussed in chapters two and five), the researcher got a good level of 
cooperation from political parties, Ministers and senior government officials 
who also expressed their interest in the research and were willing to share 
their opinions with regards to causes, the nature of corruption, its effects, and 
the role of both the state and CSOs in combating corruption, and Anti-
Corruption strategies. 
 
Given the sensitive nature of the subject of corruption, especially with 
regards to top government officials, it was not always possible to obtain 
directly the names of the perpetrators and figures associated with scandals, 
but the meanings and interpretations of what was happening was sufficient to 
understand and illuminate the complex nature of the problem. These 
challenges should be taken into account when one considers the conclusions 
of this thesis. The next three chapters are results obtained from the field 
study.  
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Chapter 4 
 
4.1 BACKGROUND OF ZIMBABWE 
 
Zimbabwe is a landlocked country situated in the Southern part of the African 
continent between the Zambezi River on the North and the Limpopo River to 
the South. It is surrounded by South Africa to the South, Mozambique to the 
East, Zambia in the North West, and Botswana to the South West (figure 
4.1). Zimbabwe has a subtropical climate that experiences occasional 
droughts and floods, which have in the past led to food shortage and created 
the „perfect‟ opportunity for those in power to monopolise production and 
distribution system. The border posts to South Africa and Botswana have 
witnessed the proliferation of corruption by Immigration and Customs officials 
as cross border traders seek to evade tax and the related bureaucratic 
procedures (Tizor 2009). Figure 4.1 below is a map of Zimbabwe and its 
neighbouring countries. 
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 Map of Zimbabwe and its surrounding countries 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Map showing Zimbabwe and its neighbouring countries 
Source: 
http://www.google.co.uk/images/mzimbab.infoplease.com/atlas/country/zimb
abwe.ht 
Area: 390,757 sq. km (150,872 sq. mi)  
Population: 12.5 million (Government of Zimbabwe 2011). Note: more than 4 
million Zimbabweans are now estimated to live outside the country  
Capital City: Harare (population of Greater Harare: 1.4 million)  
People: Shona, Ndebele, Others  
Languages: English (official language), Shona, Ndebele and others 
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Religion(s): Christian (various) indigenous, small Hindu, Muslim, Jewish 
communities  
Currency: Multi-currency, predominantly the US$ (dollar) and South African 
Rand (the most widely used currencies) the Botswana Pula, British Pound 
are also used. The Zimbabwe Dollar was suspended indefinitely by the 
Zimbabwe government in April 2009 following a period of hyper-inflation.  
Head of State: President Robert Mugabe, ZANU-PF (since 1980)  
Prime Minister: Morgan Tsvangirai, MDC-T (since February 2009). 
Zimbabwean society has heterogeneous social organisations, tribes, cultures 
and languages. Ethnic differences existed among the indigenous people 
even before the arrival of the British settlers. Frantz (1961) argues that these 
served as outstanding criteria for organising social relations. Historical 
analysis by Gatsheni (2002), Nyathi (1996) and Ranger (2004), show that 
these social and ethnic divisions were used by the colonial settlers to „divide 
and rule‟ the population. This legacy remains and dominates the political 
system of Zimbabwe.  
Zimbabwe has three official languages, English, Shona and Ndebele. It has a 
population of around twelve and half million with eighty five per cent of this 
coming from the Shona population, a broad ethno-linguistic group who are 
concentrated mainly in the north and eastern regions of the country, while 
fourteen per cent being the Ndebele speakers from the South and West of 
Zimbabwe, and one per cent being other ethnic groups (Government of 
Zimbabwe 2011). Harare is the capital city; Bulawayo is Zimbabwe‟s second 
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capital and critical urban centre for the predominantly Ndebele-speaking and 
grossly marginalised south-western region of the country. These two cities 
are areas of focus for this research. According to Mawowa (2007), sixty five 
per cent of the population is rural based. The country is partitioned into ten 
provinces, each of them administered by a senator who is appointed by the 
President. 
State media services in the shape of newspapers and radio have traditionally 
been the main source of information for many Zimbabweans. The state 
owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) runs the only television 
and radio stations in the country. All transmitting media from Zimbabwe as 
well as the main newspapers are state-owned. There are no private radio 
and television stations in Zimbabwe, however, overseas-based operations 
broadcast into Zimbabwe, accessed through online services.  
The Herald and The Chronicle are the state owned daily newspapers 
controlled by the Ministry of Media, Information Publicity. Independent 
publications, which have been vocal in criticising ZANU-PF, the ruling 
government, have come under severe government pressure and sanctions. 
Between 2000 and 2002, a number of newspapers including The Daily 
News, The Daily Mirror, and The Zimbabwean Independent, were banned by 
the government, being accused of supporting the opposition. These 
newspapers had all reported corrupt government sanctioned activities such 
as the post-2000 commercial farm invasions, human rights abuses and other 
good governance concerns.  
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The independent newspapers have played a key role in denouncing, 
exposing, and criticising the corrupt behaviours of the ZANU-PF ruling elite. 
For example, on the 5th of August 2001 The Daily News ran a story of four 
ZANU-PF Ministers who had each acquired more than three farms 
repossessed from the white commercial farmers. On the 2nd of October 2001 
The Zimbabwean Independent exposed the looting of the War Victims 
Compensation Fund (WVCF) when huge sums were awarded to the 
incumbent Police Commissioner, Augustine Chihuri, who was deemed 90% 
disabled by the war. Other independent newspapers ran various stories 
about the ruling party‟s corrupt tendencies. These and other corrupt practices 
by the government officials will be discussed in chapters five and six.  
Through the control of the media, ZANU-PF has kept political opposition and 
the challenge by CSOs at a minimum. Chinaka (2009) argues that this 
monopoly over the media has been instrumental in promoting political 
corruption by the ruling elite given that the state owned media protected 
corrupt politicians and those close to the ruling party. 
Zimbabwe is a Parliamentary state with the Executive President Robert 
Mugabe as the head of the state and head of government. He has been in 
power since the country gained its independence in 1980. The political power 
is centralised in and around the Presidency, with a weak Parliament, which 
for the last three decades until the end of 2008, was mostly dominated by the 
ZANU-PF ruling party. The government comprises of the Prime Minister 
Morgan Tsvangirai, who in 2009 formed a coalition government , the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) with ZANU-PF and the other faction of 
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MDC led by Welshman Ncube, and a bicameral legislative body (House of 
Assembly and Senate). The latter consists of 210 members elected from 
single member constituency by plurality. The country‟s main political parties 
are: ZANU-PF the ruling party, the MDC-T established in September 1999 
led by Morgan Tsvangirai, MDC-N led by Welshman Ncube, and PF-ZAPU.  
Moyo (1993) argues that between 1980 and 1990 ZANU-PF has been driving 
for a one-party state and has actively sought to diminish the political space 
for opposition parties. By the end of the 1990s, Zimbabwe began to witness 
a period of substantial political and economic upheaval. Opposition to 
Mugabe and the ZANU-PF government steadily built, in part due to 
deteriorating economic, political, and human rights conditions. This will be 
discussed further in chapters five and six. 
Zimbabwe‟s judicial system comprises of the Supreme Court, the High Court 
and subordinate courts. The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal, 
headed by the Chief Justice; the High Court consists of the Chief Justice and 
the Judge President. Members of the Supreme Court are appointed by the 
President in consultation with the Judiciary Service Commission. 
Consequently, the judicial has failed to hold the executive (and Cabinet 
Ministers) accountable when implicated in corruption scandals. 
Zimbabwe‟s wide variety of natural resources made agriculture and mining 
the major pillars of the economy alongside industry and manufacturing. In 
1990 agriculture accounted for about thirty five per cent of the GDP, while 
industry accounted for twenty nine per cent (Chemhuru 2010). In the years 
between 1982 and 1998, Zimbabwe was a major tobacco producer in 
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Southern Africa. Cotton, timber, tea, and wheat have been other major 
agricultural products exported to other countries. This strong agricultural 
background made Zimbabwe the „bread-basket‟ for surrounding countries.  
However, the forced seizure of almost all white-owned commercial farms by 
the ZANU-PF government between 2000 and 2005 with the stated aim of 
benefiting the landless black Zimbabweans resulted in sharp decreases in 
the agricultural production and precipitated a collapse of the agriculture-
based economy. This led to economic decline and subsequently saw an 
increase in corruption as politicians and bureaucrats competed for the 
declining public resources (Bracking 2009). The ruling elite and the war 
veterans were the first to scramble for the dispossessed white -owned 
commercial land.7 For example, Ministers such as Kembo Mohadi, Joseph 
Hungwe, Joseph Made, Border Gezi, Didymus Mutasa among others, 
pioneered the invasion of white-owned commercial farms. 
Zimbabwe has rich mineral deposits, including gold, diamonds (recently 
discovered), platinum, copper, coal, and asbestos. The largest industries in 
the 1980s to the late 1990s were metal products, food processing, textiles 
and furniture manufacturing. However, between 2000 and 2009 most 
manufacturers have scaled down operations due to the poor operating 
environment and shortage of foreign currency (Luebker 2008). In 2010 the 
government introduced the controversial Indigenisation and Empowerment 
                                                                 
 
 
 
7
 War veterans are a group of former nationalist soldiers who participated in the liberation struggle.  
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Act that forces all foreign companies operating in Zimbabwe to hand over 
fifty one per cent stakes to the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs (ACTSA 2012). 
This created corruption opportunities for the ruling elite and those close to 
the ruling party as the process only benefits the ruling party elite (Bratton and 
Masunungure 2011). Consequently, some industries and firms have closed 
down or relocated. 
Zimbabwe‟s major trading partners are Botswana, China, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa 
(Sande et al 2009). The country is highly dependent on primary commodity 
export and import from and to these countries for economic survival. China 
plays a leading role in supplying industrial machinery and equipment and 
large scale purchasing of raw materials, including tobacco and diamonds 
(Manyeruke 2012).  
Zimbabwe is under economic sanctions imposed by the Western powers as 
a result of human rights abuses and failure to comply with Western 
standards and expectations as far as democracy is concerned. These 
sanctions have led to preferential trade with the East, particularly China. An 
interesting point here is that Chinese aid or trade partnerships are perceived 
to be „stringless‟ and therefore do not enforce mechanisms for managing 
corruption compared to the conditions attached to Western aid. Sanctions 
have created room for corruption given that many industries have shut down 
due to a lack of foreign currency. Sanctions have created shortages in basic 
commodities, which bureaucrats and politicians have taken advantage by 
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selling available (and limited) resources and commodities at inflated prices. 
The next section discusses the political economy of corruption in Zimbabwe 
 
4.2 The context of the study: The political economy of 
corruption in Zimbabwe 
 
Zimbabwe‟s current development cannot be understood without taking into 
account the historical context. This thesis formulates four historical epochs 
that need to be understood as shaping Zimbabwe‟s current political, 
economic and social settings and development. These are: the pre-colonial, 
the colonial, nationalist liberation war, and the post-colonial epoch. The post-
colonial epoch can be further divided into two phases, firstly, covering the 
period from 1980 to 1999, and secondly, from 2000 to 2008 when the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) emerged as a challenging political 
party. This section will unpack each of these four epochs to develop an 
understanding of how the prevalence of corruption in Zimbabwe got to where 
it is today. This thesis critically analyses the status of corruption in Zimbabwe 
in terms of policies and decisions taken in the past and present by the ruling 
government. In this section this thesis argues that the best approach to 
comprehending the present day manifestations and the nature of corruption 
in Zimbabwe is to properly situate it historically and politically within the 
broader terrains of the political economy from the colonial age to the post -
colonial period. 
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According to Gatsheni (2009 and 2011), colonialism survived by violence 
and fragmenting black people into the irreconcilable tribes. It divided the 
Zimbabwean people administratively into tribal fiefdoms of Matabeleland (for 
the Ndebele), Manicaland (for Manyika) and Mashonaland (for the Shona). 
The common experience of exploitation and oppression of these tribes by the 
colonial settlers played a significant role in mobilising them to fight for 
independence. This saw the birth of Zimbabwe in 1980 with an extremely 
bad ethnic birth-mark. In addition it influenced the proliferation of forms of 
corruption. Issues of ethnic factionalism (Mauro 1995 and Tanzi 1998) were 
borne out of this tribal fragmentation. This ethnic divide has led to nepotism, 
in which employment, contracts, business permits, services and goods are 
attained on tribal lines (The Zimbabwe Situation, 23 July 2010, and Matikiri 
and Mapira 2012). Colonialism played a role in this characterisation. 
Countries that are ethnically diverse such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Sudan and 
Ghana are likely to be more corrupt than those of low diversity such as 
Botswana and Mauritius. Botswana and Mauritius are homogeneous states, 
consequently making them less corrupt. Chances of „favouritism‟ are higher 
in states with too many tribes.  
Shana (2006) argues that at independence Zimbabwe presented a number 
of interesting paradoxes. Having survived the international sanctions 
between 1965 and early 1980, as well as the burden of the protracted 
liberation war and its consequences on human and natural resources, 
Zimbabwe emerged with the most sophisticated and diversified economy i n 
Sub-Saharan Africa outside South Africa. While the manufacturing industries 
and the delivery services had survived years of economic sanctions, at 
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independence in 1980 Zimbabwe took off at a phenomenal rate. For the 
following ten years Zimbabwe had the fastest growing economy in the 
Southern Sub-continent (Donna 1998). From the early 1990s the economy 
began to deteriorate rapidly. Political and economic analysts such as 
Makumbe (2011 and 2009) Bratton and Masunungure (2011) and Shana 
(2006) argue that the political turmoil and poor management of the economy 
led to this considerable economic decline.  
Much literature has been written by historians and political scientists on the 
negative effects of colonialism in Zimbabwe. For example, Arrighi (1966), 
Ranger (1977), Bhebhe (1998), Mulinge and Lesetedi (1998), Gatsheni 
(2009), Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009), all argue that the effects of 
colonialism have continued to be felt long after decolonisation. Corruption 
and other economic evils that bedevil Zimbabwe today are directly attributed 
to this historical past (Gatsheni 2009). As argued by Munyae and Lesetedi 
(1998) and Gatsheni (2009), the nature of corruption in post-independent 
Zimbabwe is largely a response to the character of colonialism. Gatsheni 
gives the corrupt land redistribution programme between 2000 and 2005 as 
an example that echoes the colonial Land Apportionment Acts of the 1930s 
which were also corrupt in their nature. 
It is important in this instance to dissect the patterns of corruption or 
“primitive accumulation” (Mawowa 2007: 38) in Zimbabwe. To do this the 
thesis will analyse different development strategies in the context of 
colonialism, its systematic use of material inducements to compel 
Zimbabwean administrators to collaborate with the settlers in the pursuit of 
their colonial project of dominating and exploiting their own people.  
 131 
To occupy Zimbabwe the settlers used various concessions and treaties 
between Cecil John Rhodes and his British South Africa Company (BSAC) 
and Lobengula (King of the Ndebele state) and the wars in the 1890s. It is 
argued here that the Rudd Concession in which the British bribed Indunas 
(Chiefs) such as Lotshe Hlabangana to convince Lobengula to sign an unfair 
treaty that led to loss of power and resources is an early record of corruption. 
This gave white settlers both political and economic space to gain 
ascendency that allowed them to introduce the capitalist economy to the 
black society (Frantz 1961). Once their colonial society was established, the 
British settlers occupied the dominant economic, political, and social status 
positions. To assure themselves of the political and economic stability they 
controlled the Zimbabweans and regulated the processes of economic, 
social and cultural changes (Frantz 1961) through legislations such as the 
hut tax, maize tax and cattle levy, all aimed at protecting the interests of the 
white settlers. 
Having briefly looked at the pre-independent Zimbabwe the thesis turns to 
focus on the post-independence epoch, and analyses how colonialism 
informed Zimbabwe‟s economic, political, and social factors that explain the 
prevalence of corruption today. 
The transition to independence in 1980 virtually coincided with the 
international debt crisis and the resurgence of the political right in western 
politics (Donna 1998). Most of the first decade of independence took place 
during a renewed Cold War and the most intense period of direct intervention 
by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) into African economies 
(Chemhuru 2010, Dansereau 2000, Donna 1998 and MaClean et al 1998). 
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However, for a decade after independence Zimbabwe was able to maintain a 
greater freedom from interference by the IFIs for longer than most other 
African countries because of its strong and diversified economy (Dansereau 
2000). Donna (1998) has argued that the new government of Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU) (a political party that formed the government 
after independence) remained pragmatic in its approach to foreign 
investment and at the same time remained less vulnerable to the economic 
and political interference from the international donor community than any 
other African countries. Donna attributes this to Zimbabwe‟s economic 
success at the time. The period between 1980 and 1990 can rightfully be 
portrayed as one of economic boom years and stability in Zimbabwe. 
Although Zimbabwe had a strong economy, its first footing as a post-colonial 
state started by way of social and political crisis. To understand the crisis and 
how the post-colonial state interacted with the economic challenges 
immediately after gaining independence, it is necessary to identify a few 
benchmarks. Mawowa (2007) argues that one of the major factors facing the 
new state was the Lancaster House Constitutional arrangement. The 
compromise taken meant that the constitutional manoeuvres to redress 
matters of historic economic injustices, especially in the first decade of its 
independence, could only go so far as long as they did not threaten the white 
bourgeoisie. For its economic ends, the new Constitution had to maintain the 
“colonially bequeathed interventionist economic regime” (Mawowa 2007: 45) 
that largely favoured local white capital. It is argued by Hatchard (1991) that 
the Constitution was essentially imposed upon the Zimbabweans by the 
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British government and therefore contained a degree of special protection for 
the white minority. 
During the liberation struggle ZANU and Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African 
People‟s Union (PF-ZAPU) (another grouping that fought in the liberation 
struggle), had campaigned on promises to reduce the extreme inequalities 
that were the legacy of the racist policies of the Rhodesian regime (Ncube 
2010). Therefore, the government asserted in its first economic statement 
„Growth with Equity‟ that it would strongly support the redistribution of the 
productive sector while also meeting the basic needs of the white settlers 
and the poor. Donna points out that: 
“At independence a strategy of Growth with Equity; a policy of 
land reform, including massive levels of re-settlement; 
increased workers‟ rights; and the need for accessible mass 
education and health provision, all had to be balanced against 
the need to avoid the disastrous situation so many other 
countries had found themselves in after the debt crisis” 
(1998:168).  
Moreover, a political reconciliation with the white settler community at 
independence left the latter‟s control of the heights of the economy - the 
most successful commercial farms and the largest and most competitive 
industries, virtually intact. Although the new ruling elite was careful to 
accommodate the interests of the white business leaders (MaClean et al  
1998), it was also sensitive, at first, to the needs of the subordinate classes 
of black peasants and workers who had fought beside the new rulers in the 
liberation struggle and had provided ZANU-PF with its electoral victory. 
The government was immediately confronted with daunting problems, the 
most intractable being the social inequalities as a result of the colonial 
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juxtaposition of class and race; a dominant class of the white-settler owners 
of production and a subordinate class of the black workers and the 
marginalised poor (MaClean et al 1998). One such challenge for the 
government since independence has remained the necessity to meet this 
very high level of the black people‟s expectations after the end of 
colonialism.  
Zimbabwe‟s precarious economic situation has drawn the attention of 
scholars for example, Makumbe (1994), Szeftel (1998 and 2000), Mamdani 
(1997 and 2008), Kagoro (2000), and Gatsheni (2010) in an attempt to 
discern and explain Zimbabwe‟s pattern of economic development. Over the 
first decade, focus by academics and social commentators in Zimbabwe 
were on historical events such as its political and colonial heritage and on the 
importance of the sound economic institutions instrumental in creating and 
sustaining economic growth. 
Until the late 1990s, the crisis of corruption was, however, widely neglected 
by the state, civil society and academics as the ZANU-PF regime became 
widely corrupt and entrenched. Makumbe (1994) argues that the problem of 
corruption in Zimbabwe is interconnected to the climate of unethical 
leadership and bad governance, which in turn has generated a situation in 
which corruption has flourished. Makumbe argues that the national leaders 
are „unethical‟ due to their roles and conducts in plundering national 
resources meant to benefit the state and its people. Good examples o f such 
plunder include the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) Scandal of 1982, the 
National Railways Housing scandal of 1986, the Willowgate scandal of 1988, 
the War victims‟ Compensation scandal of 1994, the VIP Housing scandal of 
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1996, and the invasion of white-owned commercial farms in 2000. All these 
scandals mentioned saw the ZANU-PF political elite and their relatives 
directly implicated. 
Whilst corruption could be argued to be endemic in all societies to varying 
degrees (Rose-Ackerman 1999, and Szeftel 1998), Zimbabwe has 
experienced the severe repercussions that corruption can have upon the 
development and the consolidation of good governance and democracy 
(Shana 2006). Corruption has undermined the already precarious economic 
growth and reduced the resources available for the development of 
infrastructure, the public sector, and has weakened anti-poverty 
programmes.  
In response to the corruption crisis, several Anti-Corruption strategies have 
been promoted by the state and other Anti-Corruption agencies such as the 
transparency International-Zimbabwe (TI-Z) since the 1990s (David 2002). 
Among the state‟s numerous and significant measures has been the creation 
in 2004 of the Ministry of State Enterprises, Anti-Monopolies and Anti-
Corruption, and the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) of 2004 
and 2011. This thesis seeks to examine the strategies deployed and the 
roles played by these and other organs in fighting corruption. Judging by the 
decreasing CPI score of Zimbabwe (2012), it would seem that the corruption 
crisis is far from being eradicated, not in the predictable near future despite 
the proliferation of the Anti-Corruption institutions (as will be discussed in 
chapters five and six). 
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Combating corruption requires a holistic approach that brings together 
different agents, including the public, private, local, regional and international 
bodies to tackle the phenomenon. At the forefront of the Anti-Corruption 
paradigms are the widely agreed views by IFIs such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the bilateral donor community, 
that good governance and democracy are vital conditions for tackling 
corruption. In its 1988 report, the World Bank argues that too much state 
involvement in the economy contributed to Zimbabwe‟s development malaise 
(World Bank 1998). The World Bank and the IMF argue for the state to be 
rolled back from economic intervention and consequently pushed Zimbabwe 
into their neo-liberal policies. And, in 1991 Zimbabwe was pushed into the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) to implement the neo-
liberal policies meant to limit the state‟s participation in economic decision 
making with an eye towards controlling the state‟s influence in economic 
decisions that create opportunities for corruption (Mhone 2001 and Bond 
1998). 
Dovetailing the World Bank‟s argument are Mohan and Zak-Williams (2004) 
and Obayelu (2007) who argue that the expansion of the role of the African 
states in the economy after independence contributed immensely to the 
growth of corruption. Just as in Zimbabwe, the state elite got access to the 
state resources and easily manipulated policies to facilitate their corrupt 
activities. In the Zimbabwean context, this is particularly true for the period 
immediately after the failure of ESAP in the early to mid-1990s (Mhone 
2001). The introduction of ESAP marked a temporary reduction in the state‟s 
role in determining economic decision making and further witnessed the rise 
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of civil society bodies that briefly became powerful before the state 
reasserted its power, co-opted some civil society institutions and suppressed 
the vocal civil society constituency (Kagoro 2005). It is argued by Gatsheni 
(2006), Mawowa (2007) and Moyo (2002) that this set the stage for 
bureaucratic corruption to thrive. 
The rise in corruption was further exacerbated by the decline in the state‟s 
economy as a result of the effects of ESAP. Following this, the country 
experienced continual shortages of essential commodities such as fuel and 
maize. The shortages created a breeding ground for corrupt activities such 
as the hoarding of basic commodities by the manufacturers and traders who 
later resold them at exorbitant prices on the black market. There was also 
the externalisation of foreign and domestic currency to neighbouring 
countries for purposes of speculative profit making by senior government 
officials such as James Makamba the former ZANU-PF Central Committee 
member, Gilbert Muponda, Francis Zimuto and the former Minister of 
Finance Chris Karuneri (Moore 2007). Nyarota (2006) also argues that the 
failure of ESAP led to shortages in basic commodities. Consequently, the 
bureaucrats seized the opportunity to engage in corrupt activities. From 
being „widespread‟ as suggested by Shana (2006) and Munyae and Lesetedi 
(2008), corruption became a way of doing everyday business, which Nyarota 
(2006) argues has reached a stage that may take a long time to reverse or 
remedy, and today, it has a demonstrably negative impact on the 
development of Zimbabwe.  
Between 1980 and 1986 the state enjoyed high levels of integrity with only 
two known court cases involving corruption such as the state versus 
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Paweni.8 From 1987, however, Zimbabwe saw a steep rise in court cases for 
corruption, from two publicised in seven years to an average of four court 
cases a year (Shana 2006). Between 1990 and 1998 the number of 
corruption cases at court rose to over 580 a year (Doig 2006). Doig argues 
this to be „a paradox‟ that underlined the increasing hegemonic grip that the 
state exercised on the country where corruption was increasingly not 
tolerated. This thesis argues that given that the number of corruption cases 
was significantly higher than say in Somali and Nigeria which have higher 
corruption (according to TI 2008), demonstrates that the Zimbabwean state 
could investigate and take corruption cases to court - if it wants to. 
The year 1987 saw the first well-known grand corruption case, the 
Willowgate car scandal. Government officials, many of whom escaped official 
censure, bought new cars from the state‟s Willowvale car enterprise for 
„government business‟ only to resell them at inflated prices (Government of 
Zimbabwe 1989 and Nyarota 2006). The scandal was exposed by the state 
owned newspaper, The Chronicle. This thesis will explore and examine the 
role of newspapers, both state owned and private, in serving a watchdog 
function in controlling corruption. 
By definition, corruption as a sensitive transaction is difficult if not impossible 
to measure with certainty (U4 Anti-corruption resources centre 2005). But 
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 Businessman Samson Paweni was arrested for cheating the government of some Z$5mill ion in 
foreign-sourced famine relief during the 1982-4 drought. Though Paweni was convicted and jailed 
for the offence, most of the high-ranking government officials implicated in the fraud (including a 
Minister, Kumbirai Kangai) escaped the net (Bratton and Masunungure 2011). 
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nonetheless, estimates of the cost of corruption to Zimbabwe are a window 
on the scale of its seriousness and prevalence. To demonstrate the 
prevalence of corruption in Zimbabwe, TI-Z annually produces figures of the 
phenomenon. Established in 1996, TI-Z is the Zimbabwean Chapter of the 
global CSO TI leading the fight against corruption and is the primary CSO 
working in the area of Anti-Corruption. It aims to combat corruption in the 
private and public sector through networks of integrity. The organization is 
involved in a variety of programmes that are meant to raise awareness 
against corruption as well as to assist victims and witnesses of corruption. It 
advocates for a society free of corruption, and is committed to an all-inclusive 
approach to tackling corruption at different levels of the socio-political and 
economic divide.  
TI-Z concentrates on a variety of initiatives such as policy and research that 
focuses on generating new perspectives into corruption through knowledge 
products such as surveys and indices, global reports, country studies, tool 
kits, working papers, policy positions and expert briefs (TI-Z 2011). This has 
been very informative and useful in informing this thesis as a source of 
guidance on issues related to combating corruption. 
The TI report for 2008 states that twenty three of the thirty five most corrupt 
countries in the world were found in Africa with Nigeria ranking worst and 
Botswana the least (TI 2008). With the exception of Botswana, Cape Verde 
and Mauritius, TI‟s 2008 CP I ranked all African countries below forty eight; a 
ranking below fifty suggests high corruption. Zimbabwe‟s current score is 
relatively low (twenty), ranked one hundred and sixty three out of one 
hundred and seventy four surveyed countries in 2012 (TI 2012). The 
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country‟s CPI scores have been falling since the beginning of the economic 
and political instability in the late 1990s. Interestingly, even before 
Zimbabwe‟s economic and political turmoil heightened in post-2000, its CPI 
score still ranked below half, at forty two in 1998 (TI 2008). Consequently, 
corruption in Zimbabwe has received greater attention from both international 
and local communities (Nyarota 2006) as a crucial indicator for sustainable 
development. The monitoring of corruption and the ranking of Zimbabwe 
based on the perception of levels of corruption by TI and other interested 
organisations such as the World Bank and the UNDP has raised awareness 
of the problem of corruption. The analysis of the role of CSOs such as TI-Z in 
controlling corruption is discussed further in chapter six. 
In a politically polarized and suppressive governmental environment such as 
the one ensuing in Zimbabwe (Dorman 2003), it is more likely that CSOs will 
proactively express their energies and resources towards fighting 
bureaucratic corruption as opposed to political corruption. This is because it 
is politically less sensitive compared to grand corruption. Bureaucratic 
corruption is the “implementation end of politics” where public administration 
officials interact more frequently with the public (Goredema 2003: 26). Grand 
corruption involves huge amounts of resources and funds usually involving 
senior politicians. The notions of bureaucratic corruption together with grand 
corruption have been discussed in chapter two. The next section outlines the 
perception of corruption in Africa. Africa is developing and therefore there are 
ample opportunities for contracts, and thus corruption is to be expected. 
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4.3 The perception of corruption in Africa 
 
Corruption exists within all societies, albeit with varying degrees of intensity. 
In Africa, however, concerns about corruption are amplified. The extant high 
levels of poverty, slow growth in economies and weaker institutional 
frameworks for managing public and private enterprises are argued to be a 
result of corruption (Hope 2000, Robinson 2004, and Mbaku 2007). This was 
discussed in chapter two. It is widely believed in both the academic and 
policy arena that impacts of corruption on development have been felt more 
in Africa than in any other continent (Chikulo 2000, Riley 2000, Devine 2010, 
and Uneke 2010, and Kpunde 2000b).  
While poverty is on the rise in Sub-Saharan Africa (BBC 2009, Salih 2011, 
Ake 1991, and Williams 1987), various forms of corruption threaten to 
undermine the impact of investment made to meet the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) in the continent. Africa has been the centre of 
efforts to implement the MDGs set by the world leaders in 2000. Although 
countries are at different phases of development, evidence suggests that 
some countries are highly likely to miss the development targets by 2015 
because of corruption (UN 2012). Among others, the MDGs include reducing 
poverty and curbing epidemics such as HIV/AIDS by 2015. Many of the Sub-
Saharan African countries still fare poorly on the World Bank Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2010, and Murphy 2010). This is attributed to the 
prevalence of corruption as resources meant for public projects are siphoned 
or diverted to private or individuals‟ projects. Murphy (2010) cites the TI‟s CPI 
released in 2010 that identifies Africa as a generally corrupt region in the 
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world, with Sub-Saharan Africa the most corrupt and underdeveloped. 
Developed countries commit large sums and aid to address the plethora of 
the development problems hindering economic growth on the continent, but 
corruption remains a major obstacle to achieving the much-needed progress 
(BBC 2009). 
Corruption in Africa is argued by Riley (2000: 18) to be “part of a syndrome 
of de-development or underdevelopment which destroys the life chances of 
the poor majority” and that its “short-term and longer-term developmental 
effects are both of them disastrous”. 
Cox and Negi (2010) argue that the weakness of the African states and the 
correlative failure of the representative institutions explain the prevalence of 
corruption. The fundamental issue with the African states is the failure to 
structurally differentiate the state from the ruling government. The perception 
emanating from the political ignorance views the ruling government as the 
state. Thus this explains why public, appointed and elected officials treat the 
state as a private resource which breeds corruption in the form of fraud, 
nepotism, bribery, and embezzlement of state resources, to list a few. 
Fundamental to this assertion is what Chabal and Daloz (1999) view as 
„cultural‟ with specific reference to Africa‟s pervasiveness of patrimonialism. 
Bureaucrats hang on to their positions and their legitimacy through the 
development of personal networks with clients, which are structured by 
considerations of ethnicity, kinship, and communal affiliation. They perceive 
themselves and are regarded by their clients as a „big-man‟ in return for a 
distribution of the resources they are able to divert to themselves through 
occupying the state positions. 
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Chabal and Daloz demonstrate that the problem of corruption in Africa is not 
confined to a few individuals, selected institutions or organisations as they 
argue that: 
“Corruption is not just endemic but an integral part of the 
social fabric of life. For those at the bottom of society, like 
lowly civil servants, the sale of a limited amount of power they 
possess is virtually their only means of survival. Higher up, 
extortion is one of the major avenues of enrichment; it 
facilitates the social advancement and the upholding of one‟s 
position … it enables the political elites fulfill duties to meet 
the expectations of their clients and, hence to enhance their 
status” (1999: 99). 
It is in this sense that incumbents and bureaucrats perceive the state as a 
source of their extra-legal income.  
Since the beginning of the 1990s the perception and discourse of corruption 
as a fundamental crisis facing contemporary Africa has become widespread 
(Uneke 2010). Corruption has turned out to be a subject of critical magnitude 
of the African political and economic debates in the last part of the 20 th 
century. The destructive nature and the effects of corruption on the political 
systems, economic development and the states in Africa has become a 
broad concern of scholars and policy makers. While Kpunde (2000b) and 
Mbaku (2007) concur that corruption in Africa has grown to be associated 
with the deep-rooted crisis of economic development and political instability, 
Szeftel (1999a and 2000), and Munyae and Lesetedi (1998) argue that this is 
a direct consequence of the poorly developed and inappropriate institutional 
arrangements. It is indeed tempting to lay a blame on these weakly 
developed institutional arrangements for the current African woes as several 
observers have done, but such analysis is so one sided that it lacks a great 
deal of explanatory power detailing the prevalence of corruption in Africa. 
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Corruption as a guarded operation is complex, and impossible to measure 
with certainty due to the illicit nature of transactions and imprecise definitions 
(Uneke 2010 and Langseth 2002). Even though it is difficult to measure, 
estimations of the cost of corruption in Africa give a general picture of the 
seriousness of the problem. Figures show that in the year 2000 the African 
Union (AU) estimated that corruption cost African economies about forty 
billion dollars (US$) in one year (BBC 2009), and approximately nine 
hundred billion dollars (US$) from the year 2000 to 2008 (Uneke 2010). This 
cost was not only limited to sums of money lost, but also costs of the 
retarded development, deterring investment, increasing cost of goods, 
consequently holding back development. Murphy (2010) argues that in 2008 
developed countries gave forty two billion dollars (US$) in aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa, but a third of it was lost through corruption. These high 
figures show that corruption has severe consequences for Africa, and 
highlight the need to combat the problem.  As argued by Sibudubudu (2002), 
this has led to destructive consequences for Africa‟s public reputations and 
the integrity of the state institutions.  For the reason that corruption has such 
devastating effects in Africa, combating corruption becomes a main concern 
and a development challenge. 
In response to the changing political and economic factors, Africa has 
exhibited variations in the form and incidences of corruption over time. 
According to some historical analysts, the legacy of colonial rule is an 
important aspect in elucidating variations in the intensity and pervasiveness 
of forms of corruption in the continent. It is argued by Little (1996) and 
Szeftel (1998) that corruption in Africa has been an endemic feature since 
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the end of the colonial period. This mirrors the deep socio- cultural traditions 
that are opposed to change. Robinson (1999) concurs that the colonial 
regime left an institutional legacy that has shaped the subsequent form and 
extent of corruption practices in the continent. Yet others like Kong (1996), 
Little (1996), Szeftel (1998), and Gatsheni (2006) argue that the origins of 
corruption could be linked to the historic dominance of the state in economic 
and political affairs, a circumstance which has produced opportunities for 
rent-seeking and destabilised the capacity of the public to hold the politicians 
and the state officials accountable for their actions.  
One striking aspect of the perception of corruption in Africa is that it is widely 
portrayed as having “reached cancerous proportions” (Harrison 2004: 136). 
This perception is misplaced and comes mainly from the international donors 
and the West who do not realise that corruption in Africa is understood at the 
scale of the individuals such as bureaucrats or political leaders, yet in the 
west it is the corporations who are highly corrupt but little is put forward as 
corruption. For example, firstly, in 2008 the Lehman Brothers Holdings 
brought the global economy to a stand-still (Benos et al 2012), which 
ironically was called „financial mismanagement‟ rather than corruption. 
Secondly, the western powers are involved in corrupting African leaders and 
businesses. For example, powers such as Britain, France, and the United 
State of America (to mention a few) have bombed countries such as Libya (in 
201/12) and Iraq (in 2003) and later took part in rebuilding them, which this 
thesis argues to be a corrupt way of generating their Gross Domestic product 
(GDP) that the countries have been using to recover from economic 
slowdown. It may not be that Africa is so corrupt, but a phase of development 
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that the present developed countries passed through many years ago. It is 
therefore, unfair to put African countries on the same scale with the 
developed countries. The CPI used to measure corruption particularly in 
Africa is useful but flawed, the difference in the scales of analysis, direction 
of flow of corruption should all be considered if accurate deductions are to be 
made. Africa is developing and therefore there are ample opportunities for 
contracts, and therefore corruption is to be expected. In fact, others have 
pointed out that corruption takes „two to tango‟ (Onyingo 2012), it is Africa 
and the other parties involved are Western businesses and governments 
working in Africa. Western businesses bribe African leaders and bureaucrats 
in return for lucrative contracts and tenders (Nichols 2012). Researchers and 
academics such as Chabal and Daloz (2010), Mbaku (2010) and Smith 
(2008) label and criticise Africa as being corrupt without taking a close look 
at the role played by Western businesses in promoting corruption in Africa. 
To understand an analytic discourse of corruption analysts have formulated 
theories that explain how corruption sustains itself in various environments. 
The following two sections discuss theories of corruption. 
4.4 Theories of corruption 
 
Although many analysts such as Kpunde (2000a), Rose-Ackerman (1997), 
and Khan (1996) agree on the definition of corruption as the abuse of public 
office or resources for personal benefit, there is little agreement on the 
causes and nature of corruption. This disagreement originates from the 
choice of analytical framework employed because the discourse of corruption 
can be analysed through a variety of approaches drawing on different 
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disciplines. This thesis identifies institutional and public choice theories as 
suitable approaches to explain corruption in Zimbabwe. To explain the 
importance of these theories with regard to combating corruption in 
Zimbabwe, this thesis draws on three schools of thought such as: The 
Rochester School associated with William Riker, The Chicago School or The 
American Institutionalist‟s School associated with William Niskanem that 
concerns the role of the bureaucracy in corruption activities. The third one is 
The Indiana School of Vincent and Elinor Ostram that deals with coercion 
and voluntary cooperation whose perspective will also be discussed further 
in chapter five. All these schools of thought apply to politics and public 
institutions, in particular, how politicians and bureaucrats interact with the 
market to increase their own wealth at the expense of the public. The 
following section discusses institutional theory as perceived in Africa. 
4.4.1 The Institutional theory 
 
The institutional theory focuses chiefly on weak institutional structures, 
processes and capacities of the state. Khan (1996) argues that institutional 
theory, which is grounded in political economy, rests on the power and 
resources allocated to different institutions by the state. This theory tends to 
be grounded in the rent-seeking approach where institutions are weak and 
prone to corruption. Harris-White (1996) and Philip (1997) argue that 
according to the institutional theory corruption arises from interactions 
between public officials and politicians who are assumed to be narrowly self -
seeking in their behaviour and clients who could be business people or the 
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public. Falola argues that the state functions more through informal 
structures and processes with an: 
“Economy of affection that allows for flexible and manipulative 
rules of political and economic transactions in which 
negotiations through bribery are a major means of securing 
agreements, contracts and political consent” (Falola 2008: 
17). 
According to this theory, the rule of law is weak, the government is corrupt, 
the judiciary system is incapacitated, and procurement systems are 
compromised and “Institutions are either themselves havens of corruption or 
ineffectual” (Falola 2008: 17). Makumbe (1994) argues that theoretically, 
undemocratic institutions offer the potential for the public and the private 
sector to participate in corrupt activities. If the rule of law is weak and the 
judiciary is incapacitated there is very little to discourage corrupt activities. 
The lack of effective institutions can be explained primarily as a function of 
the ruling elite‟s capture and control of the state and governmental bodies 
(Kpunde 2000a).9 This capture of state institutions by the ruling elite has led 
to a proliferation of systemic corruption as political leadership and or other 
powerful forces are not constrained by the state‟s institutions. From an 
institutional perspective, corruption arises when public officials have wide 
authority and little accountability. 
In the Zimbabwean context, high-value national resources such as the 
Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) (a steel iron industry) and the 
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 In this thesis, the term ‘elite’ is defined as that “small group of leaders who occupy positions of 
authority and power in public or private organisations” (Leftish 2009: 2). 
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recently discovered Chiyadzwa diamond deposits are either nationalised or 
monopolized by the ruling government. Corruption of patronage and political 
cronyism is rampant, and ruling governments dominate all facets of the 
economy. Such domination has created a climate for systemic exploitation in 
the form of illegal income and rent-seeking opportunities by the public 
officials. Hellman et al (2000) argue that in Africa corruption thrives because 
state institutions are unable to protect property and contractual rights, or to 
support the organs that enforce the rule of law, rather, governments 
participate in invading and plundering private property as evidenced by the 
invasions of white owned commercial farms between the years 2000 and 
2005 where the state failed to provide protection to the commercial farmers 
and their properties. This will be discussed in chapter six. 
Scholars such as Gerring and Thacker (2004) argue that there is a link 
between institutional corruption and poor governance in both the private and 
public spheres. When this is combined with, for example, low wages, huge 
income disparities and accountability and transparency shortcomings, the 
drive for private economic gains can be stronger within institutions than the 
concern for the well-being of the society in the form of providing services and 
sustainable development. 
Engelbert views the African institutions as an assemblage of “... ghostly 
institutions lacking legitimacy” (2000: 47) while Makumbe (cited in Tl-Z 2011: 
6) labels them as “sick institutions”. Both commentators argue that as trust 
and respect for these institutions diminishes, corruption spreads. Bratton et 
al (2005) argues that higher levels of corruption result in lower levels of 
individual trust in state institutions. When the public loses trust for its 
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institutions the drive for corruption rises. Although the causes of corruption 
may be debatable, there is less disagreement about the pernicious effects of 
institutional corruption.  
4.4.2 The Public Choice Theory 
 
Public choice theory can be defined as a theory that analyses politics from 
an economist‟s perspective (Sandstrom and Sandstrom 2005). In this 
perspective, individuals and groups such as bureaucrats and politicians are 
regarded as rational egoists mainly concerned with benefiting their own 
interest. The Rochester School argues that at the heart of public choice 
theory is the notion that an official at any level be they in public or private 
sector, “acts at least partly in his own self-interest, and some officials are 
motivated solely by their own self-interests” (Felkins, 1997: 3). The Chicago 
School argues that the politicians use the political process in decision-
making to win themselves monopolies and privileges that consequently 
breed corruption.  
Public choice theory is a system within institutions (Hope 2000 and Mbaku 
2007 and 2000). It is perceived as an attempt by individuals or groups to 
subvert existing rules and generate extra-legal income and wealth for 
themselves. Falola (2008) argues that this theory is well suited for examining 
and explaining the corruption in African states. Public choice theory 
interlaces with the institutional theory and is effective in explaining post -
colonial opportunism. In this perspective, the over-bloated nature of African 
governments provides incentives for corruption in which public officials, in the 
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absence of restraining powers behave as rational actors who exploit the 
system for their benefit.  
Public choice theory concerns the behaviour of public sector bureaucrats, 
which is at the centre of the theory. While they are supposed to work in the 
public interest, putting into practice the policies of government as efficiently 
and effectively as possible, public choices theorists see bureaucrats as self-
interested and motivated by benefiting themselves (Niskanen 1973). The 
realisation that government employees are driven by self-interest is an 
extremely serious conclusion in understanding manifestation of corruption in 
Zimbabwe. 
Public choice theory is rooted in the neo-liberal paradigm.10 Policy makers 
manipulate macro-economic policies for pecuniary ends and promote various 
forms of rent-seeking activities. Public officials exploit the system to their 
advantage because of the weak restraining institutions. Robinson (1999) 
argues that this theory tends to be premised on a simplistic view of the public 
which assumes that the state organisations and the public officials are 
exclusively motivated by self-interest, and leaves little room for active and 
conscious intervention by the state actors in curbing corruption. 
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 Neo-liberal paradigm is sometimes called by some scholars as the Washington Consensus referring 
to a set of economic policies advocated by neo-classical economic theory. It is a doctrine that 
encourages the implementation of reforms to promote the operation of markets that includes 
economic and political reforms that trigger a process of revolutionary social change (Bazan, C. 
(2009), The neoliberal paradigm: What is neoliberalism? New York; Cambridge University Press) 
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In explaining the public choice theory, Hope (2000) contends that in most 
cases corruption has permeated virtually all institutions in Africa as is the 
case in Zimbabwe. The public, private sector, the governmental and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) rely on it as a way of life and a principal 
method for the accumulation of private property. The practice is not restricted 
to one particular group as pointed out by Chabal and Daloz (1999) earlier. It 
involves people from all levels of life including the professionals for whom the 
vice has made it impossible for them to regulate themselves through their 
professional bodies. The application of public choice theory in this thesis is 
important in giving us an insight into the nature of corruption in state 
institutions. 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe the background of 
Zimbabwe. It explained the geographical position of Zimbabwe and 
examined how its geographical position has been influential in the 
proliferation of corruption. The chapter further explained how Zimbabwe is 
governed. In this chapter it is argued that the ruling government – ZANU-PF, 
has borrowed some colonial corrupt tendencies that have persistently 
manifested themselves in the socio-economic and political set up of the 
state. The next chapter (chapter 5) is a presentation and analysis of data 
from fieldwork findings. 
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Chapter 5 
 
STATE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DONORS‟ RELATIONS: 
AN EVALUATION OF STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY 
INTERFACE IN ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMMES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter adopts Gramsci‟s concept of hegemony to assess state and 
civil society relations with regards to Anti-Corruption policy formulation and 
implementation in Zimbabwe.11 This hegemony is realised in and by the state 
via the use of coercion, force and persuasion. The chapter examines how 
hegemony was forced on, and subsequently challenged by civil society in 
Zimbabwe since 2000. This is important in terms of the thesis‟ first research 
question namely to assess how the state-civil society relations influence Anti-
Corruption programmes. The chapter examines how this relationship has 
changed over time, and its influence upon the fight against corruption. 
Empirical evidence based on people‟s perceptions and documentary data 
gathered during fieldwork in Zimbabwe between September 2011 and 
February 2012 is employed to evaluate the contentious state-civil society 
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 Gramsci used the term hegemony to denote the predominance of one social class over other. This 
represents political and economic control, and the ability of the dominant class to project its own 
way of seeing the world so that those who are subordinated by it accept it as natural  
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interface and how this „„shapes the organisational make-up and operations of 
civil society‟‟ (Ncube 2010: 110).  
Therefore, this chapter analyses the status and evolution of the state-civil 
society relationship and its implications for Anti-Corruption management by 
focusing on an analysis of several important CSOs such as the ZNLWVA, 
the TI-Z, the independent media, and the ZCTU. Other CSOs such as the 
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), the NANGO, the Media Institute of 
Southern Africa (MISA), as well as political parties will be drawn into the 
following analysis in order to provide both context and evidence. 
As a starting point, the contours of post-independence state-civil society 
linkages, which define the continuities and discontinuities in the composition 
of the relationship, advocacy issues and strategies of state-civil society 
engagement, are discussed. This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 
5.2 is a discussion and an assessment of state-civi l society historical 
linkages in the first decade of independence. This section explores how and 
why the state coerced and/or co-opted civil society organisations into party 
politics, thus forming a hegemonic alliance or „forced marriage‟, and the 
implications for Anti-Corruption initiatives. Section 5.3 explores the state‟s 
construction of hegemony over CSOs and opposition politics. Section 5.4 
examines the contentious nature of state-civil society relations and within 
that context how the relations strengthened and/or weakened the agentive 
civil society‟s role and influence in combating corruption. The goal is to 
evaluate the dialectic role of civil society in nationalist politics and the 
counter-hegemonic civil society struggle for democratic and policy space. 
Section 5.4.1 explores the war veterans and TI-Z‟s relations with the state 
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and how the relations influence Anti-Corruption strategies. Section 5.4.2 
examines anti-state civil society challenges in combating corruption. Section 
5.5 summarises the key findings and assesses the implications for our 
understanding of these issues and for combating corruption in Zimbabwe.  
5.2 An examination of post-independence state-civil society 
relations in    Zimbabwe 
 
Immediately after independence certain civil society organisations (CSOs) 
voluntarily chose to ally with the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic 
Front (ZANU-PF) - led government, while some sections of CSOs were 
coerced by ZANU-PF into joining the ruling government.  Consequently, the 
relationship between the state and civi l society in the first decade of the 
independent Zimbabwe had overarching consequences for Anti-Corruption 
management, and was controversial and problematic for several reasons.   
Firstly, allegiance to the ruling party allowed access to state resources and 
political recognition. As recounted by one respondent from the Zimbabwe 
Human Rights Association, while at independence organisations “expected a 
share of political spoils” from the state, they were disappointed to miss out as 
the ruling government amassed all the power leaving them voiceless.12 This 
strategy was consistent with ZANU-PF‟s hegemonic notion that to be a 
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 Zimbabwe Human Rights Association representative (Interview 25, 16
th
 December 2011) argues 
that those CSOs who expected government recognition in building Zimbabwe had no input or 
influence in reconstructing the country as the government shut them out of policy formulation and 
implementation 
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beneficiary of the liberation struggle one had to follow ZANU-PF‟s ideology 
namely that the party had exclusive ownership of power. This is reflected 
invariably through ZNLWVA‟s violent tendencies, something this chapter will 
return to later.  
However, some organisations such as the ZCTU, student unions, and 
religious groups opposed and were critical of some civi l society alliances with 
ZANU-PF in the 1980s. These organisations had genuine concern with 
regard to civil society-ZANU-PF alliance arguing that the relationship 
compromises the roles of civil society, particularly when they are to criticise 
the ruling government. This later turned to be correct when some sections of 
CSOs remained quiet when the state engaged in corrupt practices and 
abuse of human rights. 
At independence in 1980 CSOs expected the colonial attitude towards them 
to change. Trade unions and student movements that had operated 
underground during the era of the settler government, expected to attain 
legitimacy after independence, but “were left bleeding” as a consequence of 
ZANU-PF‟s tactics and suppressive tendencies of silencing its critics (Moyo 
1993: 8). This is reflected in the discussion with one respondent from the 
ZCTU: 
“This reflected indebtedness to the previous tradition of 
political thought …. Some civil society groups bled to death as 
they failed to find any political space for independent policy 
action arising from self-management and self-organisation 
without state tutelage” (Interview 17, 18th November 2011) 
Some of the organisations that survived unfortunately found themselves 
following ZANU-PF‟s political agenda, promoting the ruling party‟s policies. 
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This meant that their watchdog role was compromised as they could not 
criticise activities of the state even when corruption was evident such as in 
the Willowgate scandal. Those civic groups who were forced or voluntarily 
cooperated with the ruling party squandered their watchdog roles in 
exchange for resources, survival and recognition. 
Several interviews showed that the state sought alliance with CSOs in order 
to stop them from criticising its corrupt practices and abuses of power. For 
instance, a respondent from the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 
(CCJP) argued that the state hi jacked and forced some civil society 
organisations into party politics to prevent them from monitoring the party‟s 
activities. The respondent stated that:  
“ZANU-PF tried to force a relationship that was not going to 
work forever. It is known that civil society is set up to monitor 
the government not to work within it. These two formations 
are not complimentary forces. How did those civil society 
organisations who joined ZANU-PF define their roles?” 
(Interview 17, 12th December 2012) 
This supports the notion that one of civil society‟s roles is to monitor 
functions of the government, and challenge its abuses of authority (as 
discussed in chapter one) (Diamond 1997). ZANU-PF‟s co-option of civil 
society into its structures became an effective apparatus to contain the 
demands of civil society. Given this, this thesis argues that certain sections 
of civil society were deprived of their autonomy after independence and 
consequentially have struggled to divorce themselves from the marriage of 
convenience. Therefore, the state and some parts of civil society relationship 
have become one of a dialectical nature rather than diametric opposite.  
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The implication for this development is that whilst in theory and Western 
conceptualisation, civil society is separate from the state and seeks to act as 
checks against authoritarian tendencies of the state. The relationship is one 
of a “balanced opposition” (Bayart 1986: 112). Given the absence of this 
process of „balanced opposition‟, in the Zimbabwean context, civil society 
only performs this role so its function differs from similar organisations 
elsewhere. This enables us to understand more clearly the nature of the 
interface and interdependence between the state and civil society in 
Zimbabwe. It further demonstrates how problematic it has been for some 
post-independence CSOs to influence policy formulation and 
implementation. This was demonstrated in an interview with a Zimbabwe 
Commercial Farmers Union (ZCFU) representative who argued that ZCFU 
was co-opted by the ruling government (Interview 21, 07 December 2011). 
However, while the above respondent argues that some CSOs were happy 
with the state; this thesis argues that they did not challenge the state 
because they were benefiting from this relationship, and even when they saw 
the need to challenge the state, the nature of the relationship prevented any 
forms of effective opposition or criticism. Criticism could have meant 
effectively the end of the particular CSO. 
This analysis of post-independence state-civil society relations evinces a 
similarity between the ZANU-PF government and the colonial administrators, 
particularly in weakening civil society. The colonial political administrators 
actively discouraged the formation of a Zimbabwean civil society (Gatsheni 
2010). Civic organisations were criminalised and legislated out of the political 
space. The ZANU-PF government has continued the legacy of colonial 
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oppression by suppressing vocal organisations. This thesis argues that it is 
from this standpoint that post-independence civil society has had little or no 
influence on policy issues and partly explains the underdevelopment of civil 
society in Zimbabwe. 
It is worth noting that ZANU-PF has destabilised and frustrated the 
development of civil society by excluding them from policy formulation and 
implementation, mainstream politics, and confining them to positions of party 
structures where they would define themselves in terms of the party organs 
as opposed to civil society (Ncube 2010). A good example is the ZNLWVA, 
who became the party‟s instrument of instigating violence particularly in the 
period after the formation of the MDC in 1999, in which they harassed the 
opposition party members, and violently invaded white commercial farms 
between 2000 and 2005. 
Secondly, the other reason behind the state-civil society alliance emanates 
from their umbilical link during the liberation struggle when some CSOs 
played an important role in supporting the nationalist parties, ZANU-PF and 
Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People‟s Union (PF-ZAPU), by using their 
extensive networks to raise money and resources for the liberation struggle, 
and in disseminating information abroad about the human rights situation in 
Zimbabwe. Such a role should have led to the sharing of the spoils but 
clearly did not. Using their extensive networks and influence they were able 
to smuggle nationalists out of the country and ensured that those who left 
received military training and education. On the one hand, the problems of 
Rhodesia remained firmly placed on the international agenda via the support 
of the former Communist states like Soviet Union (Russia) and China. Other 
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newly independent countries (e.g. Ghana, Egypt, Mozambique, Tanzania 
and Zambia) also supported the liberation struggle through liaising with civil 
society constituents with regard the situation in Rhodesia (Gwakuba-Ndlovu 
1981). It is from this historical background that CSOs envisaged a „marriage‟ 
(Moyo 2010) with these political parties they assisted during the liberation 
struggle that culminated in independence in 1980.  
On the flip side, ZANU-PF embraced certain CSOs and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) to fulfil its own goals. Firstly, the ruling government 
wanted to destroy any forms of opposition which could hinder its „one-party 
state‟ ideology. The Matabeleland  Gukurahundi genocide is testament to this 
doctrine.13 Characteristically, the government neither tolerated nor accepted 
any form of power within the society other than the party and government 
structures. It viewed itself as the only „people‟s organisation‟. Several 
interviews showed that the ruling government was not comfortable with the 
existing forms of power other than the ruling party structures, therefore, 
embarked on destroying what it perceived as potential threat to its power. 
For example, at an interview with the CCJP official, it was asserted that, 
because ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU often clashed with each other during the 
liberation struggle, there was a shared suspicion within ZANU-PF that PF-
                                                                 
 
 
 
13
 Gukurahundi was a violent campaign in which over twenty thousand people in the P F-ZAPU 
dominated Matabeleland were massacred by a brigade owing allegiance to ZANU-PF government 
(Sokwanele 29/05/07 and 15/09/11, and CCJP 1997). 
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ZAPU would attempt a coup or rebel against the ruling party. 14  This 
assumption is captured in the interview with a Zimbabwe Congress of Trade 
Unions (ZCTU) official who had this to say: 
“ZANU-PF set up itself to be the representative association of 
all (social) movements and downplayed all oppositions and 
civil society organisations in the name of the revolution, look 
at what happened to Matabeleland, ZANU-PF thought that 
people from Matabeleland will not accept its government and 
the army went on to kill the people in the region as a way of 
forcing them to support them” (Interview 17, 18th November 
2011).  
Secondly, ZANU-PF co-opted some parts of civil society groups (such as the 
media) for the role they played in the liberation struggle. This was highlighted 
by the Minister of Justice and Legal Affairs who stated that: “We fought the 
liberation struggle with some parts of civil society, now we are saying to them 
„Let‟s stick together‟…” (Interview 33, 5th January 2012). Thirdly, the 
„marriage‟ was influenced by certain civil society‟s ability to attract 
international funders and donors for development projects. Given that 
Zimbabwe had just attained independence, it needed foreign aid for 
reconstruction, which the United Kingdom (UK), United State of America 
(USA), and Australia among others, channelled through CSOs and NGOs. A 
University of Zimbabwe lecturer interviewed argued that civic institutions 
were tolerated only as long as they adhered to the state‟s definition of 
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 Catholic Commission of Justice and Peace (CCJP) (Interview 15, 11th November 2011),  
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development or existed to provide alternative conduits of foreign aid.15 For 
example, the Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union (ZCFU), and 
Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), whose composition was mainly 
white commercial farmers, were seen as targets for multi-lateral and aid 
organisations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in support of agricultural and industrial development. Although 
Zimbabwe had a relatively strong economy, donors played a fundamental 
role in the economic development of the country as Zimbabwe‟s 
manufacturing industries, agriculture and welfare services relied on foreign 
aid. However, dependence on foreign donors later began to strain the state-
civil society relations, particularly when donors channelled aid through CSOs 
and NGOs rather than through the state. This clearly created issues between 
the state, CSOs (who were recipients of the aid) and donor community, and 
cracks of the soured relationship started to appear in the early 1990s when 
CSOs started criticising the government for its oppressive tendencies (Ncube 
2010). It pitted the state and civil society into opposing positions. This point 
will be discussed further in the following section. 
While some CSOs were willing to work with the government of the day, 
ZANU-PF was never willing completely to share the political space with them 
on issues such as governance and policy formulation and implementation. 
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 Given that Zimbabwe was coming from a protracted war of l iberation, it needed foreign aid to 
rebuild infrastructure and industries, NGOs and CSOs such as ZCFU and CZI who were mainly white 
bourgeoisie were considered to be influential in attracting this foreign aid, therefore ZANU-PF 
cherished a relationship with these organisations (Interview 5, 28
th
 October 2011) 
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Some sections of civil society such as the ZCFU largely abandoned the 
thinking of opposing or challenging the government on national issues. The 
state adopted the colonial administrators‟ tendencies of suppressing civic 
groups (Interview 17, 18th November 2011) and never freed the political and 
policy formulating space (Interview 39, 10th January 2012), possibly as a way 
of preventing any political opposition and curtailing criticism from civil society. 
Consequently, the state became corrupt and authoritarian because civic 
groups that should have provided checks and balances were muted by the 
suppressive tendencies of the state.   
Despite the state‟s oppressive tendencies towards CSOs, some have 
remained imbedded to the ruling party‟s politics. This is witnessed by their 
silence despite the ruling government‟s abuse of human rights and corruption 
scandals. Civil society‟s silence had implications for corruption. For example, 
when there were widespread reports of systematic and escalating violations 
of human rights by ZANU-PF in Matabeleland (Gukurahundi genocide), 
some CSOs remained quiet and denied the precise details that were 
emerging. It appears that some CSOs believed in the ZANU-PF ideology of 
the one party state, and remained firmly in support of the ruling party. 
Although other CSOs and religious groups such as the CCJP questioned the 
state‟s worst recorded human rights violations in the country (CCJP 1997) 
other civil society organisations remained silent or chose to ignore the 
government‟s actions. Silence by CSOs meant that there were no effective 
voices or watchdogs to monitor, question and criticise the conduct of 
government, particularly on corruption which proliferated in the absence of 
checks and balances.  
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Ncube (2010, citing Raftopoulos 2000) argues that between 1980 and the 
mid-1990s, certain CSOs became entrenched in the tutelage politics of 
ZANU-PF. This is evident when senior government officials got involved in 
corrupt practices early in the 1980s such as the Willowgate  scandal (see 
chapter two), and once again most CSOs did not question the corrupt 
conduct of some Ministers, either because they (civil society) saw 
themselves as part of the ruling government, or simply because ZANU-PF 
discouraged CSOs from criticising the ruling party elites. This compelled 
them to remain silent on all corruption scandals of the time such as the Grain 
Marketing Board (GMB), National Railways Housing Scandal, the Willowgate 
scandal, and human rights violations orchestrated by the ruling party 
between 1980 and early 1990s. The implication is that while for the most part 
CSOs were assimilated into the politics of the ruling party, it became a 
challenge for them to criticise the state as they were powerless in terms of 
criticising the government‟s corrupt practices, or opposing the ruling 
government chiefly to prove their revolutionary allegiance. When ZANU-PF 
came into power in 1980 it took advantage of an underdeveloped civil society 
by declaring that it was the solitary and legitimate representative of the 
people of Zimbabwe. This is supported by one interviewee from the CCJP 
who pointed out that:  
“In the 1980s civil society acted as if they were the ones who 
voted ZANU-PF in power. They never questioned the 
authoritative rule and autocratic behaviour of the state…., 
they witnessed corruption at its grassroots when ministers 
stole vehicles and food meant for those in need but they 
chose to remain silent until corruption became a system and a 
way of life in the country ….They wanted to prove their 
comradeship by remaining silent ….” (Interview19, 11th 
November 2011). 
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Certainly, certain CSOs are as guilty as the ruling party for letting corruption 
become widespread. They have not dealt with corruption because the state 
has coerced them into party structures (while some voluntarily joined the 
state) making it rather difficult for them to effectively criticise corrupt 
tendencies by the ruling government. Even those that questioned the ruling 
party‟s corrupt conduc t, such as student unions and trade unions were 
subsequently silenced through arrest and detention of its leaders (Moyo 
1993). CSOs failed to deal with corruption issues because of the hegemonic, 
coercive and repressive nature of the state, which makes relations not 
conducive for certain parts of civil society organisations to tackle corruption 
since they have not been accorded the political space to operate. 
Consequently, the hegemonic and repressive nature of the state played a 
major role in preventing some CSOs from combating corruption.  
The interview with the CCJP representative (above) echoes the position of 
most donor countries at the time. By then Mugabe was a darling of the West 
and Zimbabwe was being positioned as a model of progress that other 
African countries should follow. Western powers remained silent on human 
rights abuses and corruption scandals by Mugabe‟s government (Moyo 
2010, and Gatsheni 2010), yet the donor governments continued to provide 
aid to CSOs allied to the ruling party. Therefore the state, CSOs, and the 
donor community should share the blame for the proliferation of corruption in 
Zimbabwe, because firstly, the state did not put mechanisms to control 
corruption. Secondly, some of CSOs did not play a watchdog role against 
government corruption as they became allies, nor did they question the 
state‟s corrupt practices. They are guilty by association.  Thirdly, the donor 
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community continued channelling funds to the state  and civil society despite 
human rights abuses and corruption scandals. All this played a major role in 
strengthening the state‟s hegemony over civil society. 
The following section examines how the state constructed its hegemonic grip 
over civil society and opposition politics. Evidence from fieldwork 
demonstrates that civil society‟s relations with the state (including combating 
corruption) continue to be in a state of „chronic underdevelopment‟ as an 
outcome of the state hegemony, and historical factors related to pre-
independence and post-independence politics. The question that arises is: 
How has the state managed to suppress civil society? The next section 
interrogates this question in order to examine how state hegemony 
influenced civil society‟s Anti-Corruption management. 
5.3 State‟s construction of hegemony over civil society 
organisations and opposition 
ZANU-PF‟s capture of CSOs was based on the deployment of the themes of 
reconciliation, nation building and unity for a new country undergoing socio-
economic and political recovery and reconstruction following a protracted 
liberation struggle. Moyo (1993) argues that the ruling party challenged all 
„legitimate‟ associations to join ZANU-PF in order to show their patriotic and 
revolutionary commitment in the process of reconstruction. Between 1980 
and the early 1990s, the ruling party succeeded in confining civil society to a 
limited political space and to silence the human rights and governance 
discourse in the public sphere either through harassing them or restricting 
their activities and operations. This process gradually consolidated the one-
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party state. Some CSOs and political challengers believed to be potential 
impediments to a one-party state ideology, such as PF-ZAPU were either 
weakened or destroyed through assimilating its members into state 
structures or imprisoning its leaders. For example, members of the PF-ZAPU 
leadership including Dumiso Dabengwa, now leader of the resurrected PF-
ZAPU, were detained for four years without trial allegedly on treason charges 
(Interview 54, 14th February 2012). This was followed by the Unity Accord of 
1987 signed between PF-ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo and ZANU leader 
Robert Mugabe which effectively dissolved PF-ZAPU into ZANU-PF.16 While 
in the past, scholars have tended to view the 1987 Unity Accord as a peace 
building project between two party leaders, this thesis argues that this was a 
ZANU-PF‟s tactic used to build a one party state. It aimed to destroy PF-
ZAPU because it presented a political threat to ZANU. This was highlighted 
by Robert Mugabe when he said:  
“You can vote for them [PF-ZAPU] but that would be a wasted 
vote. I am telling you. … There is no way we can allow them 
to rule this country, never ever. We have a job to do, to 
protect our [ZANU-PF] heritage, no one can rule this country, 
and we will never allow it” (cited in Gatsheni 2011b: 3).  
Having eliminated PF-ZAPU from politics through the 1987 Unity Accord, 
ZANU-PF remained with no political threat or challenge up unti l the formation 
of the MDC in 1999.  
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 The 1987 Unity Accord ushered peace between ZANU and PF-ZAPU following Gukurahundi in 
Matabeleland and Midlands which left thousands of civil ians dead. 
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Whilst the ruling party adopted a more comprehensive policy of embracing all 
the pre-independence organisations, historians such as Nyathi (1998) and 
Moyana et al (2000) argue that the Unity Accord was a reconciliation strategy 
between the nationalists. However, while some historians view this as 
reconciliation, this thesis argues that the ZANU-PF-led government 
manipulated the discourse of reconciliation, nation building and peace to 
create a hegemonic project that gradually destroyed political legitimacy and 
led to the methodical eradication of its opponents, particularly PF-ZAPU. The 
implication this had for corruption is that while the state had already 
assimilated some sections of CSOs into party politics, the elimination of PF-
ZAPU meant there was no political opposition in Parliament to put pressure 
on the ruling government when cases of corruption emerged.  
According to Moyo (1993: 7), between 1980 and 1990 those groups which 
questioned, criticised, or attempted to oppose ZANU-PF‟s “tactic of exclusion 
by inclusion under the guise of one state, one society, one nation, and one 
leader” were criminalised and labelled as „sell-outs‟ working for the „enemy of 
the state‟ as the ruling party reinforced its commitment to a legislated one-
party state.17 This had an effect of diminishing the capacity of civil society 
and legitimating autocratic tendencies of ZANU-PF government. 
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 The state has continued to call  CSOs ‘enemies of the state’ because of their association with the 
MDC and links with the international donor community who the state allegedly accuses for 
sponsoring  the idea of change of government, thus these CSOs and NGOs have struggled to 
disassociate with this tag. 
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Consequently, it silenced some sections of CSOs, particularly on corruption 
practices by the ruling party. 
However, while scholars like Moyo (1993) and Dorman (2001) argue that 
ZANU-PF coerced CSOs into joining the state, this thesis argues that some 
sections of CSOs voluntarily subordinated themselves under the party 
patronage system by complementing and pursuing policy advocacy under 
ZANU-PF‟s politics because they enjoyed and benefited from a financial and 
material relationship with the state. Such organisations include the ZCFU, 
CZI, and later the ZNLWVA. Commercial farmers were aware of the need for 
land redistribution, and their alliance with the state was intended to delay the 
project of land acquisition and redistribution. The motive was to protect their 
self-interest, which coincided with the ruling party keeping power. 
Consequently, it was a „win-win‟ situation for both the state and commercial 
farmers. It is important to note that relations between the ruling party and the 
ZCFU broke down when the state started embarking on a compulsory land 
acquisition and redistribution project in 2000. White commercial farmers 
subsequently shifted their allegiance to the newly formed MDC hoping that 
the land redistribution programme would be reversed if the MDC won the 
elections that followed. It is this ZCFU-MDC association that ended the 
ZCFU and the ruling government relationship.  
The land issue is both significant and critical in explaining the state-ZCFU 
relations. After independence, Zimbabweans expected the government to 
carry out a swift land redistribution programme but several factors militated 
against this shift. Firstly, the „willing-buyer, willing-seller‟ policy adopted 
under the Lancaster House Agreement, and to the need to address the land 
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issue, proved to be an obstacle for the government to quickly designate 
white owned farms for redistribution. 18  In an interview, a ZCFU 
representative argued that three factors prevented the government from 
quickly acquiring white owned farms for redistribution:  
“Firstly, the agreement at the Lancaster House was that the 
distribution project will begin a decade after independence, 
secondly, the state did not have money to fund the land 
redistribution programme, and thirdly, farming was the 
backbone of the economy and the state was very cautious if 
not in dilemma” (Interview 21, 7th December 2011). 
Secondly, co-option of certain CSOs by the government in the early 1980s 
meant that there was no formidable counter pressure on government from 
CSOs to make land reform more urgent (Ncube 2010). Therefore, in the first 
decade of independence the government‟s public discourse on land 
redistribution was simple rhetorical politics in order to retain power by 
appeasing voters because commercial farmers were the backbone of the 
economy. For example, in 1985 the President announced that a quarter of a 
million people were to be resettled within the following two years. The 
President announced that:  
“The biggest single problem it is yet to resolve is that of land 
distribution. It is the most vital question we face today in our 
economic development activities. The government must 
simply move effectively, speedily and decisively with the land 
question by the end of 1987” (quoted in The Herald 1989)  
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 Lancaster House Agreement was the agreement signed in December 1979 between the British 
government and the Patriotic Front delegation led by Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU), Robert Mugabe (ZANU) 
and the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa. The agreement covered 
among other things a cease-fire agreement, the independence constitution, and to wait for ten 
years before instituting land reform (Lancaster House Report 1979) 
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However, land distribution did not happen and the policy remained rhetorical 
for the decade. As argued by the respondent from the ZCFU, given that the 
state was in a phase of socio-economic and political recovery, early land 
redistribution would have interfered with the national development agenda  
(Magaisa 2010). The fact that when the Lancaster provisions on land 
acquisition expired in 1990, the state did little to quicken the process of land 
acquisition, redistribution or resettlement validates the point that the question 
of land distribution was ZANU-PF‟s mere rhetorical political speech. 
Furthermore, when the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 1992 was enacted for 
the fast compulsory acquisition of white owned commercial farms for 
redistribution, the government designed it in such a way that the process 
would take up to ten years to complete. The government was aware that, 
firstly, compulsory acquisition of white commercial farms would destabilise 
the economy, which relied on agriculture. Secondly, this would affect 
relationships with ZCFU. 19  Therefore, the delay benefited both the 
government and ZCFU. 
Brown and Tandon (1992) and Lipsky and Smith (1990) argue that although 
organisations such as the ZCFU benefited from a marriage with the ruling 
party, they were subjected to pressure to work with the party. Thus while the 
ZCFU enjoyed relations and certain benefits, they were obliged to ignore the 
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 Eventually, when the government started embarking on compulsory acquisition of white 
commercial farms in 2000 relations between the government and ZCFU were stained, leading to 
ZCFU turning to support the opposition MDC with the hope that a win of MDC will  reverse ZANU-
PF’s compulsory distribution of commercial farms 
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early signs of government corruption that involved a land redistribution 
programme or land allocation process that favoured ZANU-PF senior 
members. For example, between 1980 and 1990, ninety eight ZANU-PF 
senior members had corruptly acquired one or more farms each (Sokwanele 
2006), while the majority of Zimbabweans remained landless. 
On the other hand, the silence of some CSOs on corrupt tendencies of the 
ruling party was evidently influenced by the politics of polarisation that 
existed in post-colonial Zimbabwe. For instance, several interviews showed 
that some sections of civil society‟s capacity to influence policy depended on 
the nature of their relationship with the state, or on issues being addressed, 
and how they were understood and interpreted within the ZANU-PF regime.20 
For example, if the ZANU-PF government felt that an organisation‟s influence 
threatened the security of the party or the state, the regime quickly blocked 
or suppressed its activities, the destruction of PF-ZAPU political party is one 
example. Leadership of organisations perceived to be a threat to the ruling 
party faced intimidation, harassment and violence. Such organisations 
include the ZCTU, NCA, the independent media, and human rights 
campaigners. Violence, intimidation, and harassment intensified after the 
formation of the MDC opposition party as the ruling government considered 
them to be a threat to state security because of their allegiance with the 
MDC. For example, in 2008 activists such as Jestina Mukoko were abducted 
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 Interview 15, 11th November 2011 with the CCJP respondent; Interview 17, 18th November2011 
with the ZCTU representative; and Interview 21, 7th December 2011 with the NCA respondent 
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and tortured for their public criticism of the government for human rights . The 
arrest of human rights activists was intended to instil fear in CSOs and their 
leaders. It also exposed the ruling party‟s intolerance of opposition and 
abuse of human rights. This situation set the state and some parts of CSOs 
on a collision course and created a challenging and controversial 
relationship, which the state in due course capitalised on to eliminate civil 
society from the politics of governance and human rights discourses. It was 
challenging in so far as civil society was not in a position to criticise the state, 
and controversial in the sense that ZANU-PF portrayed civil society as an 
extension of the ruling party. Consequently, this damaged the reputation of 
some CSOs as the general public lost confidence in them, especially those 
that are meant to defend them from the increasingly violent state such as the 
Zimbabwe Human Rights Association.21 Public opinion survey carried out by 
TI-Z in November 2011 shows that the public were of the opinion that CSOs 
concentrated on supporting the opposition (MDC) while negating their roles 
as civil society, and was not doing enough to put the state under pressure to 
reform on governance issues (TI-Z 2011). While this thesis argues that the 
public lost confidence in CSOs for their lack of power in influencing change, it 
is worth noting that the state had closed them out of policy space. The next 
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 Public opinion survey carried out by Transparency International -Zimbabwe in November 2011 
shows that the public were of the opinion that civil society organisations concentrated on 
supporting the opposition (MDC) while negating their roles as civil society, and was not doing 
enough to put the state under pressure to reform on governance issues (TI -Z 2011) 
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section will examine how those CSOs responded and challenged state 
hegemony. 
The next section evaluates how and the extent to which the pro -democracy 
and human rights CSOs broke away from the state and claimed their own 
political space, and how the state reacted. In particular it will assess how this 
has shaped state-civil society relations, how it has strengthened and/or 
weakened them, and in turn influenced civil society‟s Anti-Corruption 
strategies and activities. 
5.4 Civil society challenges state hegemony in combating 
corruption  
 
The previous section explored post-independence state-civil society 
relations, how the state co-opted some civil society organisations, voluntarily 
or via coercion, into its party structures, and implications this had for 
corruption control. Here we will assess the responses of CSOs to the state‟s 
hegemonic tendencies and the implications for these responses on the state 
and civil society relations and for combating corruption. 
The oppressive tendencies and corrupt conduct of the ruling government, 
together with the negative impact of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank backed Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP) in the early 1990s, led some sections of CSOs to break away from 
the ruling party patronage, and contested their legitimacy. The post-1990 
period witnessed more civil society organisations joining the ZCTU, student 
unions and religious groups in criticising the state for its corrupt and 
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oppressive tendencies, consequentially breaking away from the state‟s 
servitude and adopting different radical strategies to engage with the ZANU-
PF government. Unlike in the period between 1980 and early 1990s when 
CSOs were silent on the ruling government‟s corruption scandals, the period 
after this saw some CSOs beginning to act as watchdogs of the state and 
questioning the governments‟ corrupt conduct. It is this time that some CSOs 
begin to come out in open criticising the state because between 1980 and 
1990 incidences of corruption were not reported or brought to court,  and 
Anti-Corruption initiatives were not a government‟s priority, it could have 
been for CSOs, but for reasons explored above, it was not. Comparative 
literature demonstrates that in some democratic countries (such as South 
Africa), where the state cannot deal with corruption, CSOs have taken 
responsibility to combat it (DFID 2012), but in the case of Zimbabwe they are 
not able to do this due to the nature of the state as discussed earlier in this 
chapter.  
More recorded incidences of corruption emerged during or after the failure of 
the ESAP in 1993. Civic organisations began to question the nature of 
privatisation processes that profited the ruling elites. In essence, ESAP was 
a top-down economic process, in which the ruling elites acquired loans to 
support ESAP, but squandered the loans through corruption and  
mismanagement (Coltart 1992). In the process of privatising companies, the 
ruling elites corruptly acquired companies and businesses without putting 
them to tender notice boards. Privatisation was caught in the web of already 
deeply entrenched patron-client politics of ZANU-PF (Jenkins 1997). Several 
interviewees pointed out that privatisation worsened patronage politics and 
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the attendant vices of corruption. For example, a respondent from the Local 
Government Authority points out that:  
“By 1993 corruption within ZANU-PF officials had reached 
seemingly epidemic proportions, and political office was 
extremely used for private benefits from this privatisation 
process” (Interview 41, 25th January 2012)  
Unlike in neighbouring countries such as Malawi, where privatisation 
programmes were guided by a specific plan (Zhou and Masunungure 2006), 
in the Zimbabwean context, there was no such concrete planning. Thus the 
absence of coherently defined policy on privatisation demonstrates how 
vulnerable the privatisation process can be to corruption and political 
manipulation. Alongside the questioning of privatisation was the growing call 
for democratisation among CSOs. The failure of ESAP amplified divergent 
political views. Pro-democracy and human rights CSOs grew rapidly. These 
organisations challenged ZANU-PF‟s political legitimacy, autocratic 
tendencies and monopoly of power, and challenged entrenched corruption. 
By the end of 1999 most civil society groups were confronting towards the 
authoritative nature of the ruling party. The breaking away was a result of the 
ZCTU and student movements criticising civil society for representing the 
interest of the ruling party rather than of the public. Criticism also occurred 
because of scholarly concern about the impact of civil society elsewhere in 
the world. Data collected from interviews with civic groups and documents 
showed that this change was further aided by two factors. Firstly, the 
availability of funds from international donors which meant that civil society 
could cease relying on the government for funding. This was captured in an 
interview with the ZCFU representative who argued that while ZANU-PF 
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threatened to take commercial farms for redistribution, Britain promised 
commercial farmers more funding to oppose the land redistribution process, 
an option which angered and further radicalised ZANU-PF (Interview 21, 7th 
December 2011). Secondly, it was the absence of a holistic legislative 
structure to organize and manage the registration and operations of 
international NGOs despite the fact that ZANU-PF had reacted by tightening 
and denying civil society the operational space through the PVOA of 1995. 
As previously noted, this included a statutory requirement that any private 
voluntary organisation intending to operate in Zimbabwe had to apply for 
registration with the relevant Ministry. The registration process had stringent 
requirements meant to frustrate CSOs and NGOs.22 While the government 
claimed that the PVOA was purely for accountability reasons, this thesis 
argues that the PVOA enabled the state to monitor (via surveillance) and 
intervene in the operations of non-state organisations. Research findings 
demonstrate that the PVOA gave Ministers the power to de-register CSOs 
and the authority to interfere in internal operations under the guise of 
“inspecting aspects of the affairs and activities of civil society organisations” 
(Interview 39, 10th January 2012). The government targeted certain CSOs 
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 Local organisations intending to register were required to submit their applications through the 
department of Social Services Offices who made initial assessment and interviewing the appli cants. 
This was followed by supplying the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare with proof 
of public advertisement, copies of organisations’ constitution, curriculum vitae of the executive 
committee, police clearance and proof of notificati on to local authorities of intent to register. 
International organisations were to sign a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) with the 
government ministry prior to application. Signed MOU was to be submitted to the Registrar of PVOA 
head office together with the curriculum vitae of executive committee members, Interpol and local 
police clearance certificates, and proposed area of geographical coverage. 
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(such as the independent media and human rights associations) for 
surveillance and de-registration as they posed greater threat to state 
hegemony. An interview with the NANGO representative highlighted the fact 
that despite the state‟s intention to monitor NGOs and civic groups, it did not 
always follow this up because the appropriate Ministry had limited resources 
to monitor the activities of these organisations and, could not cope with the 
high numbers of organisations registering with the PVOA. So ironically, 
resource constraints proved useful to CSOs because government did not get 
things its own way. The NANGO interviewee argued that:  
“Although PVOA had strict registration requirements, the state 
never checked on who has registered for what, who is funding 
whom, and for what purposes resulting in many organisations 
and international funders changing their interest from what 
they had registered for to advocating for a change of regime. 
The government could not cope with the proliferation of 
CSOs; they had not anticipated this from us. They have no 
idea of how they want us to operate” (Interview 36, 9th 
January 2012) 
 
In the next section I draw comparisons between two pro-state civil society 
organisations – ZNLWVA (war veterans) and the TI-Z. This comparison is 
important because both CSOs adopted an outright engaging approach 
cooperating with the state. The section examines how their cooperation 
influenced Anti-Corruption management. 
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5.4.1 An examination of the war veterans and TI-Z‟s relations with 
the state and the implications for Anti-Corruption programmes 
 
Chapter one demonstrated that there are different senses of the concept of 
civil society. One of them is what Moyo (1993: 35) calls the “minimal sense” 
in which there is free associations which can be empirically shown to be free 
from direct control by the state. In Zimbabwe this includes the ZNLWVA, 
Zimbabwe liberation War Collaborators (ZILIWACO), and Zimbabwe Political 
Detainees and Restrictees Association (ZIPDRA), which included ZANU-PF 
party officials who participated in the liberation struggle. All these groups are 
called „war veterans‟. These groups are technically independent but aligned 
to the ruling ZANU-PF. Rather than playing a role in combating corruption, 
they have participated in corrupt activities. The war veterans used “struggle 
credentials to legitimate themselves and delegitimise others in competition 
for power and resources” (Kringer 2006: 111), as we shall see later in this 
section. 
This thesis argues that the relationship between the war veterans and the 
state has historically been a continuous process of confrontation, 
cooperation, and engagement, which was purely driven by self-interests. In 
contrast, the TI-Z‟s cooperation was driven by national interests as this 
section will show. War veterans‟ confrontation was particularly noticeable in 
1996 when they had protracted confrontation with the President demanding 
to be compensated for the role they played in the liberation struggle  
(Sadomba 2008). The President gave in and eventually compensated them 
thus paving the way for a more cooperative relationship. They eventually 
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opted to engage with the state, particularly for the benefits that came with the 
alliance, which are discussed below. This prompted mainstream civi l society 
organisations to argue that the war veterans joined ZANU-PF out of greed. 
For instance, a ZCFU representative argued that:  
“War veterans are working with ZANU-PF purely for personal 
reasons; it's not that they share the same thinking …..” 
(Interview 21, 7th November 2011).  
However, it is important to note that while a ZCFU representative and other 
mainstream CSOs interviewed argue that the relationship was based on self-
interests; the connection is the result of their historical link dating back to the 
period of the liberation struggle as demonstrated in chapter two.23 However, 
this does not justify their violent tendencies, and  this thesis acknowledges 
that this relationship has compromised their civil society role. 
The ZNLWVA joined the ruling party‟s policies, particularly the land 
distribution project, and never questioned the corruption that marred the 
distribution process and the contradictions in the ZANU-PF government 
because the alliance meant notable benefits such as patches of land 
dispossessed from white commercial farmers, free education for their 
children, free access to health facilities, monthly pensions, and immunity 
from state prosecution (Bracking 2009). In 1997 the President conceded to 
the war veterans‟ demands and were given a war gratuity pay-out of fifty 
                                                                 
 
 
 
23
 War veterans were the military wing of the liberation parties (ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU). They fought 
in the liberation struggle under the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the armed wing of 
ZANU, and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the military wing of PF -ZAPU. 
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thousand dollars each as part of a compensation package (Sadomba 2008: 
91). The state paid a total of three billion dollars (Z$) in unbudgeted funds to 
pacify them. With these benefits, one war veteran pointed out that they were 
bound to „protect‟ the pay-master against the MDC opposition and other 
CSOs who they call “appendages of colonisers” (Interview 30, 3rd January 
2012). They became indebted to ZANU-PF for the benefits they received and 
continue to enjoy. It was after these rewards that the war veterans adopted a 
positive or an outright engagement approach with the state, becoming 
instrumental in promoting ZANU-PF‟s allegedly corrupt land repossession 
and distribution agenda, and playing a very active role in all post-2000 
elections as they violently campaigned for ZANU-PF through beating and 
coercing the electorate to vote for ZANU-PF. This is captured in an interview 
with the war veterans‟ representative who argued that: 
“We liberated the country from the colonial masters and we 
cannot let these appendages of colonisers (civil society) take 
our resources (land) back to the British. We will do all we can 
to get our land and prevent agents of Britain from recolonizing 
our country. We cannot stand aside and watch those 
spreading lies about our government.... We are here to 
protect our party and resources against these unpatriotic 
groups...” (Interview 30, 3rd January 2012). 
This suggests that the government and the war veterans have aims in 
common such as preventing the return of colonial powers (not that 
Zimbabwe was to be a colony again), but because it was ZANU-PF‟s political 
propaganda meant to discredit the opposition, which was allegedly supported 
by Britain to change the regime. However, given the above assumption by 
the war veterans‟ representative, we are also compelled to conclude that this 
relationship is based on a patronage and clientelism doctrine rather than on 
an ideological association.  
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The ZANU-PF-led government empowered the war veterans‟ constituent 
elements to operate with a sense of impunity while orchestrating violence 
against any formations that opposed or criticised the government. Even 
when they engaged in corrupt practices such as unlawful occupation of 
commercial farms and looting property, the state did not take action against 
them. The ruling party used war veterans as its instrument for harassing, 
intimidating and violence against its political opponents and civil society 
groups opposed to its corrupt and authoritative tendencies.  
The relationship of the war veterans and the state is viewed with suspicion 
by scholars such as Bracking (2009), Bowden (2006), and the mainstream 
civil society organisations who rarely accepted the war veterans as a 
genuine part of the body of civil society in the neo-liberal sense. These 
scholars tend to conceptualise civil society monolithically as a counter-
hegemonic movement. This one-dimensional understanding of civil society 
risks presenting most CSOs as „anti-state‟. Therefore, one of the 
contributions this thesis seeks to make to the debate is to widen the 
discourse on civil society within Zimbabwe by going beyond the dominant 
moderate view of civil society as situated only within the anti-state bloc. 
This thesis rejects Bracking (2007), Bowden (2006) and the mainstream civil 
society‟s perception, which doubt the status of the war veterans because at 
registration (with PVOA) the organisation acquired a civil society status 
despite the ruling party subsequently assimilating them into party politics. 
However, while ZNLWVA is a legitimate and genuine CSO, it viewed itself as 
an organ of ZANU-PF, which is why the aforementioned scholars and the 
mainstream civil society doubt its „civic‟ status. In addition, with regard to the 
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point that war veterans are aligned with the „illegitimate‟ ZANU-PF 
government, research findings from interviews with a wide range of civic 
groups demonstrate that other civil society networks such as NANGO, 
ZCTU, NCA, independent media and human rights groups, have continued 
to debate their civic status and adopted a non-engagement approach 
towards the war veterans, isolating them from all activities involving CSOs 
while the war veterans relegated themselves from the rubric of national civil 
society discourse. Indeed, associating with the allegedly oppressive ZANU-
PF government means risking losing comradeship with other civil society 
networks. This problem was raised in several interviews. A ZCTU respondent 
argued that civil society does not trust war veterans because of their violent 
character and association with an „illegitimate‟ government which views civil 
society as agents of imperialism and therefore fights hard to destroy alleged 
anti-state groups (Interview 17, 18th November 2011). While the war veterans 
use the label of „agents of imperialism‟ to fight the opposition and other 
CSOs, this study argues that their alliance with the government is largely 
based on the benefits of party patronage rather than shared ideology as we 
shall see later.  
Given the above thinking, an alliance with ZANU-PF automatically excluded 
the war veterans from the rubric of civil society in Zimbabwe. This view has 
split social and political commentators with regard to the civic status of the 
war veterans who under the given circumstances are a CSO that has 
remained loyal (to ZANU-PF) since being compensated and subsequently 
co-opted by the state. It is instructive to note that the ZNLWVA was 
registered as a non-partisan member organisation in terms of PVOA to cater 
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for the well-being and needs of war veterans. From ZNLWVA‟s perspective 
its alliance with the ruling government has allowed it to fulfil its goals and 
meet the needs of its constituency. This sounds pragmatic, although there 
are also negative overtones to its activities. It is from this perspective that the 
study of civil society in Zimbabwe is a challenge because some entities such 
as the ZNLWVA can easily dissociate themselves from the rest of the civil 
society cluster for their own benefits and narrow aims. 
The war veterans are an organisation driven by self-interests, and do not pay 
attention to the problem of corruption. In fact, research findings from 
fieldwork interviews and document analysis demonstrate that rather than 
playing a role in combating corruption, war veterans have participated in 
corrupt practices, particularly during farm invasion. For example, an interview 
with the ZCFU representative showed that war veterans looted some farming 
equipment from the white owned commercial farms and sold them to those 
who had occupied the farms while some machinery were destroyed or not 
put to use (Interview 21, 7th December 2011). This is further pointed out in 
The Daily News (22nd August 2000) that: “several cattle were missing from 
commercial farms as war veterans continue to steal and sell them ….” 
With the influence they had over the post-2000 elections, particularly in 
violent campaigns for ZANU-PF, war veterans amassed massive power and 
acquired immunity from state prosecution as they harassed and terrorised 
the MDC party supporters and other civi l society organisations who opposed 
the ruling party‟s policies. Mhanda (2011) argues that during all post-2000 
elections war veterans had the capacity and ability to mobilise rural 
constituencies against the opposition (MDC) and other civil society coalitions 
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in favour of the ruling party through intimidation. For instance, in the 2005 
Parliamentary elections, ZANU-PF gained seventy eight seats (out of the one 
hundred and twenty contested seats), of which forty seven were allegedly 
from rural constituencies, where war veterans operated (The Herald, 2 April 
2005). This further strengthened their relations with the state. In support of 
the ZNLWVA‟s violent conduct against the opposition and the anti-state civil 
society, the President articulated that: 
“The boys (war veterans) will not tolerate those people and 
their party who wants to sell the country back to the British 
……  We told them to use their experience in preventing a 
second invasion by the agents of imperialism, and we will not 
stop them …” (quoted in The Herald 23rd April 2002). 
The President‟s speech had several implications. Firstly, while the war 
veterans were acting without some restraint before this speech, it assured 
them that whatever they were doing had the backing of the head of the state,  
therefore, they became more corrupt and continued to loot private property 
unabated knowing very well that they were immune from state prosecution. 
This eliminated them from the equation of the Anti-Corruption movement as 
they had no role to play in such development programmes. Secondly,  war 
veterans became the fortress of ZANU-PF (Bracking 2009), standing against 
the opposition and CSOs dealing with human rights and governance issues 
particularly those funded by the West such as MISA, NCA, ZCFU and ZCTU 
(Interview 18, 21st November 2011). Their role in defining the nature of 
Zimbabwe‟s politics after 2000 has been instrumental in shaping the politica l 
landscape of Zimbabwe vis-a-vis ZANU-PF‟s authoritarian, repressive and 
corrupt tendencies. ZANU-PF would have had challenges in winning some 
parliamentary seats without the influence of the war veterans given the way 
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they coerced the rural electorate to vote for ZANU-PF. It is from this angle 
that this thesis has an interest in the part played by the ZNLWVA in shaping 
and influencing the state-civil society interface in Anti-Corruption 
management. It is problematic to envisage how war veterans could play a 
role in combating corruption because they are a corrupt organisation. 
Research findings from interviews with informants drawn from different levels 
within the government and CSOs, and Parliamentary Debates documents 
revealed that some of the members of the ZNLWVA claim to be war veterans 
yet they are not. They fraudulently and corruptly received gratuity pay-outs of 
fifty thousand dollars, and continue to receive a monthly pension. Some of 
them are too young to have participated in the liberation struggle 
(Parliamentary Debates, 13 July 2010). What makes this a challenge is that 
the state is aware of these claims, but has never investigated them simply 
because they are the defenders of the ruling party. Corruption within the 
ZNLWVA has become a strategy of survival, and this explains why they have 
no interest in the Anti-Corruption movement. 
However, while the war veterans cooperated with the state for the above 
selfish reasons, TI-Z successfully managed to build and maintain a 
productive partnership with the state, mainly for the national interest. TI-Z 
has been cooperative with the ruling government while some sections of 
CSOs such as MISA, NCA, ZCFU, ZCTU, and independent media (to 
mention a few) have been unable to build good relations with the state. The 
TI-Z is one of such civil society organisation that has been sharing limited 
political space with the state in policy issues relating to the Anti -Corruption 
programmes. It is essential that the TI-Z, as an Anti-Corruption institution 
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maintains good relations with the state for the purpose of combating 
corruption. One respondent from the TI-Z‟s Advocacy and Legal Advice 
Centre (ALAC) emphasised the importance of their relationship with the state 
because the state provides the space for the articulation of their Anti-
Corruption activities. The interviewee noted that they needed to build a 
strong partnership with the state because: 
“There won‟t be effective Anti-Corruption strategies without 
engagement with the government. Fighting corruption needs 
the state‟s power for the fight to succeed. Corruption is a 
complex phenomenon that calls for the state and other 
concerned stakeholders to work together. ...  At some stages 
the state has applied some Anti-Corruption strategies which 
we have been involved in ... The government provides the 
social space; granting us the permission to hold public 
meetings and forums. All these road shows and conferences 
we hold every time are a result of effective dialogue and our 
negotiated relations with the state...  We cannot do [it] without 
the state.... We try by all means to forge good relations with 
the government but in some cases ZANU-PF appears to be 
not willing to work with us” (Interview 2, 26th October 2011). 
Important and critical questions that need to be asked and explored for the 
purpose of this thesis are: How did TI-Z create a space for themselves when 
certain CSOs failed to work with the state? How has TI-Z managed to 
engage with the state and the implications this has for the state and other 
CSOs in building workable and effective relations? TI-Z‟s approach is an 
example of good practice and a potential model which other CSOs can follow 
in order to resolve the deadlock and reduce confrontation with the state. TI-Z 
realised that a solely confrontational approach could not create good 
relations with the state. Its success has come through compromise and 
effective negotiations with the ruling government.  
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While some civil society organisations adopted an outright non-engagement 
approach, TI-Z adopted a principled engagement approach which avoided 
confrontational politics with the state. This is essentially a consultancy 
relationship (Interview 1, 24th October 2011). Crucially, this kind of 
engagement does not question the contradictions within the state. Whilst TI-
Z remains committed to its broad agenda of combating corruption, it  has 
managed to succeed with the government by staying away from the national 
politics and justice related issues, issues which cost some of CSOs their 
operating space and rights.  
One government Minister representing ZANU-PF summed up the state-TI-Z 
relationship this way: 
“Since its formation in 1996, Transparency International -
Zimbabwe has been particularly very active in promoting the 
ratifications and implementation of Anti-Corruption 
Conventions liaising with the government and also conducting 
workshops to raise public awareness about corruption issues, 
and also promoting transparency and accountability. We 
never have problems with Transparency International that is 
why they are our good friend because they are concerned 
with the development of the country. They do not manipulate 
the state for selfish purposes ...” (Interview 15, 23rd 
November 2011)  
 
This implies that the government is willing to work with CSOs who do 
not criticise them, a pathway followed by TI-Z in its Anti-Corruption 
programmes. This demonstrates how TI-Z has managed to score 
success where other CSOs have failed. A discussion with the TI-Z 
representative showed that TI-Z was prepared to compromise its 
watchdog role for the political space to articulate its Anti-Corruption 
programmes. This has resulted in the TI-Z enjoying a political space 
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not enjoyed by some CSOs, particularly in combating corruption. TI-Z 
became the only CSO to deal with corruption without facing state 
repression, backlash and lawsuits from senior government officials 
(as we shall see in chapter six).  The next section takes a look at how 
some CSOs have responded to the state‟s repressive and 
suppressive tendencies. 
5.4.2 An analysis of anti-state civil society‟s challenges in 
combating corruption 
Given the undemocratic and suppressive tendencies of the ZANU-PF 
government, most of the civic groups preferred and adopted an outright non-
engagement strategy arguing that the ruling government was illegitimate due 
to the lack of fair and free elections after 2000. Among these CSOs were the 
ZCTU, NCA, the independent print media such as The Daily News, The 
Independent and The Financial Gazette, and a number of human rights 
campaigners such as Zimbabwe Human Rights Watch (ZHRW), and 
International Crisis Group (ICG). They argue that ZANU-PF rigged the 
elections via vote buying, violence and deployment of intimidating tactics, 
which coerced the electorate to vote for ZANU-PF.  
During interviews with different civil society organisations the study 
established that a number of different strategies of engaging the state were 
adopted. The ZCTU and NCA expressed their discontent through forms of 
civil disobedience such as street demonstrations and strikes. Adopting these 
strategies had two major consequences for civic actors. Firstly, they suffered 
the consequences of blocked policy spaces. Secondly, it demonstrated the 
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violent nature of the ZANU-PF government. One respondent from ZCTU 
pointed out that:  
“Whenever there were demonstrations or job stay away 
ZANU-PF responded by narrowing our space either by 
deploying police force and the army to where there are 
demonstrations, and shutting us out of policy issues through 
ignoring our contributions on governance or development 
issues. Many civil society organisations found themselves 
excluded from national development issues, some civi l society 
leaders were arrested and beaten” (Interview 17, 18th 
November 2011). 
This had two implications, firstly, those civic organisations who participated in 
demonstrations and strikes continued to operate under extremely difficult 
circumstances as the state tightened its powers to narrow the right to public 
space and freedom of the press and of expression through the POSA and 
AIPPA laws of 2002. These laws militated against civil society conducting 
civic activities, and required CSOs to gain police clearance to hold activities 
such as public meetings. For instance, a MISA representative pointed out 
that the twin laws meant that CSOs were “criminalised for their activities  
while some were not able to operate at all” (Interview 39, 10th January 2012). 
Secondly, the world was alerted of ZANU-PF‟s illegitimacy, human rights 
abuses, oppressive character and its corrupt tendencies, particularly 
following the fraudulent 2000 land invasions and election results, which 
allegedly occurred under corrupt circumstances. Criminalising some of CSOs 
for criticising the state‟s corrupt tendencies compromised the sector‟s 
watchdog roles as corruption increased. 
What is important here is to understand that the authoritarian tendency of 
ZANU-PF regime forced civi l society networks to become more radical in 
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response to the state‟s repressive laws such as POSA and AIPPA. For 
example, while discussing these, a MISA representative pointed out that: 
“The police often refused to grant permission for such 
meetings citing threats to order and security, and in most 
cases civil society organisation got used to this and learnt to 
ignore the police orders. Put differently, POSA and AIPPA 
were instrumental in preventing civil society organisations 
from engaging in good governance activities. They were 
employed as instruments to suppress freedom of civil society 
and draw them out of national policy space” (Interview 39, 10th 
January 2012). 
With POSA and AIPPA in place, many CSOs shifted their interest to issues 
beyond their immediate concerns such as human rights, democracy and 
good governance because donors and funders were willing to fund projects 
on governance issues. Nevertheless the Zimbabwean state castigated 
Western funded organisations accusing them of plotting against the 
government and therefore viewed some CSOs as a threat to state security. 
This further explains the reasons why the ZANU-PF led government have 
isolated certain NGOs and CSOs from national policy formulation and 
implementation processes (even though it does not justify it), which to a 
greater extent led to social, political and economic paralysis. This paralysis 
led to the emergence of a more proactive and vibrant counter-hegemonic 
civil society in Zimbabwe which further widened the gap between state and 
civil society. 
Given this collision, it became a challenge for CSOs to work with the state in 
good governance issues such as fighting corruption because the state could 
not work with the „agents of imperialism‟  as they called them. One 
interviewee, a politician from PF-ZAPU pointed out that because of this 
mistrust, the state became occupied with monitoring what civil society is 
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doing, with state security agents and war veterans spending time and 
resources tracking senior officials from CSOs, assessing and analysing their 
objectives, what they do, say and think about the ZANU-PF rather than 
concentrating on development issues (Interview 54, 14th February 2012). For 
this reason, a lack of trust creates challenges for both the state and civil 
society to work together. Similarly, in an interview with a Zimbabwe Human 
Rights Association official it was highlighted that its activists also face serious 
problems. They cited the case of Jestina Mukoko of Zimbabwe Peace 
Project who was kidnapped and tortured by security agents for her activism 
on human rights abuses (Interview 42, 25th February 2012). The kidnapping 
of activists is further evidence of the regime‟s repressive response on civil 
liberties perceived to be anti-ZANU-PF.  
The attack and violence against the humanitarian and governance civil 
society institutions and their officials by the ruling government on trumped up 
charges of being „pro-neo-colonialism‟ and appendages of the Western 
powers trying to unconstitutionally remove the „democratically elected‟  
ZANU-PF amounts to removing civi l society from the democratic space (this 
thesis uses the phrase „democratically elected‟ loosely given the contested 
post-2000 election results). This onslaught by the government mirrors the 
state‟s sustained aversion to participatory governance, making it a challenge 
for civil society organisations to participate in issues such as Anti-Corruption. 
This has compromised the independence of various organisations to institute 
and promote a culture of tolerance and participatory politics. With 
Zimbabwe‟s politics visibly characterised by repressive political tendencies, 
the capacity of civil society to influence Anti-Corruption policy becomes a 
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contentious issue. This is validated by a respondent from the ACTSA who 
argued that: 
“The government does not want any challenges, even if the 
challenge is a positive one focusing on development issues of 
the country, [so] our voices are suppressed. We are trying to 
participate in formulating Anti-Corruption policies but we face 
hurdles from the government, who always isolate and exclude 
us from policy formulating processes” (Interview 4, 27th 
October 2011). 
Interview data gathered during fieldwork study demonstrates that while the 
state continues its crackdown on civil society for their role in advocating good 
governance leading to their isolation from policy formulation, it becomes a 
challenge to envisage lasting solutions to the problem of corruption in 
Zimbabwe. Some CSOs such as religious groups and student unions will not 
deal with corruption because of the state‟s tendencies to victimise critics of 
its corrupt conduct. Thus although the main hypothesis of this thesis is that 
civil society, working hand-in-hand with the state might serve as an effective 
instrument in dealing with corruption, the state-civil society interface, at 
present, is not well developed and largely conflictual, so Anti-Corruption 
strategies have been ineffective because they have barely got off the ground. 
Furthermore, civil society has hardly had an input or influence on good 
governance issues, and the significance of this thesis is in analysing why this 
problem has arisen. Of course Zimbabwe‟s socio-economic institutional 
situation in post-independence has influenced the swings and nature of 
state-civil society relations. The ruling party relied on a relatively strong 
economy in the first decade of independence to create the basis for its 
hegemonic politics. A strong economic situation also influenced shifts in civil 
society advocacy issues in response to both hegemonic politics and the 
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impact of macro-economic policies on people‟s lives. Given people‟s 
improved living standards, the state became popular with the masses, and it 
used this popularity and uncontested rule to legitimise hegemonic politics 
and to demonise civil society (Ncube 2010). Despite the strong economy, 
some CSOs remained recipients of international aid which angered the 
Zimbabwe state who accused the West of channelling the aid through civil 
society rather than through the state.  
Whilst the increase of international donor funding in the early 1990s 
intensified the authoritarian nature of the ruling government, the view 
advanced in this thesis is that the approach pursued by the donor community 
enabled some parts of civi l society to gradually break away from the state 
patronage and thereby engage in promoting good governance, albeit under 
stringent regulations. This asserted civil society‟s political role and led to the 
formation of strong MDC opposition, with its executive coming from 
mainstream CSOs such as ZCTU and the NCA. The formation of the MDC 
opposition party served to expose ZANU-PF‟s intolerance of opposition 
adding a political dimension to the crisis. It provoked the rise of reactionary 
authoritarianism in ZANU-PF. 
The formation of the MDC in 1999 by the ZCTU and NCA increased the level 
of outside funding geared towards “regime change” (Ncube 2010: 197) , with 
donors such as the European Union (EU) becoming more active in 
sponsoring advocacy and research institutions such as MISA and private 
media outlets such as The Daily News, which became the mouthpiece of the 
opposition and certain CSOs giving them the opportunity to articulate an 
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alternative democratic politics, and expose corrupt government practices 
such as Ministers taking more than one white owned commercial farm each 
against the one man one farm policy. The government had argued that 
commercial famers had several farms each therefore needed to share the 
land with the landless, but senior government officials such as Obert Mpofu, 
Ignatius Chombo, and Kembo Mohadi (among others), acquired more than 
one farm each (ACTSA 2012). It would appear the state condoned these 
corrupt practices as senior government officials continued to acquire several 
farms while victimising organisations and individuals vocal against the 
accumulation of farms by Ministers. 
The situation created an uneasy relationship between the state and Anti-
Corruption organs, and some donor organisations and between pro-
democracy civil society and the state, making it impossible for the sides to 
complement each other on governance issues, in particular on Anti-
Corruption programmes. 24  For instance, while discussing Ministers who 
accumulated farms, interviews with a Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe (CCZ) 
employee and the TI-Z representative revealed that while government 
Ministers are being implicated in corruption activities it became a challenge 
for Anti-Corruption organs, particularly for CSOs to combat corruption given 
that they cannot publicly criticise them because of suppressive laws such as 
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 Donor community such as the European Union, Canada International Development Agency (CIDA), 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) were primarily responsible for funding 
‘anti-state’ organisations in Zimbabwe, this created tension with the state 
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AIPPA. Furthermore, the formation of an MDC opposition party, consisting of 
a coalition of CSOs such as ZCTU and NCA, in part sponsored by the West 
heightened ZANU-PF‟s sensitiveness towards land acquisition criticism from 
rivals to the state or rising power outside the state structures (Interview 28, 
23rd December 2011). This has further increased repressive and oppressive 
tendencies, which has made it difficult for CSOs to combat corruption. 
Regarding the oppressive nature of the ruling party and implications for civil 
society, this thesis offers new insights. A consensus has developed between 
the more radical CSOs such as the ZCTU and student movements, and the 
liberal scholars such as Mamdani (1996), Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004), 
Gatsheni (2002 and 2006), and the ZANU-PF guardians. The radical wing 
points to the state as having not fulfilled its revolutionary mission of 
transforming and shifting the political platform to accommodate non-state 
institutions, on the one hand, and satisfied the poor, landless and oppressed 
civic groups on the other. The liberal scholars argue that the state has tried 
to play a central role in promoting economic growth and democratise the 
political space but did not live up to the expectations the people and CSOs 
had for an independent Zimbabwe because of corruption within the ruling 
elites. In this context, both radicals and liberals‟ views unite against ZANU -
PF in proclaiming that the ruling government has failed to live up to 
expectations. However, the contribution which this thesis makes to the 
debate centres on the fact that while Zimbabwe had its pressures to adopt a 
strong developmental policy framework to actualise political freedom and 
growth and welfare for the masses, the state leaders concentrated on 
corruptly enriching themselves while supressing the rights of civic groups to 
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prevent Anti-Corruption vocal voices from CSOs. In order to be able to 
criticise corrupt tendencies of the ruling government some sections of civil 
society had to end their relationship with the state. 
ZANU-PF characterises parts of civil society‟s break away from the state as 
an act of betrayal. For example, a government Minister from ZANU-PF 
pointed out that civil society‟s coalition with the state in the first decade of 
independence helped the state‟s socio-economic development through 
donations and funding from the international community (Interview 15, 11th 
November 2011). The implication here is that CSOs were useful to the state 
and that they both worked together, even if indirec tly, for the benefit of 
Zimbabwe.  
The failure of the government has led to a proliferation of CSOs, international 
NGOs, and the mushrooming of alliances and networks to engage in the 
various policy issues relating to socio-economic, political, human rights and 
governance issues, and particularly in welfare service provision such as in 
education and health sectors where the state has demonstrably failed. 
However, these organisations have also failed to effectively address the 
problem of corruption in their fields of operation. 
Raftopoulos (2000: 21) argues that the ruling party, by its failing and weak 
capacity, “stood in contrast to the strengthening capacities of civil society 
organisations as they increasingly became the favoured conduit for 
international aid”. As I have established in this chapter, it was the issue of 
international aid that tied the state to some CSOs, except for some such as 
the war veterans who were sponsored by the state. It was the need for 
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international aid which widened the already strained state-civil society 
relations as ZANU-PF over time viewed these CSOs as „sell-outs‟ or 
„disciples‟ representing the interests of the West to undermine the ZANU-PF 
government. The donors, as an external factor, fuelled state-civil society 
divides as they became instrumental in shaping Zimbabwe civil society‟s self-
conceptualisation of their roles and relations with ZANU-PF.  
Whilst such an argument is credible, according to the research findings, the 
initial donors‟ motive for backing CSOs and NGOs was geared towards 
reforming the state institutions and promoting good governance and 
democracy rather than engineering a “regime change” as suggested by 
some of the respondents such as the war veterans (Interview 30, 3rd January 
2012), Minister of Justice and Legal Affairs (Interview 33, 20th December 
2011), the ZRP Commissioner (Interview 45, 5th January 2012), and some 
members of the ZANU-PF leadership as well (Parliamentary Debates, 
Tuesday 14 July 2004, Wednesday 15 September 2005, and Wednesday 12 
March 2008). The notion of changing the regime occurred after the fast track 
land reform programme in 2000 and when civil society contested post-2000 
election results accusing ZANU-PF of rigging the elections. This point was 
further made by a MISA interviewee who argued that government‟s chaotic 
land reform programme and its violent tendencies against opposition parties 
and CSOs during elections influenced United Kingdom (UK), United States of 
America (USA) and Australia, and funders such as Friends of Zimbabwe 
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(FOZ), Commonwealth, and EU to call for a change of government (Interview 
39, 10th January 2012).25  It is from this moment, rather than at an earlier 
stage that the state perceived civil society and NGOs as agents of the West 
who wanted to remove a democratically elected government. 
The period after 2000 witnessed greater interest, both journalistic and 
academic, in state-civil society relations in the context of resistance to ZANU-
PF‟s repressive and authoritarian politics as well as due to the influence of 
the neo-liberal framework that was promoted in the early 1990s, which 
perceives and portrays civil society as being anti-state. Rather than working 
to complement the state, CSOs, according to this perspective, seek to 
provide an alternative space of political power. It is this rivalry that has 
created animosity between the state and certain CSOs. The formation of the 
MDC party by the Labour Movement and the NCA in 1999 is in line with such 
a viewpoint. Within this context, Ncube argues that: 
“Civil society is theorised in a Gramscian institutional sense 
as entities, institutions or organisations that oppose the 
authoritarian state, without organically situating it in society 
and broader notion of the state” (Ncube 2010: 232). 
The formation of the MDC was meant to function as the „political face‟  of 
some civil society organisations. The MDC‟s projected agenda was to fight 
for political power from ZANU-PF via its diverse members, “of which CSOs 
were its core institutional members” (Ncube 2010: 191). As a result, some 
                                                                 
 
 
 
25
 FOZ is an organisation started by the diplomatic service of the European Union’s European 
External Action Service (EEAS) represented among them by countries such as United States of 
America, United kingdom, Canada, Australia, Germany, Netherlands . 
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civil society organisations became more of a „consultative committee‟, some 
of them campaigning for the MDC. This relationship benefited the MDC 
rather than the counter-hegemonic civil society‟s watchdog role. CSOs such 
as the ZCTU, and NCA among others, concentrated on supporting and 
strengthening the MDC structures while negating their mandated roles of 
representing the general public, workers, and the electorate on national 
development issues, particularly such as monitoring the state‟s corrupt 
practices. In terms of corruption, this means that corruption within the ruling 
government proliferated in the absence of effective watchdogs. 
The MDC-civil society relationship is, in this thesis, viewed as problematic in 
the same way the ZANU-PF-civi l society relationship of the 1980s to early 
1990s was because firstly, this also compromised the autonomy of certain 
sections of civil society. When CSOs are allied to a political party it becomes 
a challenge to envisage how they can fight political corruption when they are 
part of the organisation. For instance, a respondent from the Ministry of 
Justice and Legal Affairs pointed out that parts of civil society‟s friendship 
with the MDC led the state to treat any political input emanating from civil 
society (apart from those sections linked to the state) as suspicious and a 
threat to state security (Interview 33, 5th January 2012). This demonstrates 
the problems facing those sections of CSOs that allied themselves with the 
opposition party in the hope of influencing policy. This implies that civil 
society organisations were intentioned, but backed themselves in a corner 
and consequentially failed to deal with the problem of corruption.  
Secondly, the situation compelled the state to restrict or ban civil society 
groupings working on good governance and human rights issues . To restrict 
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the political space, the state passed laws such as PVOA, NGO Bill, POSA 
and AIPPA that effectively restrained their activities. Commentators such as 
Banisar (2006) have suggested that the POSA and AIPPA further widened 
state-civil society divide and reinforced the state‟s authoritative nature over 
civil society while, in turn some CSOs, such as the independent media that 
include The Daily News, grew more radical and fought against the state‟s 
repressive tendencies. The POSA and AIPPA laws were aimed particularly 
at the independent media. It justified the hard-line stance by making 
accusations that they wrote lies about the government or were unduly critical 
of government policies. Such laws also targeted human rights activists and 
restricted their access to information while preventing them from discussing 
governance and development issues (Banisar 2006). This had overarching 
consequences for some Anti-Corruption programmes as some CSOs such 
as the media were banned from reporting about corrupt government officials. 
Several interviews with the mainstream CSO (Interview 17, 18th November 
2011, 20, 7th December 2011, and 36, 9th January 2012) and evidence from 
document analysis demonstrate that without media reportage corruption 
increased to catastrophic proportions. 
Banisar (2006) carried out a global survey on the freedom of information and 
access laws to government records around the world in over fifty African 
countries (including Zimbabwe) that have Freedom of Information (FOI) laws. 
He concluded that Zimbabwe‟s POSA and AIPPA constitute anything but a 
FOI law, noting that: 
“While the title refers to Freedom Of Information and Privacy, 
the main thrust of the law is to give the government extensive 
powers to control the media by requiring the registration of 
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journalists and prohibiting the „abuse of free expression” 
(2006: 96). 
This demonstrates that the laws‟ prime function has been to suppress the 
freedom and activities of certain parts of civil society, the public, journalists 
and newspapers opposed to President Mugabe‟s ZANU-PF party, if they 
raised any concerns about human rights abuses and corrupt activities within 
the party. The laws required the independent media to register with the 
state‟s Media Commission, which had stringent requirements. Successful 
registration gave state authorities the right to interfere in the internal affairs of 
the particular organisation. Those that failed to register, such as The Daily 
News, were closed down with journalists subsequently arrested under the 
two Acts.26 One interviewed journalist noted that: 
“Many journalists and independent newspapers that acted as 
whistle blowers have regularly experienced severe damages 
to their career. …. Journalists have much worse to fear 
beyond mere career repercussions as many amongst us have 
been both physically and psychologically harassed, arrested 
and tortured by the police and the state security agents for 
blowing the whistle on government corruption and other 
stories” (Interview 3, 27th October 2011). 
Interviews with members of several civic coalitions revealed that while these 
laws were directed at civic organisations working on human rights and good 
governance issues, they also affected other associations with only an 
interest in broader policy issues such as environment or humanitarian needs. 
They found themselves under state surveillance and interference too. 
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 The arresting of journalists led to an international outcry about the POSA and AIPPA, consequently 
leading to the increase of funding for anti -government CSOs and NGOs by outside funders  
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Consequently, some CSOs were unable to carry out their activities, 
especially those concerned with pressing for democratisation of the public 
institutions, putting an end to an authoritarian government, ending corruption, 
and adopting transparent electoral and governance practices. This led to the 
arrest of several CSOs leaders for their involvement in governance issues as 
highlighted earlier in this chapter.  
The government interpreted some civil society responses as political 
intending to undermine its sovereign power thereby threatening its stability. 
As a result, while certain CSOs did not achieve any of their goals, as the 
state tightened its laws against them, organisations such as the ICG, Crisis 
Coalition of Zimbabwe (CCZ), and MISA were sti ll nevertheless able to draw 
international attention to the actions of the Zimbabwean state. 
Some parts of the civil society sector responded to the state‟s hostility by 
emphasising the illegitimacy of the regime, agitating for a change of the 
ruling party, and pushing for the exclusion of ZANU-PF-led regime from the 
international community. This was achieved by exposing the ruling party‟s 
widespread violations of human rights, the illegal confiscation of white owned 
commercial farms, and violence against organisations, opposition supporters 
and individuals that denounced the state‟s corrupt nature. According to 
Manheru (cited in newzimbabwe.com, 10 September 2011), a mouthpiece of 
ZANU-PF, some civil society organisations such as the ZCFU, Legal Rights 
Foundation (LRF), ZCTU, and NCA, openly agitated for international punitive 
sanctions hoping to compel ZANU-PF to be more „democratic‟. This resulted 
in the Commonwealth, EU and the USA imposing economic sanctions which 
included travelling bans on selected individuals within the political 
 204 
establishment, organisations and institutions that were allegedly creating or 
supporting a culture of autocratic rule, violence, and violation of human 
rights. These sanctions also obstructed Zimbabwe from accessing 
international capital markets. This worsened the economic challenges faced 
by the nation as investors pulled out of the county. Sanctions led to 
sustained disinvestment and de-industrialisation (The Herald, Thursday 7 
July 2011) that severely weakened the economy with negative 
consequences for the public‟s welfare and well-being. This led to a collapse 
of service delivery systems and shortages of basic commodities 
(Parliamentary Debates, Thursday 25 November 2010). Sanctions had 
serious implications for the proliferation of corruption in Zimbabwe  as the 
public and bureaucrats resorted to corrupt means of accessing services such 
as health and acquiring basic commodities such as food and fuel.  
Several interviewees criticised CSOs for advocating sanctions. For example, 
interviews with two respondents from different government Ministries 
representing both ZANU-PF and MDC-T revealed similar critical sentiments 
of those civil society organisations involved in influencing Western powers to 
impose sanctions, which this thesis argues to have fuelled the dichotomous 
nature of state-civil society relations. A respondent from the Ministry of 
Justice and Legal Affairs (ZANU-PF) pointed out that: 
“ZANU-PF views civil society as unpatriotic and representing 
colonial masters. As long there are sanctions the state will not 
collaborate with some of these known organisations. I don‟t 
think that even if these sanctions were to be removed there 
will be any kind of cohabitation between the state and some of 
these organisations. We are waiting to see what happens in 
the near future whether there will be some compromise from 
the state...” (Interview 33, 5th January 2012). 
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The other respondent from the Ministry of Local Government Rural and 
Urban Development echoed similar sentiments in relation to sanctions and 
state-civil society relations arguing that:  
“Some of civil society organisations were literally forced to 
oppose ZANU-PF for financial gains; they were even given 
projects with programmes meant to remove the ruling 
government. When this failed they agitated for sanctions. The 
sanctions have also failed to change the regime, which is why 
there is this bad blood between the Western sponsored civil 
society and the state. All these civil society organisations you 
refer to are externally sponsored. Given the history of the 
regime change agenda, ZANU-PF will never allow these 
organisations to operate freely in the country” (Interview 16, 
16th November 2011) 
While these opinions, criticisms and accusations by the above respondents 
are built on their individual perceptions, they carry substantive truths. The 
thesis argues that the economic crisis and the struggle for day-to-day 
survival influenced civi l societies to engage international community in 
imposing sanctions. They were not guided by principles and values but by 
cash flows from funders. The Zimbabwean economic crisis led to the rise of 
a scenario called “bending the analysis” (2008: 391), in which civic 
campaigners amplified the crisis in order to sustain a crisis industry for donor 
funding. This demonstrates that some CSOs are also corrupt. Exaggerating 
a crisis in order to maintain supply of funds is a form of corruption. Given 
this, it will always be a challenge for CSOs to combat corruption since they 
too are corrupt. This is supported by an interviewee representing 
ZIMRIGHTS who criticised some CSOs for encouraging sanctions as a 
betrayal of the national struggle against colonialism for personal gains. This 
advances the point that some civil society groups were motivated by greed 
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rather than by the socio-economic and political crisis because by 
campaigning for the removal of ZANU-PF government they received support 
in the form of funding from many international funders. For example, the 
respondent pointed out that the doctrine on the change of government: 
“Was a lucrative source of income for many people because 
international funders were happy to fund them as long they 
advocated for a change of government” (Interview 28, 23rd 
December 2011). 
A respondent from the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education (MDC) was 
also critical of the role played by civil society in advocating sanctions against 
the state. The interviewee pointed out that civil society commercialised their 
activities and their relations with the donor community at the expense of the 
Zimbabweans as sanctions hit the public harder than their intended targets 
(ZANU-PF members). The respondent argued that:  
“Even though the sanctions were targeted at selected 
individuals and organisations, instead of affecting those 
targeted individuals they have ruined the lives of the innocent 
Zimbabweans as a result of the de-industrialisation of the 
country. Some companies have closed down and some have 
been operating below capacity. It‟s not the Ministers who 
suffer from these sanctions, look at the poor, look at the 
school children who go with no teachers or textbooks. Those 
people who supported these illegal sanctions got it wrong and 
it‟s them who must be blamed for the current economic crisis” 
(Interview 47, 3rd February 2012). 
Sanctions caused more harm than good and hence achieved the opposite of 
what they were designed to accomplish. As highlighted by these 
respondents, the effects of sanctions were felt by the general public as the 
economy declined. Unemployment rose from seventy per cent in 2000 to 
ninety two per cent by the end of 2008 (Sokwanele 2010), as a result of 
companies closing down due to shortage of foreign currency, industrial, 
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manufacturing and agricultural inputs and equipment. Education and health 
services were also affected by the sanctions as schools went without 
teachers and resources, hospitals lacked nursing personnel and necessary 
medications while shops lacked basic commodities. To a greater extent civil 
society erred in calling for sanctions that further increased socio-economic 
and political crisis. The crisis led to the proliferation of corruption as it 
became a way of surviving, and both the state and CSOs have failed to 
address this effectively.  
Nevertheless, this demonstrates the ability of civil society to mobilise some 
parts of the international community against state hegemony in Zimbabwe. 
Not surprisingly, this strengthened the state‟s hegemonic and authoritarian 
stance leading to the continued suppression of non-state actors. It forced the 
ZANU-PF government into a defensive posture culminating in the enactment 
of punitive legislation. The state used the sanctions as an excuse for its 
failing economy which, in turn justified why civil society organisations and the 
NGOs‟ activities were restricted and/or banned. Whatever the rhetoric about 
who was to blame, sanctions still crippled the economy in many ways, which 
took Zimbabwe‟s socio-economic development a decade to recover following 
the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009.27  
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 GNU was a pact between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations signed in 2009 after the disputed 
2008 Presidential election results  
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An interview with the Chief Executive Officer of MISA (Interview 39, 10th 
December 2012) pointed out that state-civil society relations have of late 
improved as a result of some changes in national politics such as formation 
of the GNU in 2009. Since the formation of a government by three political 
parties there has been some notable and positive developments in the way 
the state treats and relates to various CSOs (although repression of human 
rights civic groups by the state is still visible). The GNU has also widened the 
space given to some civil society organisations such as Bulawayo Agenda, 
TI-Z, MISA, ZCTU, and NCA as the researcher personally witnessed some of 
them holding public meetings which were illegal before the formation of an 
inclusive government. The interviewee from MISA noted that: 
“The authoritarian nature of ZANU-PF pulled civil society 
down because the ruling party did not want its corrupt and 
oppressive systems exposed, but with the formation of GNU, 
civil society got a backing especially from the two MDC 
parties, that is why we are seeing a lot of civil society starting 
to speak aloud on human rights, democracy issues and 
change of government. These things were never mentioned 
three years ago. It is the state that is to blame because for 
almost twenty eight years it denied civi l society a political 
space...” (Interview 39, 10th December 2011). 
This demonstrates that civil society has finally found some operational 
space, but there has been far less progress in reducing corruption. It is still 
important to remember that while the POSA and AIPPA laws remain in 
operation, criminalisation of good governance organisations and human 
rights activists will persist, making it difficult for Anti-Corruption organs. 
Although a few civic organisations such as the ZCTU, independent media, 
NCA, (to mention a few of them), are beginning to find operational space, 
there are some good governance and human rights groups that still operate 
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under state surveillance, and continue to be harassed and arrested. A recent 
example is the case of Okay Machisa of the Zimbabwe Peace Project who 
was arrested and detained (from the 14th January 2013 and released on the 
29th January 2013) for engaging in human rights advocacy (The 
Zimbabwean, 1 February 2013).  
To argue that the formation of GNU freed up all the necessary political space 
for civil society to operate would be an exaggeration, particularly given that 
ZANU-PF continues to criminalise certain alleged „anti-state‟ organisations. 
This thesis argues that despite the influence of the MDC factions in 
Parliament, the ruling party has benefited from an overwhelming imbalance 
of power in the legislature, and remains powerful and suspicious of most but 
not all CSOs, and is unwilling to offer them political space.28 ZANU-PF is to 
blame for the state‟s unwillingness and failure to engage with some parts of 
CSOs especially on issues that relate to national development and  
governance such as Anti-Corruption management.  
Nevertheless, despite ZANU-PF‟s suppressive tendencies, several 
interviews with CSOs and government representatives, political statements, 
and document evidence such as Parliamentary Debates, and newspapers 
demonstrate that the romance between the state and civil society is gradually 
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 Since 1980 ZANU-PF has dominated the composition of Parliament, for instance, in 1980 ZANU-PF 
had 110, PF-ZAPU had 20; in 1990 ZANU-PF had 117 seats against 3 seats for other parties; in 2000 
after the formation of MDC ZANU-PF had 90 seats versus 57 for MDC; in 2008 ZANU-PF had 54 seats 
against 95 for MDC, making the MDC factions a majority representation in Parliament (Davoodi, S. 
and Sow, A. (2008) Democracy and Peace in Zimbabwe, Austrian; Stadtschlaining 
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beginning to warm up as a result of the MDC legislators pushing for the state 
to democratise the political space. Many legislators such as Sithembiso 
Nyoni, and Gorden Moyo, within the government are getting involved in 
some civil society activities.29 Good examples of those participating in civic 
activities include firstly, the Minister of State Enterprises, Mr Gorden Moyo, 
who is a patron for the Bulawayo Agenda. The Bulawayo Agenda is a civil 
society focusing on socio-economic development issues across the country. 
At the end of 2011 Minister Gorden Moyo attended Bulawayo Agenda for 
meetings with the public as a guest speaker reviewing the year‟s success 
and failures specifically debating developmental issues that among areas 
focused on corruption, national administration and other good governance 
issues. A second example is that of Sithembiso Nyoni, who is director of 
ORAP. According to one social commentator interviewed this is a positive 
sign in so far as the GNU builds dialogue with civil society (Interview 51, 10th 
February 2012). 
Despite state-civil society differences and the political and legal challenges 
faced by CSOs, Gorden Moyo and Sithembiso Nyoni‟s participation in civic 
activities demonstrates that it is highly likely that the state and civil society 
might solve some of their differences and start working together. Part of the 
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   Sithembiso Nyoni is ZANU-PF MP for Nkayi North; Minister of Small and Medium Enterprises and 
Co-operative Development; and founder and Director of Organisation of Rural Association for 
Progress (ORAP). 
Gorden Moyo is the only Minister who was invited by the MDC party to join inclusive government 
from civil  society, becoming Minister of State Enterprises and Parastatals; is also a patron of 
Bulawayo Agenda. 
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reason is that the state is very interested in the funds donated by Western 
NGOs. Research findings from primary sources such as Parliamentary 
Debates (2010 and 2011) show that the state gave way not because it is 
democratic, but want a share of funds or aid from international donors. The 
state hoped to get money from donors, which comes through CSOs. This 
demonstrates how much the state needs civil society for international 
funding. An interview with a Ministry of Public Service representative 
confirmed this by saying:  
“We know that civil society organisations get a lot (funds) from 
foreign donors and some managers of civil society 
organisations use it to enrich themselves …., we need to sit 
down with them and say „Look, let‟s use this money for 
national development rather than using the funds to enrich 
yourselves… Foreign donors should channel their donations 
through the government, this is an issue we need to solve 
with these NGOs” (Interview 12, 9th November 2011). 
On one hand, there is an element of truth in this assertion because aid opens 
up many avenues for corrupt practices because some CSOs are often 
crippled by the problem of corruption (The Financial Gazette, 15 April 2004). 
On the other, there are signs of possible government greed and desire to get 
their hands on Western finance, perhaps it is not a desire for a genuine 
dialogue with these CSOs but a pragmatic approach to sustaining itself, 
ironically with Western help.  
Contrary to the Ministry of Public Service staff‟s point of view (Interview 12, 
9th November 2011), through several interviews with civic groups, analysis of 
government documents and political speeches and observation of civic 
activities, it is evident that funds donated have made a difference in 
improving the welfare of the people, particularly where the state has failed  
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such as in welfare provision. However, this has failed to make an impact in 
reducing corruption. This was further articulated by the ORAP representative 
who argued that funding from donors has not been used to combat 
corruption because the area of corruption has been shunned by many CSOs 
since it is a sensitive area which could put them into collision with the state 
(Interview 23, 14th December 2011).  
The Ministry of Public Service representative‟s opinion demonstrates that the 
state is aware of the impact and influence of CSOs and their ability to attract 
and source funds and donations from the West, which is imperative in the 
development of their constituencies. While Bracking (2007) and Bowden 
(2006) argue that the state and civil society are opposing entities, this thesis 
claims that despite the material obtained in this chapter showing major 
differences between the state and some parts of civi l society, they can be or 
become allies to the benefit of the state and CSOs. 
This above analysis demonstrates that a state-civil society coalition is 
important in establishing successful Anti-Corruption programmes.  For these 
programmes to succeed, the relationship between the state and civi l society 
has to be on a strong and permanent basis. The existence of a strong state-
civil society interface supported by vibrant and dedicated organisations, 
enterprises and networks, both public and private, is necessary in 
strengthening the fight against corruption. During fieldwork interviews, 
numerous CSOs demonstrated their willingness to fight corruption but 
unfortunately those working in this field are suppressed by the state. As a 
result, current state-civil society relations tend to largely weaken attempts to 
combat corruption as both institutions do not work closely together. Policy 
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based literature such as the World Economic Forum (WEF) (2012) and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) (2003) show 
that state-civil society collaborations make a difference in addressing 
corruption as argued in chapter two. 
This chapter has shown that at present there is very limited interchange 
between the state and most CSOs in terms of Anti-Corruption planning and 
policy. This has significantly affected the nature and functions of some civil 
society groups when fighting corruption, as we shall see in chapter six. The 
oppressive nature of the state is and remains a barrier to certain parts of civil 
society playing a larger role in influencing policy formulation and 
implementation, in particular, the Anti-Corruption strategies. The thesis 
argues that the existence of a free and active civil society is fundamental to 
the vitality of Zimbabwe‟s economic development, particularly as watchdogs 
against corruption. While this thesis recognises the development of a strong 
civil society as a very effective means of controlling the entrenched corrupt 
tendencies, particularly the abuse of office by public officials, it is also sadly 
the case that the autocratic state elites are responsible for weakening civil 
society in order to prevent them being made accountable for their corrupt 
conduct. It is therefore possible to argue that only a democratic state can 
create a free, strong and democratic civil society, and in turn a free, strong 
and democratic civil society can also help sustain a democratic state. 
Combating corruption requires a robust civil society that can hold any 
undemocratic leadership accountable. If this happens then civil society may 
influence policy formulation and implementation.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the evolution and development of state-civil 
society relations before and after independence, and assessed how the 
relations strengthen and weaken civil society‟s influence in fighting 
corruption. In order to understand the roles of the state and civi l society in 
combating corruption, the dynamics and contours of state-civil society 
relations were discussed for their importance in defining continuities and 
discontinuities in the political economy of Zimbabwe.  
The thesis argues that during the first decade of independence ZANU-PF 
deployed a pro-independence developmental policy framework based on the 
ideology of the nation-building project that offered the context for legitimating 
state hegemonic politics and for demobilising civic activism. During this 
phase, the large majority of CSOs were unable to operate properly, the state 
easily incarcerated key individuals from civic institutions, drafted in those 
troublesome or influential opponents such as PF-ZAPU and ZNLWVA with 
the goal being to weakening any potential threats. 
Some CSOs such as war veterans operated with the new regime and 
became a key representative of hegemonic civil society. This part of civil 
society was the opposite of the anti-state civi l society groups represented 
mainly by governance and human rights organisations. This chapter shows 
that the formation of the ZNLWVA, the emergence of an authoritarian rule, 
and ZANU-PF‟s one-party state ideology had a decisive influence in shaping 
the development and activities of most CSOs in Zimbabwe. The ZANU-PF 
government successfully co-opted the ZNLWVA into its structures, and the 
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latter subsequently became part of ZANU-PF‟s radical wing, which was 
involved in harassing, intimidating and silencing other civil society groups, as 
part of a broader opposition. As a result, the state was able to “shape, define 
or suppress civil society and popular reactions ...” (Manor 1991: 5), making 
sure that certain, specific civil society institutions‟ elasticity remained pliable 
and under government control. The state employed violence to coerce large 
parts of civil society and the electorate to get them to comply with ZANU-
PF‟s nationalist sentiments and its rule.  
The post-1990 period witnessed a proliferation of civic groups opposed to the 
state‟s hegemonic politics that consolidated their counter-hegemonic position 
and posed a potential threat to ZANU-PF‟s dominance. This radicalised the 
state in terms of its anti-opposition politics, anti-imperial sentiments, anti-
governance and human rights civic advocacy work. Repressive laws such as 
POSA and AIPPA were instituted by the state in order to silence its critics 
and to narrow the democratic space for a civil society transformative politics. 
The repressive laws and sponsored violence that followed have all adversely 
impacted on some CSOs‟ capacity to influence policy by seeking to 
challenge the ruling party. 
A major goal of this thesis is to critically evaluate the role played by both the 
state and CSOs in combating corruption. The nature of the uneasy, at times 
conflictual relationship, outlined in this chapter has implications for the way 
civil society groups can fight and/or influence Anti-Corruption policies. These 
issues and others are discussed further in chapter six which examines 
strategies employed by both the state and civil society in combating 
corruption.  
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Chapter 6 
 
AN ASSESSMENT OF STRATEGIES EMPLOYED BY 
THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN COMBATING 
CORRUPTION 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses the second research question underpinning this 
thesis, namely: What strategies do the state and civil society use to fight 
corruption in Zimbabwe? Key issues are examined on the basis of field 
interviews, primary sources, and secondary data. The premise here is that 
previous scholarly works examining Anti-Corruption programmes have 
tended to examine initiatives more as a governmental responsibility. In 
contrast this thesis seeks to examine whether and to what extent this 
approach misses the critical role of civil society. Evidence from fieldwork 
clearly demonstrates that the Zimbabwean state‟s legal and administrative 
Anti-Corruption reforms have produced disappointing results.  
Even though records and reports on the cost of corruption in the Zimbabwe 
economy remain inadequate (Matsheza and Kunaka 2010), empirical 
evidence gained from the fieldwork demonstrates that there are large 
resources involved in corrupt practices involving the state.  
During interviews, civil society organisations (CSOs), senior government 
officials and Ministers, and other individuals interviewed revealed that 
corruption is prevalent both in the public and private sectors. Therefore, this 
study considers this acknowledgement as a first step towards combating 
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corruption. This is guided by the principle that, if people acknowledge the 
problem of corruption the better they are to combat it. This mirrors the 
public‟s general feeling that the pervasiveness of corruption is no longer a 
question of debate, rather, a question of: what has been done to combat it 
and how effective strategies have been? What must be done to prevent it? 
The thesis explores strategies used by the state and civil society in order to 
answer these and other research questions. 
The chapter is divided into four major sections. The first section (6.2) 
examines the Anti-Corruption strategies implemented by the state through 
focusing on the role of the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC), 
Parliament, and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). The second section 
(6.3) analyses some CSOs‟ Anti-Corruption strategies and how the relations 
with the state influence their Anti-Corruption efforts. This is achieved by 
examining the role and strategies employed by Transparency International-
Zimbabwe (TI-Z) and the place of the independent media, particularly on 
issues related to good governance, and the role of the state owned media in 
combating corruption. The fourth section (6.4) summarises the key findings 
and concludes the chapter. 
6.2 An examination of the state‟s Anti-Corruption functions and 
strategies 
 
The institutional framework for regulating and implementing Anti -Corruption 
measures does exist in Zimbabwe. Its components include the ZACC of 
2004, and the later version, the Parliament, Ministry of State Enterprises, 
Anti-Monopolies and Anti-Corruption, the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), 
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and various apparatus within government Ministries. These organs were 
discussed in chapter two and are revisited later in this chapter. In chapter 
two the thesis discussed the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1996, the ZACC 
of 2004, and the Ministry of State Enterprises, Anti-Monopolies and Anti-
Corruption, all created as a result of the Constitutional provision (Chapter 13, 
Section 254) for the establishment of Anti-Corruption instruments. In addition 
to these Constitutional provisions, Zimbabwe is a signatory to regional and 
international Anti-Corruption Protocols such as the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) Protocol Against Corruption which 
Zimbabwe government signed in 2001 and ratified in 2003, the African Union 
(AU) Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related 
Crimes signed in 2003, and the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC) of 2005. These ratifications and the presence of the 
Constitutional provision demonstrate Zimbabwe‟s commitment to combating 
corruption. However, they have not been able to satisfactorily produce 
results given that corruption is perceived to be increasing (see chapter one 
for Corruption Perception Index). The evidence of corruption captured in the 
interviews reported across this thesis, however, demonstrates that the 
commitment by the state exists on paper and not in practice. 
Mainstream CSOs such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU), the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), National Association of 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO), several independent media and 
individuals interviewed indicated a lack of political will in fighting corruption 
as a major cause of corruption. This is despite the establishment of several 
Anti-Corruption apparatus such as the ZACC, the establishment of which 
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was seen by the public and civic groups as of paramount importance to the 
country‟s problem of corruption as it emerged from decades of political and 
socio-economic decline. This lack of political will hinges on the fact that it is 
the same policy makers who are largely involved in corruption.  
6.2.1 The Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) 
 
Following the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 
September 2009, the President laid down the foundation for socio-economic 
development by launching the ZACC in August 2011. The GNU created a 
political space for an inclusive ZACC that accommodated all three political 
parties. In consultations with the Parliamentary Committee on Standing 
Rules and Orders, the President appointed the Commissioners who report 
directly to the Parliamentary Committee through the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
These members were chosen for their integrity, knowledge and experience in 
administration, prosecution or investigation of crime or for general suitability 
for appointment (The Herald, Friday 19 August 2011, The Zimbabwean, 
Friday 19 August 2011 and Bulawayo24 News, Friday 2 September 2011). 
These Commissioners were challenged by the President to investigate and 
prosecute politicians from all the parties without fear or favour. It is headed 
by a chairperson, and made up of nine Commissioners who have executive 
powers. The ZACC is made up of the Secretariat, which consists of three 
operating arms, namely: Corruption Prevention and Corporate Governance, 
Investigation and Prosecution, and Publicity and Education. The ZACC‟s 
mandate is defined in the Constitution and the Anti-Corruption Act 12.3, 12.4 
and 12.5 (The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2009). Its primary functions are 
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firstly, to combat corruption, which manifests itself in the form of abuse of 
power, bribing, embezzlement and other improprieties in the public and 
private sectors; and secondly, to make recommendations to the government 
and the private sector to increase accountability and integrity and to prevent 
improprieties (The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2009). The Constitution states 
that the ZACC should combat corruption through public education, 
prevention, and punishment (3 Ps) and prosecute offenders after thorough 
investigation. As we shall see, evidence shows that the ZACC has overly 
concentrated on investigations as its primary strategy to the detriment of its 
educative and preventative aims. Figure 6.1(below) is a framework showing 
how the ZACC operates. 
 Figure 6 1: Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission Operational Framework 
Source: Researcher‟s own design of the structure of the ZACC 
In addition to its functions, the ZACC is also constituted to receive complaints 
alleging corruption from anyone, and empowered to investigate them and 
any conduct of any person whom the Commission has reason to believe is 
The President 
Chief 
Commissioner 
(Chairperson) 
Commissioner Commissioner Commissioner Commissioner 
Ministry of 
Home Affairs 
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connected with activities involving corruption. The Commission is mandated 
to instruct, assist and can draw assistance from other Ministries such as the 
ZRP in the elimination or minimisation of corruption. A surprising finding of 
this research from fieldwork is that the ZACC and the ZRP do not 
complement each other. This thesis discusses this important subject later in 
this chapter. 
While the President has given the ZACC the power to investigate politicians, 
interviews conducted and document evidence, from newspapers such as 
The Standard (Sunday, 19th April 2009), The Zimbabwean Independent 
(Tuesday, 16th February 2010) and The Zimbabwean Mail (Wednesday, 28th 
August 2010) show that politicians, particularly senior ZANU-PF members, 
were not investigated by the ZACC of 2004 despite being implicated in 
corruption because the 2004 ZACC‟s composition was mainly ZANU-PF 
members or sympathisers. For example, as chapter two demonstrated, the 
2004 ZACC remained silent when Ministers were implicated in one or more 
scandals such as: (a) The War Victims Compensation Fund Scandal 
(WVCF), (b) the District Development Fund (DDF), (c) The VIP Housing 
Scandal, (d) The Willowgate Scandal, and (e) wealth accumulation drive by 
many senior ZANU-PF officials since 1980. The 2004 ZACC was clearly 
ineffective, so its renewal in 2011 left the public wanting to see if it would fare 
any better in tackling endemic corruption. The public were sceptical of the 
renewed ZACC because of the poor record of its predecessor.  This thesis 
will visit this important dimension later to illustrate how this view shapes the 
public perception of the ZACC. 
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The President pledged to strengthen the judiciary, law enforcement, and the 
ZACC in order to capacitate them in the fight against corruption. The pledge 
to adopt a „zero tolerance‟ policy on corruption and arming the ZACC with 
stronger investigative powers demonstrates the President‟s awareness of the 
problem as he spelt out that corruption has been the biggest enemy of 
foreign investors and overall socio-economic development. President 
Mugabe argued that:  
 “The state undertakes to adopt legislative measures to 
prevent and combat acts of corruption and the related 
offences committed by individuals, groups and/or 
organisations. The Commission is tasked to establish 
mechanism to encourage participation by the public and the 
private sector in controlling corruption” (The Financial Gazette 
19 August 2011). 
Given these remarks, and considering that the original established ZACC in 
2004 had not demonstrated a measurable decline in general levels of 
corruption, the public expected the later to achieve measurable success in 
combating corruption compared to its forerunner. A number of interviews 
supported this, for example, the TI-Z official (Interview 1, 24th October 2011) 
pointed out that the public thought that a cure for corruption has been found, 
particularly given that the 2004 ZACC had failed so dramatically. The 
President gave an impression that the reformed ZACC embodied a 
comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach to preventing and combating 
corruption effectively. The availability of practical mechanisms in the form of 
the ZACC appeared to be giving the nation hope that these Commissioners 
will combat corruption effectively. 
It is important to point out that the Commissioners were nominated by 
political parties and appointed by the President, and report to the 
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Parliamentary Committee through the Ministry of Home Affairs. Given this 
fact, the Commissioners‟ independence is compromised, particularly when 
the executive, the Ministry‟s officials, or officials of the political parties are 
implicated in corrupt conduct. Under this scenario, the ZACC may have to be 
influenced into loosening its grip in the event that the executive or the 
Ministry‟s officials are involved or implicated in corrupt activities. The 
relationship between the Commissioners and the political parties who 
nominated them (their paymasters, so to speak) and with the Ministry creates 
and sets investigative challenges because it puts their independence in 
doubt. A recurring theme emerging from the research is the detrimental 
impact that this relationship creates in public confidence and trust of the 
ZACC. For example, the Global Corruption Barometer conducted by TI-Z 
(November 2011) demonstrates that the public does not have trust in the 
ZACC because of its relations with political parties. In addition, one 
interviewee from ACTSA (Interview 4, 27th October 2011) argued that the 
Ministry of Home Affairs administers various sub-departments where 
corruption is endemic such as the Immigration Control, ZRP, and 
departments issuing various licenses and certificates such as business 
licenses, driving licenses, birth and death certificates, passports and tender 
contracts. In all these departments the opportunities for corruption abound, 
for example, several interviews established that the public accepted that 
bribing bureaucrats for any mandatory documents such as driving licenses 
had become the norm, but the ZACC has not been taking action against 
such conducts by the Ministry employees. This was further elaborated by the 
Minister of Finance who argued that:  
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“Today if you want a driving license you have to pay a small 
fee to get it, if you want a passport they will tell you that you 
can get it faster if you pay a „small fee‟, this has become a 
normal way of life for the public officials”  (Interview 55, 7th 
December 2012). 
Thus, the public perception is that the ZACC finds it challenging to 
investigate and expose corruption that is taking place in its own parent 
Ministry. Since the risk of exposing either the corrupt activities or failure to 
address corruption by senior officials in the Ministry is high, it is likely that the 
ZACC will be ineffective. There is therefore a strong chance of self-
censorship by the ZACC before submitting any report. 
Given this possible clash of interests, the thesis argues that the public should 
have been included in the process of choosing the Commissioners. They 
should have been nominated through public platforms with their profi les set 
out in the public domain. Since nomination and appointment has been the 
privilege of the political leader, this makes its independence questionable. 
For example, a respondent from ACTSA (Interview 4, 27th October 2011) 
argued that the ZACC can only be deemed independent when there is no 
political influence in its operations. To be appointed by the President 
eliminates its independence; therefore political influence is most likely. The 
Anti-Corruption institution that is appointed by the Head of the State should 
be considered to be advantageous if the Head of the State is firmly 
committed to fighting corruption, but in the context of Zimbabwe, this is a 
disadvantage because there is no political will from the Executive as the 
chapter will demonstrate. 
A fundamental aspect of any Anti-Corruption institution is its independence, 
both legal and perceived. But the ZACC casts doubts on that independence. 
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The political interference in administration, operation, and allocation of 
powers within the ZACC is an effective criterion to evaluate the institutional 
independence. In scenarios where there is political interference in the 
administration, a culture of polarisation develops making it difficult to 
investigate senior political leaders or individuals with strong political allies. 
One Home Affairs representative gave examples of such interference with 
the ZACC‟s operations:  
“I get calls from the Commissioners that so and so [names 
omitted] called them, why would a Minister call the ZACC? 
What is their business with the ZACC? What are they up to? 
Are they contacting them to create friendship with them or to 
threaten them or to tell them who to investigate?” (Interview 
40, 19th January 2012).  
 
The sentiments of the Home Affairs representative were echoed by the 
Deputy Minister of Justice and Legal Affairs who is also Chairman of the 
Ministry‟s Anti-Corruption Committee, who pointed out that he has come face 
to face with the ravages of unprecedented corruption that has permeated the 
entire fabric of the justice delivery system (newzimbabwe.com 4 October 
2012). The Deputy Minister argued that he had witnessed some powerful 
politicians frequenting and interfering with the ZACC, and in many cases 
literally dictating who should be investigated or who should not. For example, 
when the Parliamentary Affairs Minister requested the ZACC to investigate 
the MPs for abusing the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), it is alleged 
(Interviews 41, 25th January 2012 and 51, 10th February 2012) that a senior 
ZANU-PF member authorised that Deputy Health Minister Douglas 
Mombeshora (one of the implicated) be excluded from investigations. In 
response, the Attorney-General called off the probe, and suspended the 
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prosecution, because the case involved one of the „big fish‟. This 
demonstrates how political interference has disempowered the ZACC. The 
Deputy Minister describes the government‟s efforts of combating corruption 
as “a circus of the anti-graft fight in Zimbabwe” (newzimbabwe.com, 4 
October 2012). Fieldwork interviews with several Parliamentarians show that 
the probe was suspended because it appeared that many senior MPs had 
also abused the CDF (Interviews 19, 23rd November 2011, 24, 16th 
December 2011, and 55, 7th December 2012). It is therefore, befitting to 
conclude that this is the interference that helps the „big fish‟ escape the 
dragnets. 
Despite its powers to conduct investigations and inquiries on its own 
initiative, or on receipt of complaints, the ZACC does not have powers to 
arrest and prosecute the offenders. This is a problem which compromises its 
independence because it requires assistance from the ZRP and the 
Attorney-General‟s office to secure prosecution. Problems arise when the 
ZRP is reluctant to make an arrest or when the Attorney-General‟s office is 
reluctant to prosecute those found guilty. Its dependence on the ZRP and the 
Attorney-General‟s office has created conflict between the institutions , 
consequently compromising its independence. An interview with a Police 
Commissioner established that there is a concern within ZRP that the ZACC 
carry out their own investigations, and when they fail to find evidence of 
corruption they ask the ZRP to proceed with the investigations. The 
respondent argued that:  
“They turn to us after messing up the whole investigation 
process, after all investigating Ministers is tantamount to 
plotting a coup, that‟s why we refuse to do that, the police are 
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disempowered to investigate a Minister …” (Interview 45, 30th 
January 2012).  
The importance of this interview is that the ZACC relies hugely on the ZRP 
who is „disempowered‟ to investigate Ministers , therefore the effectiveness of 
the ZACC is hugely compromised.  
Rather than complimenting each other in the fight against corruption, there 
has been a lack of coalition and/or interlink between these organs , a 
characteristic favourable to the survival and proliferation of corruption. For 
instance, in the case of the Zimbabwe Football Association (ZIFA) Chief  
Executive Officer (CEO), Henrietta Rushwaya who was accused of match 
fixing in international football matches in Asia for personal gains, in what is 
known as the Asiagate scandal. The ZACC investigated the case and 
handed it to the ZRP who refused to carry out further investigation. Another 
example is that of nine Members of Parliament (MPs) accused of abusing the 
Constituency Development Fund (CDF). The legislators were allocated fifty 
thousand dollars each (Parliamentary Debates, Wednesday 18th January 
2012) for development projects in their constituencies but failed to account 
for it. Consequently, the Parliamentary Affairs Minister approached the ZACC 
to investigate how the money had been used in each of the constituencies.  
Newspapers such as The Financial Gazette (24 January 2012), The Daily 
News (27 January 2012), as well as Parliamentary official records and 
interviews with the ZACC‟s chairperson (Interview 56, 10th December 2012) 
show that the funds were misappropriated or mismanaged. After 
investigations were completed the cases were passed on to ZRP and the 
Attorney-General‟s office to arrest and prosecute, but no arrest and 
prosecution was made. Drawing on several interviews with some CSOs and 
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selected individuals, the implication for this is that the public continued to 
blame the ZACC for not taking further action against those MPs investigated, 
yet it should be pointed out that the ZACC mandate does not include the 
power to arrest and prosecute.  
It is imperative to highlight diverse stakeholders‟ perceptions and what they 
expect from the 2011 ZACC. Several interviewees from organisations such 
as the ZCTU, NCA, NANGO, Local Government Authorities, state owned 
and independent media, and individuals argued that the public wanted the 
government to demonstrate its political will in combating corruption. The 
issue of political will features as a particularly intriguing factor. The ZACC 
has to grapple with a mammoth task of nurturing this political will if it is to 
play an effective role in combating corruption. This thesis reveals that there 
is a lack of political wi ll and support for combating corruption because it 
threatens not only the position of ZANU-PF led government and politicians, 
but also the stability of the political system itself bui lt on patronage. This 
creates problems for both the state driven Anti-Corruption agencies and 
CSOs because they strike at the means of the regime‟s survival, and at the 
very nature of the state which functions on the basis of political patronage. 
That said it is the complexity of corruption control in Zimbabwe – whereby at 
one end the state creates the Anti-Corruption apparatus, while on the other, 
does not fully support its functionality, which leaves the ZACC vulnerable to 
criticism. This has produced an institutionalisation of corruption and a culture 
of patronage that reinforces uneven power structures. 
The issue of political will dominates interview responses from CSOs, 
academics and political analysts on one hand, and political leadership on the 
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other. Whereas political respondents from ZANU-PF (Interviews 19, 23rd 
November 2011 and 33, 15th January 2012) argued that there are numerous 
concrete examples of notable steps by the government demonstrating a real 
willingness to combat corruption. However, the public perception is that the 
inadequacy of political will accounts for the failure to control corruption. This 
thesis concurs with the public perception, politicians should be seen taking 
action against corruption and address it on public platforms i.e. on television, 
and declaration of personal assets, such effort could be used to measure 
their commitment. 
One respondent, a government Minister from ZANU-PF (Interview 19, 23rd 
November 2011) argued that in the last two decades the government has 
established Anti-Corruption institutions, reformed processes of political 
participation (through the formation of GNU) which eventually freed political 
space for some sections of CSOs to participate in fighting corruption. The 
Minister referred to the establishment of an array of Anti-Corruption 
Committees in every government Ministry, the Anti-Corruption institutions 
and providing operational space for certain CSOs such as the TI-Z and 
ACTSA, including the convening of national and regional Anti-Corruption 
Conventions. The government denies the lack of political will and points to 
successful Anti-Corruption cases that led to the six Cabinet Ministers such as 
Morris Nyagumbo, Dzingai Mutumbuka, and Enos Nkala who were removed 
from office following the Sandura Commission of the Willowgate scandal in 
1988. However, since the Willowgate scandal the government has not done 
anything recently to prove themselves in this area. The public will want to 
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see more current high-level sackings as a demonstration of practical 
commitment rather than referring to incidences of three decades ago. 
Several respondents from organisations such as the ACTSA, ZACTU, NCA, 
MISA and independent media argued that the government has not been 
willing to combat corruption and therefore the public should not expect any 
political will from both the government and the ZACC. One ACTSA 
respondent argued that: 
“I will use this expression; you have got fishing net which is 
supposed to catch all the fish from a pond, when you dip it 
into the water, you only catch those matembas (small fish) 
and you don‟t get the big fish, I don‟t know whether those big 
fish jump out of the net or something happens to them while in 
the net. It becomes questionable that why are big fish always 
not on the net. It is problematic that the ZACC will fight 
corruption when the senior politicians have never been 
arrested, even though tens of them have been implicated in 
corrupt deals, no cases or dockets have been opened against 
them, what happens is they are just recycled from one 
political position to another, from one Ministry to another to 
start on a new looting spree. These guys (ZACC) know 
exactly what is happening because it happens right under 
their nose, but what do they do? The Commissioners are not 
the best to drive the ZACC agenda, they are part of the rot, 
and how can you assign cowards to eradicate corruption? 
(Interview 4, 27th October 2011). 
The ZACC is made up of people of honour and integrity, but the state has 
failed to demonstrate i ts political will by adequately empowering it. 
Consequently, CSOs and the public view it as an ineffective and „toothless 
bulldog‟. While this thesis concurs with CSOs and the public that there is no 
political will, the thesis also argues that even if there was to be political will, 
the ZACC by its very nature, will be unable to overcome the underlying 
political pressures which promote corruption because success in doing so 
would mean:  
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“Interfering with the patterns of private accumulation and 
political patronage, threatening the privileges which the state 
office bestows on political elites and their supporters ...” 
(Szeftel 2000a: 428).  
The public wants the ZACC and the state to deal with the „big fish‟ decisively 
without favour and fear as outlined by the President. The concern is that the 
„big fish‟ always seem to avoid the wrath of the law. They appear to be 
immune from prosecution despite media hype identifying cases of corruption 
by senior government officials. The perception of mainstream civil society is 
that the ZACC works against the weakest members of the political class. For 
instance, The Zimbabwean Independent (Friday, 15 January 2012) argues 
that the ZACC officials spend time trying to interpret political signals to 
establish whether or not certain Ministers are protected from investigation 
and prosecution. They are routinely practicing a form of „self-censorship‟ in 
fighting corruption because they are not sure of the degree of political 
dedication from Cabinet Ministers and MPs. Consequently, the ZACC is seen 
by civi l society and the public to be less willing to undertake investigations of 
close allies of the political leadership. 
While the establishment of the ZACC is an encouraging measure towards 
combating corruption, views of those interviewed differ as to its relative 
effectiveness in reducing corruption. Although some sections of civil society 
and the public argue that the ZACC has not been effective in reducing 
corruption pointing out that it has not investigated the „big fish‟ . However, 
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research findings from interviews and document analysis demonstrate that it 
has investigated some of the „big fish‟ but this has been diluted by political 
interference.30 CSOs and public perception is problematic because it wants 
to portray the ZACC as only responsible for investigating the „big fish‟ while 
corruption is rife in the lower ranks of the society. 
This thesis argues that the ZACC has made an effort to combat corruption 
but is let down by a lack of political support. It has already left impressive 
footprints as many public and private institutions such as the Parliament  
where nine MPs have been investigated. Organisations such as the Grain 
Marketing Board (GMB), where several officials have been arrested for 
criminal activities, Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development 
senior officials, accused of fraudulent land deals, and the Prime Minister 
accused of abusing his public position to influence excessive expenditure on 
his private property. The ZACC‟s Chairman (Interview 56, 10th December 
2012) pointed out that this demonstrates that the Commission has 
investigated several „big fish‟ thus contradicting public perception, but it is the 
ZRP and the Attorney-General‟s office that make the arrest and prosecution.  
When a new institution such as the ZACC is set up, the nation expects 
instant action and positive results in the form of arresting and prosecution of 
public figures. This was demonstrated in public survey carried by The Daily 
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 The Standard (Sunday, 21 October 2012) The ZACC won’t spare ‘big fish’, Harare 
    The Herald (Friday 2 November 2012)Ministers under corruption probe, Harare 
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News, 14th August 2011, Financial Gazette, 12th August 2011, and the Global 
Corruption Barometer survey of TI-Z in November 2011, yet at its nascent 
stage the ZACC does not have the capacity or the „political clout‟ to take 
effective steps such as arresting and prosecuting to meet immediate public 
expectations. 
Despite the state‟s notable efforts of creating the ZACC, the thesis argues 
that the Commission remains incapacitated and therefore unable to achieve 
its mandate. While the legal frameworks to combat corruption exist it is also 
important to point out that the latest Transparency International‟s (TI) 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) reveals that corruption is on the increase 
in Zimbabwe (TI-Z 2012). Since the reformation of the ZACC in August 2011 
a lot of corruption issues from various key state institutions such as 
education, health, sports, mining, and agriculture among others have been 
published in the media. For example, the education sector has seen rampant 
corruption in which gross nepotism and favouritism has been used by 
education officials in employing and deploying teachers  (TI-Z 2012), officials 
exclude deserving orphans from benefiting from the Basic Education 
Assistance Module (BEAM) funded by the Department of International 
Development (DFID) (Ministry of Education, Sports, Art and Culture 2012). 
The health sector has also witnessed poor service delivery in which drugs 
meant for free distribution to HIV/AIDS positive people were being sold by 
nurses (TI-Z 2012). Thus, the ZACC has a lot of work do to investigate these 
sectors despite views that it targets only the „small fish‟. 
While the views that so far the ZACC is picking up only the „small fish‟ is not 
entirely incorrect, it is also true that there are „smaller fish‟ (civil servants) in 
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large numbers who are corrupt, eating away public resources in education, 
health institutions and the ZRP, for example (TI-Z 2012). It is important to 
point out that the „small fish‟ are in contact with the public on a daily basis 
where petty corruption has become a way of life. Therefore, the ZACC 
cannot ignore rampant petty corruption by the „small fish‟ and concentrate on 
the „big fish‟ because the „small fish‟ have a huge cumulative effect.  
Interviews with the Commissioners intended to focus on the ZACC‟s 
strategies, its contentious independence, and the relationship with other 
stakeholders. However, on many occasions I found it difficult to fully access 
the ZACC premises and officials to assess its work because it was not yet 
fully operational at the time fieldwork was carried out although I was 
eventually allowed very limited access for brief discussions. 
The ZACC officials refused to discuss their Anti-Corruption strategies and 
mechanisms arguing that it was still at i ts „infancy stage‟ (4 months old at the 
time of fieldwork), therefore were not in a position to divulge strategies they 
use. One executive officer stated that they were on the primacy stage of 
designing and formulating strategies. Thus according to one respondent, it 
was “premature for the ZACC to start advertising its work plan” (Interview 8, 
4th November 2011).  
However, brief discussions held with officials from the ZACC (Interviews 8 
and 9, 4th November 2011) established that their major concern was a lack of 
finances. The ZACC required a budget of twenty million dollars for the year 
2012, but the ZACC official records showed that it had three million dollars 
funded by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, far below its budget. The 
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respondent pointed out that the ZACC did not get money from the state 
budget, which has directly affected its effectiveness and limited its activities. 
This further reinforces the growing public perception that the political 
leadership is less than willing to tackle the problem of corruption by not 
adequately funding the ZACC. 
In addition to a lack of funding, an interview with the ZACC chairperson 
showed that it also lacks human expertise in dealing with corruption cases. 
The ZACC requires a staff complement of at least 204 for various operating 
arms, but currently due to limited funding it has 57 workers. 31  With this 
deficiency in numbers, it is indeed difficult to see how the ZACC will 
effectively operate.  
The literature reviewed from the ZACC resource room indicated that the 
ZACC intended to adopt the following three strategies: prevention, public 
education, and punishment (the 3 „Ps‟). However, a discussion with the 
Commissioners did not reveal much information on how the „3 Ps‟ will be 
implemented. It was through document analysis that the researcher was able 
to build a framework on how the 3 „Ps‟ may be implemented as instruments 
of fighting corruption that has been used elsewhere in Southern Africa by 
various Anti-Corruption Commissions. These 3 „Ps‟ complement each other, 
the principle is to prevent corruption through public education, if prevention 
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and public education fail to deter corruption then punishment is applied as a 
last option. 
The „3 Ps‟ framework places prevention of corruption at the top of its agenda 
and aims at intervening before the corrupt conduct occurs. The principle 
intends to reduce the chances of corrupt acts. One way of doing this is 
identifying loopholes that may be exploited for corrupt purposes through 
examining the procedures and systems within the given organisations. This 
reduces the opportunities for exploiting the institutional weaknesses for 
personal gain by eliminating contributing factors and conditions of corruption 
through the promotion of transparent and open provision of service. Rather 
than strengthening these measures, the ZACC has relied on investigation to 
prevent corruption, which has not worked for Zimbabwe. When discussing 
the preventive strategies used by the ZACC, its chairperson (Interview 56, 
10th December 2012) argued that investigating individuals has helped to 
warn people and organisations against corrupt conduct. While the prevention 
strategy involves investigating allegations of corruption that takes place after 
the corrupt conduct has occurred (as pointed out by the Commission‟s 
chairperson), investigation is not sufficient to prevent future corruption. This 
is because not all forms of corrupt conduct become the subject of 
investigation, and not all those investigated will be prosecuted to prevent 
further corrupt conduct. However, this does not mean that investigations are 
not important in preventing corruption; it is not the best to rely on although it 
provides a starting point from which preventive measures can be applied 
after understanding how the corrupt conduct occurred. The better one 
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understands how corrupt conduct occurred the better equipped one is to 
prevent it from occurring again.  
Whilst prevention is at the top of the ZACC‟s strategies, it is important to 
consider how it has worked for Zimbabwe. Since 2004 the state has enacted 
several Anti-Corruption mechanisms such as the Provision of Anti-Corruption 
Act of 2004, the 2004 and 2011 ZACC, the Ministry of State Enterprises, 
Anti-Monopolies and Anti-Corruption, and signing and ratifying of regional 
and international Anti-Corruption Protocols such as the SADC Protocol 
Against Corruption of 2001, and the UNCAC of 2005. The purpose for all 
these measures has been to prevent corruption, but statistics from TI-Z 
indicate that corruption is on the increase despite these preventive measures 
(TI-Z 2012). Thus, this suggests that these measures have not been able to 
combat corruption. Combating corruption is not about adding more Anti-
Corruption instruments because this has not worked for Zimbabwe. This may 
not work as long there is a lack of political wi ll, and when there is political 
interference in the operations of the ZACC. Furthermore, the ZACC has no 
arresting and prosecution powers. The best prevention strategies for 
Zimbabwe are not the ones that propose the most instruments. This study 
suggests several strategies that are best tailored to prevent corrupt conduct. 
For example, a strategy that has worked in neighbouring countries such as 
Botswana (Sibudubudu 2002) has required MPs to declare their interests. 
This is more usually associated with the businesses they are involved with; 
the assets they own when they come into office, with any changes being 
monitored to ensure any further acquisitions are within their income. This 
would be an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability of 
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public employees, the custodians of public resources, to the general public. It 
would undoubtedly help to disclose financial interest, and therefore help 
prevent accumulation of disproportionate wealth. A respondent from ACTSA 
(Interview 4, 27th October 2011) argued that senior government officials have 
accumulated disproportionate wealth while in office. If checks were in place 
this would make it easy for the ZACC investigators to identify instances of 
corruption. 
Prevention should encompass more than investigation as applied by the 
ZACC, this thesis argues that the strategy has to interlink with public 
education. This is based on the understanding that public education 
programmes are intended to address the negative impact and/or effects of 
corruption on the socio-economic and political developments at national, 
institutional and individual levels. The intention of public education is to 
prevent corrupt behaviour. It is through public education programmes that 
the public get to know about corruption, its causes and effects, and about the 
ZACC, its function, objectives and how the public can work with it. The 
success of the ZACC therefore depends on the level of its exposure to the 
public. As one respondent from the ZCTU argued: 
“Public education promotes a culture of intolerance in which 
corruption is made an unacceptable norm in the conduct of 
public business, it is difficult to reach this milestone when the 
ZACC has not taken this project to the people, many people 
do not know that there is a ZACC somewhere, I am very 
certain that people do not know what is corruption or what is 
not, this is where the ZACC must come in and explain to the 
public …” (Interview 17, 18th November 2011).  
This lack of public awareness is reinforced by many interviews conducted 
with certain CSOs and individuals arguing that they have not heard of and/or 
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attended any public education programmes organised by the ZACC. It is 
necessary for the ZACC to meet and educate the public about corruption, so 
that the public recognises its effects. Of course the public may be aware of 
the effects of corruption, but the ZACC needs to increase the public‟s 
awareness. The most effective way forward in public education programmes 
would be to utilise the media, an effective partner and watchdog in fighting 
corruption. The media could publish or broadcast educational programmes 
about corruption. The ZACC will also help in forging a relationship with the 
public, and other supporting institutions such as the media, TI-Z and ACTSA. 
It is from the education programmes that the ZACC can bring itself closer to 
the public, thus closing the gap in perception regarding its ro le and 
effectiveness. The symbiosis is vital because corruption is a multifaceted and 
sophisticated phenomenon that necessitates a holistic approach to detect 
and control.  
While the ZACC‟s chairperson argued that they work with some CSOs and 
the public, empirical evidence from fieldwork study demonstrates that this is 
not the case. For example, the ZACC has not partnered with any CSOs 
particularly the TI-Z as the country‟s leading organisation on Anti-Corruption 
issues (Interviews 1, 24th October 2011; 2, 25th October 2011and 4, 27th 
October 2011). Respondents from the TI-Z, ACTSA, and the independent 
media sector (Interviews 7, 4th November 2011; 4, 27th October 2012; and 
39, 10th January 2012) pointed out that they have tried to forge an alliance 
with the ZACC without success because firstly, “the ZACC was advised by 
the government not to work with the Western funded organisations” 
(Interview 2, 26th October 2011). This further undermines the ZACC‟s 
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apparent independence. Secondly, the media has been critical of its work 
(Interviews 3, 27th October 2011 and 22, 12th December 2011), for example, 
The Daily News (12th March 2012) and the Financial Gazette (22nd 
September 2012) labelled the ZACC as a „toothless bulldog‟ for failing to 
combat corruption. The ZACC and TI-Z share a similar objective, therefore a 
coalition would be a formidable step towards their joint goals. The media is 
an important watchdog apparatus that the ZACC should consider working 
with, particularly considering that it has been the whistle blower of many 
corruption cases in Zimbabwe. For example, the media first published 
incidences of corruption such as the Willowgate scandal, the CDF, the 
WVCF scandal, the VIP Housing scandal, and the Asiagate football scandal. 
Thus, the ZACC should not underrate the importance of a possible coalition 
with the media as a source of information for both the ZACC and the public. 
As noted earlier, ZACC is inadequately funded to run public awareness 
campaigns. Thus, the media can be used to educate the public through 
serialising and/or publishing Anti-Corruption programmes. The publicity 
campaigns through the media, particularly in the newspapers, television 
advertisements and radio broadcasts increase public awareness about what 
constitutes corruption, its causes and effects, and how to prevent it. This 
echoes an interview with the TI-Z respondent who argued that:  
“We used to have Anti-Corruption programmes on the state 
television and newspapers, the programmes became very 
popular with the public, the government felt uncomfortable 
with it and ordered the television bosses to end our 
programmes. We also had weekly columns with The Financial 
Gazette which educated the public about the effects of 
corruption, and I can tell you that this was a success because 
we had people calling us to give feedback and their thoughts 
about corruption” (Interview 7, 4th November 3011). 
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While SAHRIT (2003) articulates that punishment has been the traditional 
approach to combat corruption, critics from various CSOs argue that this has 
not been effective because few people have been prosecuted and punished. 
Punishment is intended to be a deterrent, but it has not worked for 
Zimbabwe. Given that the ZACC investigates corrupt conducts but does not 
have powers to arrest and prosecute is a challenge for the ZACC because 
this weakens its role as it depends on the will of the ZRP and the Attorney-
General‟s office to make arrests and punish those found gui lty. A respondent 
from the judicial office (Interview 43, 27th January 2012) pointed out that 
eleven individuals have been sentenced for corruption in 2011 arguing that it 
is difficult to prosecute and convict those accused because cases of 
corruption are complex, gathering sufficient evidence is problematic and a 
challenge since the corrupt tend to clear or cover their footprints. The judicial 
officer‟s sentiments echo  Matsheza and Kunaka (2010) who argue that 
criminalisation of corruption is relatively new in Zimbabwe therefore 
prosecution of corruption is hampered by insufficiency of pre-existing case 
law. 
Drawing on fieldwork interviews and document analysis, research findings 
demonstrate that the ZACC has not been doing enough to meet the three 
pronged approach (3 Ps) to fight corruption because they have not taken the 
ZACC to the public, they have not created partnership with other 
stakeholders. The ZACC has relied on investigation that has not produced 
positive results as corruption continues to increase. This further compounds 
the public‟s perception on the effectiveness of the ZACC as argued by the TI-
Z executive who pointed out that: 
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“The perception has been created in part by a lack of visibility 
of the Commission‟s work, particularly with regard to keeping 
the public informed of the outcome of their investigations, in 
particular arrest and prosecution of the senior ZANU-PF 
members - the so called „big fish‟ (Interview 7, 4th November 
2011).  
There is a measurable concern from the public, certain CSOs and document 
analysis – both journalistic and academic - about the effectiveness of the 
ZACC because investigations have not produced visible results in the form of 
arrests and prosecution to symbolise its effectiveness and seriousness on 
fighting corruption as pointed out by the TI-Z official. This further reinforces 
the erosion in public confidence and trust in the ZACC. 
As already discussed (in this chapter), the original ZACC proved ineffective 
and submitted to the Parliamentary Committee only a single report in a 
period of five years. Furthermore, this report contained very limited details 
and gave ambiguous information concerning its objectives and strategies 
employed with regards to cases it handled. Despite the availability of 
immeasurable evidence about brazen looting and plunder of the national 
resources by public figures, the ZACC has not dealt with them as they 
became known.  
It was argued by several respondents that the ZACC has in fact been active 
in protecting the corrupt political elites while concentrating on petty corruption 
which should ordinarily and routinely be dealt with by the ZRP (Interviews 4, 
27th October 2011, 39, 10th November 2011 and 41, 25th January 2012). 
While the lack of progress by ZACC may be attributed to logistical and 
procedural problems, several interviews and document evidence show that 
the lack of political will on the part of the state, alarming political interference 
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by the „big fish‟ in the administration of the ZACC and a lack of powers to 
arrest and prosecute, are more fundamental drivers of such failure.32 That 
said, it is concluded here that public funds have ironically been used to 
finance a giant cover-up operation for the benefit of the corrupt ruling elites 
whose political survival hinges on political patronage and a clientele system 
of corruption as argued in chapter two. With corruption cases reported in the 
Marange diamond fields being plundered by a complex network of the 
ZANU-PF senior Cabinet Ministers, senior civil servants, ZRP and the army 
Generals; and wealth accumulation drive by the bureaucrats, the ZACC 
should be the busiest in the history of Anti-Corruption Commissions.  
Following fieldwork evidence, public opinion is that Ministers and MPs are 
among the most corrupt. In a context within which senior government 
members are perpetrators of corruption, it is un-surprising that there is a lack 
of political will to address this endemic problem. The next section examines 
the role of Parliament in combating corruption, and assesses its political will, 
how its power influences Anti-Corruption strategies. 
6.2.2 The Role of the Parliament of Zimbabwe in Combating 
Corruption 
 
                                                                 
 
 
 
32
 Interviews 3, 27th October 2011; 4, 27th October 2011; 10, 7th November 2011; 18, 21st 
November 2011;    40, 19th January 2012; and 54, 14th February 2012, and Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Assembly (Wednesday 21st September 2011 and 23rd November 2011), Vol. 37, No. 24 
and 37, No. 26. 
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“Ministers grow richer ...., Members of Parliament feather their 
nests and there is not a soul down to the simple policemen 
who does not join in the great procession of corruption” 
(Devine 2010: 1). 
 
The Zimbabwe Parliament is mandated by the constitution as one of the 
major Anti-Corruption apparatus. MPs debate governance of social, political 
and economic issues as part of its function. Parliament oversees the conduct 
of the management of public resources. It‟s power emanates from its 
decrees and laws that criminalise acts of corruption. Among other issues, 
this power allows the Parliament to potentially play a leading part in 
combating corruption through the passing of sets of laws, and organs such 
as the ZACC are set to enforce them. For example, the Prevention of 
Corruption Act of 2004 (Government of Zimbabwe 2006) was passed to 
enforce the ZACC. 
Parliament is assisted by the office of the Comptroller Auditor General 
(CAG). The office of the CAG is responsible for inspecting and auditing 
public accounts and reports directly to Parliament on the status of those 
accounts. The noble idea of using the CAG and Parliament in this function 
potentially makes it possible for Parliament to identify and expose corrupt 
officials or incidents of mismanagement. One interviewee from the Ministry of 
Justice and Legal Affairs also illustrated this by indicating that: 
“The function of the Parliament involves ensuring that they 
administer the country‟s resources in terms of the budget and 
also in accordance with the principles of sound corporate 
governance with the help of other state organs” (Interview 33, 
15th January 2012).  
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It was through this CAG-Parliament interface that incidents of 
mismanagement of the CDF by MPs were identified. While this can be 
picked as a credible example of how the Parliament and the CAG interrelate, 
it also suggests that it is the first and only one of its kind. However, despite 
this commendable supportive work of identifying corrupt conducts such as 
mismanagement of the CDF by this CAG-Parliament interface, nothing has 
happened to the implicated MPs because the Attorney-General called off the 
probe which a respondent from the University of Zimbabwe has cited as “the 
protection of the big fish” (Interview 57, 21st December 2012). This further 
advances the public perception that there is no political will to address the 
problem of corruption because such obvious cases can be easily suppressed 
by the Attorney-General while the Parliament is silent about it. This was 
further captured in an interview with the University of Zimbabwe respondent 
who argued that:  
“Some Parliamentarians thought they had made a mistake of 
reporting its nine members to the ZACC, they realised their 
mistake when it was revealed that all the MPs would be 
investigated for similar corrupt conduct, and knowing that 
those who live in a house of glasses should not throw stones, 
they pleaded with the Attorney-General to withdraw the 
probes” (Interview 57, 21st December 2012). 
The interview, together with the empirical evidence gathered from the 
fieldwork study, demonstrates that many MPs are corrupt and therefore 
cannot be trusted to drive forward Anti-Corruption programmes. When asked 
about this, one MP (MDC-N) (Interview 44, 30th January 2012) gave an 
insight into the weaknesses of the Parliamentarians, pointing out that there is 
a lack of commitment to the problem of corruption and arguing that most of 
them are not willing to debate corruption issues because it affects them as 
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they have benefited from it. The MP‟s argument turned to be a true reflection 
of what the document analysis (Parliamentary Debates, Wednesday 17th 
November 2010 and Wednesday 23rd January 2011) demonstrate, showing 
that several senior MPs were absent when there was a debate on corruption. 
For example, the interviewee argued that twenty nine of the current ZANU-
PF legislators have been in Parliament since 1980 (although they have 
occupied various positions within the government) most of them have 
succumbed to the system of corruption. The respondent argued that:  
“Remember these are very inf luential guys in the Parliament, 
they can oppose a motion if they are not comfortable with it, 
particularly the discourse of corruption. They are not willing to 
talk about it, or some don‟t turn up when such issues are 
debated” (Interview 44, 30th January 2012). 
Several respondents have cited Parliament as problematic in combating 
corruption because among other reasons, the legislators are corrupt 
therefore not willing to address corruption because they are benefiting from 
it. It is not only that they are benefiting but because it is the system that binds 
them with the electorate through politics of patronage and clientelism, the 
resources they distribute to the electorate preserve their political power.  
Given the above insight and empirical evidence from the fieldwork study, one 
would argue that MPs and Cabinet Ministers will not be effective at 
monitoring or controlling corruption in the country as composite indicators 
echo a massive decline in trust in the legislature. Research findings from 
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interviews and document analysis show that the legislators are too corrupt to 
be tasked to combat corruption.33 This draws on the perspective that since 
1980 numerous corruption scandals predominantly involved ZANU-PF MPs 
and Cabinet Ministers as the major beneficiaries. 
Given that ZANU-PF Parliamentarians have failed to combat corruption since 
independence, one would think that a stronger opposition (MDC) 
representation in Parliament would provide an effective check against a 
dominant ZANU-PF executive. The rise in the power and popularity of the 
two MDC formations in the government as exemplified by the GNU in 2009 
appeared to provide a potential political space for the two MDC legislators to 
check and combat corruption within the Parliament. But they have failed; 
instead, some of them such as Tedius Chimombe have succumbed to 
corruption resulting in their expulsion from the party. Document evidence 
(Kwayedza, 6th April 2011, The Chronicle, 7th April 2011, and Parliamentary 
Debates, 22nd June 2011) show that between 2009 and 2011 Tedius 
Chimombe corruptly allocated residential and commercial stands to himself 
and friends at discounted prices and resold them at higher prices. One way 
to assess whether Parliamentarians are the right people for combati ng 
corruption is to examine and analyse their history and the role they have 
                                                                 
 
 
 
33
 Political speech by Morgan Tsvangirai at the 10th MDC’s 10th anniversa ry rally in Bulawayo 
(Sokwanele 14th September 2009),  
The Zimbabwe Independent (2012) Graft l inked to state policies. Comment, 19 January.  
SW Radio Africa (2010) Magistrate says Minister Chombo has corruption case to answer, 15 June. 
Mail and Guardian (South Africa) (2006) ZIM grain trade boss charged with corruption, 26 August. 
Available from http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/aug27_2006.html#Z2 (accessed in December  
2011). 
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played regarding corruption. As several interviewees and primary sources 
have revealed, most Parliamentarians have been implicated in one or more 
scandals (Interview 24, 16th December 2011), therefore cannot be trusted to 
manage Anti-Corruption programmes. 
While the MDC-N MP argued that senior MPs would oppose motions 
concerning Anti-Corruption, interviews with two MPs, one from ZANU-PF and 
the other from MDC-T (Interviews 12, 9th November 2012 and 24, 16th 
December 2011) and Parliamentary Debates (Wednesday, 17th November 
2010) revealed that in some cases there are debates on corruption issues, 
but the Parliament does not have the power to influence the investigation 
and prosecution of those implicated in as much as it does not determine the 
Anti-Corruption initiatives. This is a loophole utilised by the corrupt „big fish‟ 
that also get involved in these debates, knowing that the debates have no 
influence on existing Anti-Corruption strategies. It is from this standpoint that 
this thesis criticises the Parliament for its lack of the necessary powers 
expected to systematically fight the problem of corruption. One social 
commentator argued that the Parliament has power to control corruption, but 
its power is conveniently concealed in order to maintain a status quo that 
benefits some MPs (Interview 52, 10th February 2012). The corruption 
environment calls for a strong and willing political system leading by example 
in the exercise of Anti-Corruption initiatives. One respondent from the TI-Z 
argued that: 
“At least we should see these leaders on the media or TV 
saying something about the effects of corruption then the 
public will know that there is political will from their side” 
(Interview 1, 24th October 2011). 
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Given that the Parliament should be a key Anti-Corruption organ, it should be 
seen taking a pivotal role and leading by example in the quest for 
accountability, integrity and transparency. 
A major concern expressed by MPs interviewed (for example, Interviews 12, 
9th November 2012; 24, 16th December 2011; and 44, 30th January 2012) is 
that the Parliament does not have in place a code of conduct and ethics for 
its members, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution (chapter 5, 
Section 107) provides for the creation of such code. Understanding of 
corruption within the Parliamentarians is “intrinsically linked to the concept of 
ethics” (Matsheza and Kunaka 2010: 37). Therefore, understanding the 
concept of ethics in the context of corruption in Zimbabwe is important for 
this study. Ethics are values that signify honesty, responsibility, 
accountability, trust, respect, empathy, fairness, and a sense of good and 
bad, and right and wrong. The legislators determine ethics through collective 
acceptance of what is right and wrong, good or bad for the country, and are 
expected to follow them because they define their professionalism in socio-
economic and political environments and circumstances – as implied by their 
role as public servants. These ethics as a set of moral principles are 
intended to guide the legislators, but in the context of the Zimbabwe‟s MPs, 
these values are disregarded, particularly those related to corruption. The 
implication is that if the law makers disregard these ethics the public is also 
bound to disregard the Anti-Corruption laws created by the Parliament, which 
explains why some members of the public have succumbed to corruption. 
One way of addressing these loopholes or weaknesses would be to equip 
the Parliament with Constitutional powers to enforce its decisions. 
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Furthermore, as demonstrated in chapter five, Zimbabwe needs to free up 
the political operation space for civic groupings that could put pressure on 
the Parliament because the existence of a vibrant independent media and 
civil society can make Parliament more accountable. This is possible if the 
state discard the oppressive and draconian laws such as the AIPPA and 
POSA (discussed in chapter five) that criminalise CSOs that try to address 
good governance issues or criticise the ruling elites. 
While the formation of the GNU has led to a rise of robust debate on good 
governance related issues such as human rights abuses, findings of this 
research from interviews with MPs and document evidence such as 
Parliamentary Debates (Thursday, 13th July 2010, Wednesday 17th 
November 2010 and Wednesday, 23rd February 2011) and local newspapers 
demonstrate that Parliament has not been able to combat corruption, or hold 
the executive accountable, but it has managed to keep the executive under 
pressure to put corruption in the limelight resulting in the rebirth of the ZACC 
in 2011. Drawing on these findings, this thesis argues that the Parliament 
has failed the nation in combating corruption, whether by design, intent, or 
unintended consequences linked to policy implementation failure. This 
informs perceptions from various interviewed organisations such as the 
independent media, ACTSA, ZCTU, and the selected individuals like the 
University of Zimbabwe respondents, all of whom asserted that 
Parliamentarians are corruptly profiting from the existing economic and 
political system that breeds corruption, therefore, have no passion and 
commitment to combat it. This draws us back to chapter five where reference 
was made to the principle of „bending the analysis‟ where by in this case, the 
 251 
existing economic, social and political systems are nurtured by public 
institutions such as the Parliament to sustain corruption that benefits them. 
Having discussed the roles of the ZACC and the Parliament, the next sub-
section evaluates the role and strategies deployed by the ZRP in combating 
corruption. The section assesses how the ZRP has responded to incidents of 
corruption, and how corruption is perceived within the police force. 
6.2.3 Policing Corruption: The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) 
practice, control and the track record of tackling corruption 
 
Literature about ZRP corruption is quite extensive, but none focuses on the 
role played by the political environment. Most literature is related to bribery. 
Therefore, this thesis brings forward a new dimension of police corruption in 
Zimbabwe and regards the political environment as playing an important role 
in engendering police corruption. The ZRP are the guardians of criminal law 
but have systematically failed to uphold this in the area of corruption.  
Key findings of this study gathered from interviews with government and civil 
society representatives, and document analysis such as ZRP official records 
reveal that the ZRP‟s strategies to detect, investigate and control corruption 
have been non-existent since independence. Corruption scandals such as 
Willowgate, WVCF, VIP Housing, DDF, Land invasion, the CDF, etc. were 
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first identified by the media, particularly the private newspapers.34 Even when 
the scandals became known to the ZRP in some cases they refused to 
investigate the implicated Ministers leaving the media to assume an 
investigative role. Drawing on the interview with the Police Commissioner, 
the refusal to investigate MPs or ZANU-PF members is purely political given 
the Commissioner‟s argument that “investigating Ministers is tantamount to 
plotting a coup” (Interview 45, 30th January 2012). A respondent from the 
ZCTU (Interview 17, 18th November 2011) argued that if ever there were 
investigations on corrupt conduct these would be against the „small fish‟ 
leaving the „big fish‟ untouched, an action that supports the Police 
Commissioner‟s opinion. Many civic groups and individuals interviewed 
concurred that the ZRP has become a party instrument because of its biased 
tendencies towards the ruling party. One ZCTU respondent argued that: 
“This police force is not to be trusted to be the guardian of the 
public, unless you are a ZANU-PF supporter or member. Look 
at the big corruption scandals where ZANU-PF is involved, 
how many have been investigated and arrested? They 
investigate companies involved not the perpetrators. Recently 
in the Harare airport road scandal, they investigated the 
manager of the construction company for leaking the deal.35 
They never visited the Minister [name given] who owns the 
company and responsible for giving the tender to his 
company” (Interview 17, 18th November 2011). 
                                                                 
 
 
 
34
 In some cases the state owned newspapers such as The Chronicle and The Herald wer e first to 
expose some of the scandals, but most of the scandals are revealed by independent media 
such as The Standard, The Zimbabwe Independent, The Daily Mirror and The Daily News. 
35
 In June 2007 Memorandum Of Understanding was signed between Augur Investment Company 
(owned by Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development) and the City of Harare to 
upgrade the ten kilometres Harare Airport road. The project was valued at eighty million dollars, 
which should have cost ten mill ion dollars (The Zimbabwean Wednesday, 25 July 2012, and 
swradioafrica.com, 3 may 2010) 
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As the police force refuses to investigate politicians chiefly to protect the 
ruling elite from prosecution and other reasons that will be discussed here, 
the question of interest in this thesis is: Why does the police force not 
investigate the widespread grand corruption and bureaucratic corruption 
incidences in various government Ministries, departments and parastatals 
where MPs and bureaucrats enrich themselves through extorting bribes from 
the public seeking services? The answers are: firstly, the ZRP does not have 
strategies to detect and investigate corruption because if these mechanisms 
are and/or were in place they would be able to control the problem of 
corruption. This is captured in an interview with the Ministry of Home Affairs 
representative who argued that the ZRP is not trained to deal with corruption 
cases. In scenarios where detection has failed but cases reported, as Figure 
6.2 shows, the ZRP should be seen taking action against those reported 
cases (Interview 19, 23rd November 2011). That said, this leads to the 
second answer that is drawn from empirical evidence gathered from the 
fieldwork study - that the ZRP is also corrupt. The thesis will visit this 
important point shortly. 
Figure 6.2 presents data of the reported cases of corruption, investigated 
and un-investigated, and the investigative or court outcomes between 1985 
and 2011. The figure reveals alarming ZRP action and inaction and 
investigative court outcomes in corruption cases and sheds new light on the 
ZRP‟s complicity in corruption. While other researchers such as Sokwanele 
have looked at the role of the ZRP in combating corruption, identifying and 
analysing the ratio of investigated against cases un-investigated provides a 
new and more meaningful insight. 
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Drawing on Figure 6.2, of the eight hundred and twenty eight cases reported 
to the ZRP between 1985 and 2011, only 12.8% were investigated, 87.2% 
cases were not investigated, and of the 12.8% investigated only 9% of them 
reached court, 2% produced convictions followed by a Presidential pardon, 
while 7% of them were dropped. It can be seen that the ZRP action 
(investigation) and court investigative outcomes are very low compared to 
the very high cases reported. Broadly conceptualised, conclusions drawn 
from Figure 6.2 reinforce the fundamental issues raised in chapter two and 
this chapter that the government is corrupt, particularly given that it is the 
government Ministers and MPs who were involved in all of the scandals 
identified here. This draws us back to the conclusion reached earlier that 
there is a lack of political will to combat corruption drawing on the 
investigative and court outcomes where the 2% of those convicted either got 
a Presidential pardon or the Attorney-General dropped the cases. 
The high proportion of reported cases against low investigation and 
prosecution rates (including failure by the ZRP to investigate cases) 
demonstrates corruption in the ZRP. Several respondents from different 
organisations argued that the ZRP is manipulated by ZANU-PF leadership 
and ordered on whom to investigate and charge for corruption, with a 
respondent from the ACTSA arguing that only a corrupt police force can do 
that (Interview 4, 27th October 2011). This and other factors to be discussed 
in this section make it a challenge for the ZRP to act even where there is 
clear evidence of corruption. Evidence from interviews and document 
analysis collated into Figure 6.2 (below) demonstrates that the ZRP 
effectively shields the corrupt ruling elite. 
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Figure 6.2:  Cases of Reported Grand Corruption, action taken by the ZRP  
and the outcome of investigations  
Souce: Author‟s version based on data gathered during fieldwork 
 
The analysis of Figure 6.2 is in line with the Tl-Z‟s Global Corruption 
Barometer (2011), which demonstrates that the ZRP is perceived by the 
public as Zimbabwe‟s most visibly corrupt institution. There is therefore, a 
strong link between the ZRP and the prevalence of corruption that underpins 
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its action against the reported cases. The public perception on the ZRP‟s role 
is damaged by pervasive corruption within the organisation. At interview, the 
Police Commissioner acknowledged that there is corruption within the ZRP 
arguing that: “off course we cannot deny that there are a few corrupt police 
officers who solicit bribes from motorists” (Interview 45, 30 th January 2012).36 
This applies to the “rotten apple doctrine” (Newburn 1999: 134), a principle 
arguing that a small number of corrupt police officers can tarnish the image 
of the whole police force. Furthermore, an interview with a junior police 
officer who disagreed with the Police Commissioner‟s perspective argued 
that “all senior officers secretly condone corruption because they tell us not 
to raise an alarm on corruption within the police force” (Interview 58, 21st 
December 2012). The two interviews established that policing in Zimbabwe 
has been punctuated with patterns of misconduct and malpractice as flagged 
by the Police Commissioner and further demonstrated by Figure 6.2 where 
cases of corruption have not been investigated despite being reported. 
Police corruption is a big hindrance to Zimbabwe‟s Anti-Corruption 
management given that the ZRP has refused to take orders from the ZACC 
on the grounds that they cannot investigate Ministers. While the corruption 
scandals discussed above involved government Ministers and MPs and the 
ZRP taking minimal or no action against them, the implication is that it is 
                                                                 
 
 
 
36
 A ZRP traffic officer was caught on camera soliciting and receiving  bribe from a motorist 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SBNoYl_XGCA&feature=player_detailpage) [Viewed on 19
th
 
April  2013] 
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highly likely that the ZACC will not get political support from the Ministers, 
MPs and the ZRP in the fight against corruption because they are corrupt. 
There are many competing explanations of police corruption within the ZRP. 
Newburn (1999) argues that there are areas of policing that places the ZRP 
„at risk‟ of corruption which Manning and Redlinger (1997:354) have called  
“the invitational edge of corruption” where the temptations to engage in 
corrupt activities are very high. The nature and context of their work, in which 
they have substantial autonomy in enforcing laws, increases the likelihood 
for decisions to be influenced by considerations of material or other gain 
rather than by professional judgement. 
Sherman (1998) argues that in general the police force is structured in 
relation to a number of informal rules that play two key purposes in 
influencing corruption within the police ranks. Firstly, the rules minimise 
potential chances of control by external forces, and secondly, are meant to 
keep corruption within the police force at a „minimal‟  level. Linked closely to 
these rules is a culture of silence within the police organisations. The ZRP 
has been accused by the ZACC of not cooperating with investigations that 
relate to Ministers or senior political officials and other members of the ZRP. 
The culture of silence is “protective armour shielding the force from public 
knowledge of infractions” (Reiner 1992: 93).  One respondent from the 
ACTSA argued that this culture of silence on corruption issues “has created 
a strong bond of allegiance between the ZRP and ZANU-PF” (Interview 4, 
27th October 2011), which has encouraged and facilitated corruption while 
obstructing inquiries, investigations and Anti-Corruption management. 
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Central to the culture of silence is that for honest and junior officers joining 
the ZRP it influences them to accept corruption as part of the job. A 
discussion with one junior police officer produced interesting revelations 
about the nature of the culture of silence within the ZRP. The officer argued 
that:   
“Our silence is not because we are too afraid to talk or to 
investigate corruption, but it is because our seniors and 
bosses are corrupt themselves, so they teach us not to 
cooperate with the outsiders investigating other officers. As 
juniors there is nothing we can do besides joining them. No 
one will prosecute anyone because we are all involved. Since 
we fear the consequences of their corruption scandals, we are 
cautious with our investigations” (Interview 58, 21st December 
2012) 
The culture of silence is a discouraging factor in the attempts of combating 
corruption by external forces such as the ZACC, the TI-Z, the ACTSA and 
other interested Anti-Corruption stakeholders. This culture engenders ZRP 
loyalty while allowing corruption to flourish in Zimbabwe. Most importantly, 
this has engendered corruption within the ZRP that influences decisions of 
whether or not to investigate or prosecute any persons for corruption 
because of fear of opening a „Pandora‟s Box‟, particularly with the ZRP 
senior officers involved in one or more corruption scandals.  
The implication is that such is the culture of corruption, which is so endemic 
that it is „self-sustaining‟. Empirical evidence gained from document analysis 
such as newspapers and opposition political statements suggest that the 
 259 
political environment is a leading explanation of why the ZRP is corrupt 
largely as an outcome of ZANU-PF leadership „buying allegiance‟ of the 
police force.37 Several interviews support this, the perception of the MDC 
MPs is that ZANU-PF Ministers command immense power which they apply 
to interfere and influence operations of the ZRP particularly against the MDC 
formations (Interviews 24, 16th December 2011 and 44, 30th January 2012). 
The ZRP are politicised and indoctrinated by political leaders against 
opposition parties seen as „agents of imperialism‟ as already discussed in 
chapter five. This politicisation and de-professionalisation of the police force 
has led to junior police officers conducting policing duties in a partisan way.38 
One of the consequences of this is the proliferation of a corrupt ZRP, which 
explains why it has succumbed to corruption. The MDC respondent argued 
that: 
“There is an unhealthy relationship between the police force 
and ZANU-PF Ministers, their policing strategy aims to 
maintain a ZANU-PF government in power to preserve the 
benefits acquired from corrupt activities. Many senior police 
officers are members of ZANU-PF; their objective is to 
prevent any party coming to power through arresting 
members of the opposition. That is the reason why the ZRP 
supports ZANU-PF against the MDC parties, don‟t be 
surprised that most of the officers are supporters of ZANU-PF 
…” (Interview 24 16th December 2011). 
                                                                 
 
 
 
37
 Addressing a rally in Marondera in Mashonaland East Morgan Tsvangirai (leader of MDC) argued 
that ZRP is a partisan organ keen on serving ZANU-PF’s interest for personal benefits (Zimeye 
Saturday 4, July 2009, available online: http://www.zimeye.org/?p=6833 
38
 Politics has reduced the ZRP’s professional status, discretion and autonomy, and thus 
compromising their capacity to act in the best interest of their nation (Clark, C. 2005). The ZRP has 
abandoned its constitutional mandate in favour of an approach to policing which is blatantly 
partisan. 
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An interview with the NCA representative echoed the MDC sentiments 
arguing that: 
“The ZRP act with the primary intention of scoring a political 
advantage knowing pretty well that doing so also sustains its 
corrupt activities as the ruling government grants them 
immunity if the officers are implicated in politically motivated 
violence or corruption” (Interview 20, 7th December 2011). 
Several respondents argued that the ZRP are rewarded in many ways 
ranging from pay increase to promotion for applying the law in a selective 
and biased manner against opposition parties. One respondent added that: 
“Those who demonstrate that they are anti-opposition enjoy a lot of benefits, 
some of them live in mansions and while some have farms …” (Interview 20, 
7th December 2011). The police corruption involved is not only financially 
oriented nor is it bribery or extortion, but mainly what Newburn (1999: 36) 
refers to as “corruption of authority” in which the ZRP receive rewards such 
as free accommodation, free transport, free meals from the state for the 
corrupt services rendered. When ZRP sell their service for private gain the 
rule of law is compromised. A lack of Anti-Corruption law enforcement 
coupled with the absence of and/or no real democratic institutions in 
existence leaves the ruling elite free to do as they please. It is from this 
perspective that corrupt activities are not investigated and the corrupt are not 
convicted as Figure 6.2 demonstrates. 
While Zimbabwe has been a non-democratic state for three decades, the 
state has used the ZRP as instruments of political control to repress dissent 
and democratic competition. The ZRP (under ZANU-PF orders) has 
employed tactics such as „framing‟ the political opponents to disqualify, 
discredit and frustrate them from political participation. Victims of such tactics 
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include PF-ZAPU (chapter five) and the MDC leaders who were arrested, 
tortured and released without a charge. In an interview, the Minister of 
Finance pointed out that:  
“ZANU-PF wanted to keep me out of politics maybe until the 
elections results were announced, but they could not find 
reasons to detain me so they had to frame me on treason 
allegations of plotting a coup against the government only to 
release me without charge after the election results were 
announced” (Interview 55, 7th December 2012). 
An interview with a respondent from the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Association (Interview 42, 25th January 2012) established that human rights 
groups recorded several cases of the partisan nature and conduct of the 
ZRP implicated in human rights violations and abuses directed at opposition 
supporters.39 
This polarised political environment has further created room for police 
corruption. The whole political culture needs to change because its influence 
on the ZRP administrative duties pervades every level of public life . This 
requires politicians and the ZRP to accept a democratic order where those in 
power can be held to account for their actions. This can be made possible 
through allowing independent and efficient watchdog institutions such as an 
                                                                 
 
 
 
39
 The ZRP executed Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) in 2005, which demolished homes 
and buildings in urban districts. The operation targeted homes of the opposition 
supporters, and there were no plans in place to assist those forced from their homes, which 
meant many were left homeless. 
               In 2008 the ZRP prevented prayer meetings organised by the Save Zimbabwe Campaign (a 
coalition of church, civic groups and NGOs) and the opposition party MDC from taking 
place. Leaders of the MDC and the civic movement as well as other people hoping to attend 
the function were arrested and assaulted by the police. 
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effective Anti-Corruption Commission with powers to prosecute those found 
guilty of corruption, civil society watchdog organisations who can take a lead 
in corruption issues (as we shall see in the next section), and a vibrant and 
independent media which is free to report corruption by elites. Elimination of 
laws such as AIPPA and POSA (discussed in chapter five) that criminalise 
reporting on government corruption can free the media to report corrupt 
officials who engage in corrupt activities. The AIPPA and POSA are being 
used by ZANU-PF politicians to shield themselves from media scrutiny in 
instances where they are participating in corrupt activities. The use of these 
laws demonstrates the failure of the state to understand or localise the 
principles of democracy. This has fuelled corruption as politicians tightly hold 
on their political positions that help them accumulate wealth. 
The next section discusses strategies employed by CSOs to combat 
corruption, and how the political environment influences and affects civil 
society‟s Anti-Corruption management. 
6.3 Civil society‟s Anti-Corruption strategies: From tolerance, 
condemnation and the fear factor 
 
Chapter five established that while Zimbabwe has experienced an increase 
in CSOs in recent years, this has not translated into any substantial 
contribution towards abating corruption. In addition, while morally opposed to 
corruption, the majority of civil society institutions do not specifically address 
corruption issues through targeted Ant-Corruption programmes. Building on 
this, the following section will demonstrate that some CSOs have a major 
role in combating corruption. While acknowledging that efforts in controlling 
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corruption in Zimbabwe have been fundamentally state-driven without much 
involvement from other stakeholders – with the exception of TI-Z (Mavuso 
and Merwe 2008) and certain sections of the independent media, this section 
explores the role and strategies of certain CSOs as an integral part in fighting 
corruption alongside and in partnership with the state.  
However, regardless of the absence of the evidence of a large number of 
civil society constituents in Anti-Corruption programmes in Zimbabwe, the 
role of civil society in combating corruption remains an indispensable 
element in the theory of political economy.  
Empirical evidence gathered suggests that there are two key explanations for 
the failure by CSOs to combat corruption. Firstly, as demonstrated in chapter 
five, there is a limited political space for CSOs to effectively implement Anti-
Corruption programmes due to repressive and suppressive laws such as 
POSA and AIPPA that criminalise individuals and organisations venturing 
into such discourses. The notion of combating corruption is a sensitive and 
risky area particularly given the findings from Figure 6.2 that established that 
MPs, Cabinet Ministers and ZANU-PF elite are corrupt. The risk lies in that a 
discussion of corruption in Zimbabwe has to mention politicians or 
government corruption. This has resulted in most of CSOs not involving 
themselves in good governance projects such as combating corruption 
because of the „untouchability‟  of the ruling elite and fear of invading their 
space. This is elaborated by an executive officer from NANGO who argued 
that since the enactment of the POSA and AIPPA laws in 2002 many CSOs 
and NGOs have been cautious of what they choose to do to avoid head-on 
confrontation with the state. The respondent argued that: 
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“Subjects like human rights abuses, corruption and land 
invasion are high risk areas because whichever way you 
choose to tackle them you will directly or indirectly clash with 
the state authorities. For instance, how do you prevent 
corruption when Ministers allocate themselves several farms 
each? How do you discuss the land question without 
addressing the methodology used by the state? To avoid 
taking chances, many civil society organisations have opted 
to concentrate on other issues which will not cause problems 
for themselves” (Interview 37, 9th January 2012) 
Some sections of CSOs opted to concentrate on environmental and social 
welfare programmes, areas that are not political. This way they were able to 
avoid confrontation with the state given that their interventions were non-
political. Many CSOs reverted to environmental and agentive humanitarian 
issues such as food, education and health provision, and women‟s 
empowerment out of fear of risk of de-registration (chapter five for PVO Act) 
and the wrath of ZANU-PF government if they ventured into governance 
issues surrounding corruption. The executive from NANGO (Interview 37, 9th 
January 2012) and interviewee representing ORAP (Interview 23, 14th 
December 2011) pointed out that the fear of provoking the corrupt 
government influences some of CSOs to shy away from good governance 
issues like corruption and human rights. Despite this fear, other 
organisations such the TI-Z and some sections of the private media have 
remained resilient, playing an important role in fighting corruption. 
The second explanation for the failure to combat corruption by civi l society is 
evidenced from the interviews with the state Prosecutor (Interview 26, 20 th 
December 2011) and the TI-Z‟s Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre (ALAC) 
representative (Interview 2, 26th October 2011). Both interviewees concurred 
that there is a gap of knowledge in dealing with corruption issues in the 
country. The Prosecutor argued that there was insufficient human capital to 
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address corruption. Corruption law is new in Zimbabwe; therefore very few 
people have experience in handling corruption cases. Furthermore, the 
representative of the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education (Interview 47, 
3rd February 2012) established that the curricula across all school levels do 
not incorporate studies into corruption, or equip students with adequate tools 
to be effective in enforcement of Anti-Corruption. In addition, the curricula do 
not incorporate wider concepts of „citizenship‟ under which such issues as 
corruption might arise. This is a challenge for those who venture into the field 
of combating corruption because in practice, the theory of Anti-Corruption 
management is missing. This further explains why certain sections of CSOs 
have not concentrated on combating corruption because they have no 
human expertise with necessary skills and knowledge in terms of dealing 
with corruption. For example, the TI-Z ALAC representative pointed out that: 
“Even this organisation which directly deals with corruption has no experts in 
corruption issues” (Interview 2, 26th October 2011). 
This was echoed by the Prosecutor who argued that:  
“We cannot expect civil society organisations to focus on 
combating corruption because the country has no experts on 
corruption cases, unless those organisations rely on 
foreigners … Above all there is no political will to establish 
corruption studies at higher education or tertiary level” 
(Interview 26, 20th December 2011). 
 
While scholars like Mavuso and Merwe (2008) have blamed CSOs for the 
failure to combat corruption, evidence from these interviews demonstrate 
that the project of combating corruption is as complex as corruption i tself. It 
requires individuals and organisations with substantial expertise. This calls 
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for the state to introduce corruption studies at schools, colleges and 
universities (as proposed earlier in this chapter) to equip the public 
(particularly students) with Anti-Corruption fighting skills. The Constitution of 
Zimbabwe has a chapter (Chapter 4) that focuses on combating corruption 
that could give education institutions a starting point in this regard. 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe (Chapter 4, Part 2 Sections 58, 61 and 62) 
guarantees freedom of association and assembly, freedom of expression 
and freedom of media, and freedom of access to information. ZANU-PF has 
limited these rights by enacting stringent and repressive laws such as POSA, 
AIPPA, NGO Bill and PVOA. As discussed in chapters five and six, this has 
seen the relationship between the ruling government and CSOs widening 
with some civil society leaders subjected to harassment due to their critical 
stance on good governance issues. The PVOA regulating activities of CSOs 
reinforced the government‟s authoritative and autocratic grip on the 
organisations‟ operations . While many CSOs retracted from good 
governance issues, they left a lacuna in areas of policy formulation and 
implementation, which drove Zimbabwe into what various commentators 
have ca lled “socio-economic meltdown” (Zhou 2012: 179). The introduction 
of the repressive laws struck at the core of operations of some CSOs as the 
laws hugely limited the space within which to operate. One respondent from 
Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe argued that:  
“It‟s been really difficult for us because whatever we do we 
have to consider POSA and AIPPA because if we step over 
this line we will be in trouble, … off course we have taken 
chances here and there and ignored the laws but it is a risk 
because if we are caught you know what will happen” 
(Interview 28, 23rd December 2011). 
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This has two fundamental implications. Firstly, it demonstrates that the laws 
had an effect on the operations of civil society, and secondly, it shows that 
despite these laws in place some CSOs were able to operate regardless of 
the risk of government censure. 
While this thesis argues that CSOs have an obligation to fill the lacuna in the 
formulation and implementation of the Anti-Corruption policies, it must be 
pointed out however, as argued earlier in chapters five and six, that the 
democratic space which has grown ever narrower due to the ZANU-PF‟s 
totalitarian project, has defined the pathway followed by certain CSOs in the 
fight against corruption. A respondent from NANGO (Interview 36, 9th 
January 2012) argued that the inimical nature of ZANU-PF has played a 
negative role in the way CSOs have participated in policy formulation, 
particularly issues that may affect their power such as corruption. 
TI-Z is one organisation that has managed to participate in Anti -Corruption 
policy formulation processes without invading the state‟s space. The next 
section examines and assesses how it has managed to achieve this. 
6.3.1 An assessment of Transparency International-Zimbabwe‟s 
(TI-Z) Anti-Corruption strategies and challenges in 
combating corruption 
 
TI-Z is the Zimbabwe chapter of Transparency International (TI). It was 
formed in 1996 by a group of dedicated and concerned citizens to fight 
corruption and its effects on the Zimbabwean society. TI-Z is part of the 
growing network of TI national chapters fighting corruption through networks 
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of integrity within civil society, business, academia, and the government to 
curb corruption (see chapter one for detailed background). 
TI-Z has numerous objectives specifically designed to fight corruption. It aims 
to help develop and broaden Zimbabwe‟s economic and social development 
by countering corruption in the public and private sectors (TI-Z 2008). Since 
its formation in 1996, it sought to formulate policies that discourage and 
penalise unethical conduct. It works to strengthen public support and 
understanding of Anti-Corruption programmes by enhancing public 
transparency and accountability in both public and private sectors.  
Interviews with the TI-Z officials (Interviews 1, 24th October 2011; 2, 26th 
October 2011; and 7, 4th November 2011) show that it adopted four Anti-
Corruption strategies namely: 
1. The public awareness campaigns 
2. Networking and coalition building  
3. Advocacy and lobbying 
4. Research and publications 
Public awareness campaigns have been at the core of TI-Z‟s strategy over 
the years. The programme has been executed through various activities 
such as public lectures, workshops and seminars, press statements using 
electronic and print media (television, internet and newspapers), publishing 
pamphlets, Anti-Corruption commemorations, and road shows. In chapter 
five this thesis discussed the restrictive and suppressive POSA and AIPPA 
laws that limit the activities and freedom of certain CSOs. The question is 
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how did the TI-Z manage to operate effectively while seemingly in 
contravention of laws? The legal structures in place following the POSA and 
AIPPA raise fundamental issues relating to access to government 
information, the freedom of expression and association and the right to hold 
public lectures and gatherings. Consequently, at times the TI-Z also found it 
challenging to hold public meetings and road shows, or to use government 
information related to corruption or informing the general public about 
corruption because it required naming corrupt government officials. This has 
hampered the TI-Z‟s effectiveness.  
Interviews with TI-Z officials and the Minister representing ZANU-PF 
(Interview 15, 23rd November 2011) established that unlike most CSOs, TI-Z 
has an „on-and-off‟ relationship with the state allowing it a „limited‟ political 
operational space for their Anti-Corruption activities. However, although the 
government closed the operational space for certain CSOs, interviews with 
the TI-Z officials demonstrate that it has remained effective, albeit in 
somewhat limited manner. Before embarking on an Anti-Corruption 
campaign or activity, TI-Z applies for accreditation from the state through the 
ZRP. In some cases the organisation has been denied the rights to hold 
public events by the ZRP or state security agents. For example, the 
respondent from TI-Z pointed out that: “It depends on the objectives and 
agenda of the meetings and on the political environment of that time” 
(Interview 2, 26th October 2011). Empirical evidence from interviews with the 
TI-Z and government officials show that TI-Z has not publically accused 
ZANU-PF individuals as corrupt, but has mainly focused on how best 
corruption can be eradicated. This is an important distinction and goes some 
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way to explain why this organisation has been able to operate in the public 
sphere. 
However, despite this limited interface between the two organisations, the TI-
Z respondents raised concerns that it has been difficult to work with ruling 
government officials. This is due to antagonistic ZANU-PF politicians that 
regard certain CSOs as partisans to the MDC. While an interview with a 
ZANU-PF Minister (Interview 19, 23rd November 2011) painted a picture of 
good relations with the TI-Z, another interview with a different government 
official demonstrates clear government resentment towards the TI-Z and a 
reluctance to work with the organisation. The respondent argued that:  
“TI-Z is also a civil society funded by Western countries, why 
should we trust them? We don‟t want to work with people we 
don‟t trust because we don‟t know their agenda” (Interview 33, 
5th January 2012) 
While some tension between the government and civil society is a healthy 
and a natural sign that civil society is being effective in its watchdog role, 
sustained and escalating government hostility hampers the progress of work 
of the TI-Z and many other CSOs. TI-Z‟s participation in designing and the 
implementation of Anti-Corruption strategies requires a positive state-civil 
society interface for their strategies to be effective. Over the course of 
fieldwork, it was observed that TI-Z was facing challenges in forging a 
permanent workable partnership with the state. However, the polarised 
political situation makes it a challenge to forge such lasting relations because 
some government officials suspect that the TI-Z is an agent working for 
Western powers “who want to overthrow a democratically elected 
government” (Interview 30, 3rd January 2012). According to a TI-Z 
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respondent, (Interview 2, 26th October 2011) this suspicion by ZANU-PF has 
made it difficult to fully engage with the government at the level the TI-Z 
wants. 
However, despite the impediment imposed by the POSA and AIPPA laws in 
concert with antagonistic elements within the government, public awareness 
campaigns have been a vital strategy for mobilising public opinion against 
corruption and supporting the establishment of Anti-Corruption mechanisms 
such as the ZACC. Respondents from the state organs established that the 
TI-Z public awareness campaigns have helped to give impetus to the 
creation of the state Anti-Corruption structures and institutions needed to 
curb corruption within different organisations and government Ministries. One 
academic and a former board of trustees member with the TI-Z (Interview 18, 
21st November 2011) indicated that the formation of the Ministry of State 
Enterprises, Anti-Monopolies and Anti-Corruption in 2004 was a direct result 
of TI-Z public awareness and sensitisation campaign in which the TI-Z invited 
government Ministers to its Anti-Corruption events that were attended by 
senior Ministers such as Nicholas Goche, Kembo Mohadi, Ignatius Chombo 
and Paul Mangwana (Interview 18, 21st November 2011).   
TI-Z strategy is hinged on promoting cooperation among various concerned 
institutions. TI-Z has networked with and built coalitions with institutions 
including the media and state departments (TI-Z 1996, 2000, and 2002). 
According to one TI-Z respondent (Interview 1, 24th October 2011) bui lding 
coalition with state institutions has not been easy because they do not want 
to associate with some CSOs for fear of ZANU-PF who would see them as 
supporters of the opposition given that certain CSOs are perceived to be 
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anti-ZANU-PF.40 Forming strategic associations and coalitions with different 
actors in the public, private and civil society sectors is one strategy with a 
potential to encircle corruption. This strategy aims at combating corruption by 
coalition building, which helps in encompassing local initiatives and regional 
and international Anti-Corruption Protocols. Locally, this is evidenced by the 
formation of the Ministry of State Enterprises, Anti-Monopolies and Anti-
Corruption of 2004, the creation of the two ZACCs of 2004 and 2011, and the 
various Anti-Corruption chapters set up in many government departments 
with their foundations based on the state-TI-Z relations.41 
Interviews with TI-Z representatives established that the organisation works 
with other Anti-Corruption structures in the region such as those from South 
Africa, Namibia and Zambia where they share strategies, mapping out how 
best corruption can be tackled on a regional as well as national basis. The 
international community has always played a vital role in the history of the TI-
Z through donations and funding for different projects directed at combating 
corruption. These include organisations such as the European Union (EU), 
United Nation (UN), the World Bank, and other different embassies such as 
the Swiss, French, German, and American. This is part of the reason that the 
TI-Z is not trusted by government. Interviews with an EU official based in 
                                                                 
 
 
 
40
 ZANU-PF perceives some CSOs to be enemies of the state due to their predominantly western 
funding that is associated with a regime change agenda. 
41
 An example of Anti -Corruption chapters within government ministries is in the Ministry of Legal 
Affairs, a committee set to deal with rampant cases of corruption in the legal system (The Herald 21 
May 2012) 
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Harare (Interview 27, 21st December 2011) revealed that the EU has been 
funding numerous Anti-Corruption research projects. This has added to the 
government‟s distrust of TI-Z. There are also other regional and international 
institutions and organisations such as the SADC, AU, USAID, to mention a 
few, who have played different roles in fighting corruption in alliance with the 
TI-Z. For example, SADC has played a major role in promoting the 
development of Anti-Corruption mechanism at the national level and promote 
cooperation in fighting corruption by the state (Zvekic 2002). 
Advocacy and lobbying are other strategies employed by the TI-Z that are of 
interest in this thesis. These encourage state institutions such as law 
enforcers, the judiciary and government Ministries to mobilise Anti-Corruption 
schemes for the purpose of detection, investigation, prosecution and 
adjudication of corruption matters within and beyond state institutions. The 
strategy has been used to target “policy makers to propagate appropriate 
laws” which enforce Anti-Corruption machinery (OSISA 2011:39). Advocacy 
and lobbying has led to an increased debate on the need for a strong and 
independent ZACC. One official from the TI-Z (Interview 1, 24 October 2011) 
indicated that there have been some consultations going on with the 
legislatures on how best the ZACC can independently work without influence 
from the political elite, and how it can be supported by the state, civil society 
and the public. 
In association with the media, TI-Z has carried out and published findings 
from research into various aspects of corruption. Among their outputs are the 
Anti-Corruption public opinion survey, and the statistical analysis of 
corruption and related cases in the provincial magistrates‟ court (Interview 7, 
 274 
4th November 2011). The outcome of the TI-Z research has been guiding 
programme formulation and informing the organisation and the state on the 
nature and effects of corruption within society. The research and subsequent 
publications by the TI-Z have continued to raise public awareness about 
corruption. 
When discussing the role of CSOs in combating corruption, the importance 
of media cannot be ignored. Field data suggests that investigative journalism 
has played a vital role in exposing corruption in Zimbabwe. The independent 
media has been operating under immense political intimidation but has 
remained committed to informing the public about the scale of corruption in 
the public and private sectors regardless of the barriers faced under POSA, 
AIPPA, and harassment by the government. One journalist from an 
independent newspaper (Interview 3, 27th October 2011) argued that the 
government‟s suppressive tendencies have attracted journalists‟ interest in 
investigating and consequently revealing corruption scandals involving senior 
government officials such as the Minister of Local Government, Public Works 
and Urban Development, Mr Ignatius Chombo‟s wealth accumulation. Other 
cases revealed by independent newspapers include the VIP land grab, the 
VIP Housing scandal, the DDF scandal, and the Harare airport road scandal 
(The Zimbabwe Independent, 26 September 2003, The Financial Gazette, 16 
March 2009, and The Zimbabwesituation, 11 September 2010). The next 
section takes a closer look at the role of the media in combating corruption. 
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6.3.2 Media challenges in controlling corruption in Zimbabwe 
  
“The news media are the chief watchdogs. The checks and 
balances work as a system, so an independent judiciary and 
genuine political competition are important, but the media can 
provide oversight of the government even where the other 
checks and balances have broken down. Safeguards for the 
media – ensuring they are protected from political influence 
and are credible to the public – may be the crucial policies for 
shoring up democracy” (McMillan and Zoido 2004:91). 
This section utilises social responsibility theory, which posits that the media 
has a moral responsibility to facilitate socio-economic and political 
development. Political thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Thomas 
Jefferson acknowledge that the media is a fundamental democratic right, and 
essential to contemporary democracy as a principal source of information. 
Democracy is a political arrangement requiring an informed citizenry capable 
of effectively participating in the overall political process of the country and 
facilitating them to make conversant decisions (Moyo 2011). This is achieved 
through the freedoms of the press, association, speech and access to 
information. The question of interest is: To what extent does Zimbabwe have 
this freedom? While answering this question the section aims to examine 
and explore strategies of the media in combating corruption, and how the 
state-media relations have influenced the role of the media in fighting 
corruption. 
While it is evident that corruption is a phenomenon affecting both 
democracies and non-democracies, studies by Burbidge (2012), Rock (2007) 
and Treisman (2000), show that incidences of corruption are lower in the 
former. This is attributed to the presence of various checks and balances in 
democratic systems which act as deterrents. One of them is the freedom of 
 276 
press that is a potentially important democratic control. Several respondents 
concurred with this view arguing that this gives the public equal opportunities 
to participate in political debates and developmental issues of their societies. 
For instance, one respondent from MISA pointed out that: 
“Key elements of democracy include the free flow of 
information through free media that give the public the ability 
to have equal access to sources of information” (Interview 39 
10th January 2012).  
However, the effectiveness of the media in fulfilling this role in Zimbabwe 
faces numerous challenges, one of them being political repression because 
of a lack of democracy. To understand this and the role played by the media 
industry in Zimbabwe, it is important to briefly summarise the country‟s media 
landscape in which ZANU-PF has continued to maintain a media monopoly 
structure similar to that of the colonial administration. 
The print media is largely dominated by ZimPapers, a company largely 
owned and controlled by the Mass Media Trust (MMT), which belongs to 
ZANU-PF. Experiential knowledge and evidence gathered from interviews 
with independent newspapers and document analysis such as radio stations 
both state controlled and independent (Interviews 3, 27 th October 2011; 10, 
7th November 2011; 22, 12th December 2011; and 48, 6th February 2012) 
established that ZANU-PF wields excessive powers over the airwaves (both 
radio and television). Interviewees pointed out that the state does not permit 
any other radio and television stations to be established without a license 
from the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ), whose  members are 
appointed by the Ministry of Information in consultation with the President. 
The MMT prevents any of its stations from employing non-Zimbabweans or 
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journalists trained outside the country. As a result of these constraints, 
journalists cannot work to international standards. Mbanga (2008), has 
argued that for the journalists to win the battle for access to information in 
Zimbabwe, the finer points of journalism have regrettably been 
compromised, as they relied on what he called „guerrilla journalism‟. This is 
further supported by one journalist interviewed in the present study who 
argued that:  
“For the media to play an effective role media practitioners 
need to have freedom of expression, easy access to 
information as well as a code of professional and ethical 
investigative journalism that meet the international standards” 
(Interview 17, 18th November 2011).  
While this is lacking in Zimbabwe, it has left the public with two state 
newspapers (The Herald and The Chronicle) and Zimbabwe Broadcasting 
Co-operation‟s (ZBC) single television station and four radio stations, Radio 
Zimbabwe, Spot FM, National FM, and Star FM. 
Since independence, the Zimbabwe daily newspaper market had been 
dominated by the state controlled papers, The Herald, published in the 
capital in Harare, alongside its sister paper, The Chronicle, published in 
Bulawayo. Both fall under ZimPapers owned by the MMT. From the late 
1990s to early 2000s several independent newspapers such as The Mirror, 
The Daily Gazette, and The Daily News, The Zimbabwean Independent, and 
The Financial Gazette entered the market in an attempt to break the 
monopoly of the state-controlled media in the dissemination of news. The 
Daily Gazette and The Daily News suddenly became the strident critics o f 
ZANU-PF, exposing corruption and holding the government accountable for 
its corrupt actions and human rights abuses. One respondent, a Deputy 
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Editor from the independent media sector (Interview 29, 30th December 
2011), pointed out that journalists from independent papers adopted a 
fearless approach in their criticism of the ruling government‟s abuse of power 
and political intolerance which gave hope to many people where a culture of 
silence had become dominant. Echoing the Deputy Editor‟s sentiments, one 
interviewee from The Chronicle – a state controlled daily newspaper 
acknowledged that: 
“The independent papers have represented the voice of the 
voiceless in a country where the public cannot publicly debate 
on the conduct of their leaders, good governance issues and 
other related national deve lopment issues” (Interview 31, 3rd 
January 2012). 
While the independent media spontaneously exposed corrupt conducts by 
the ruling elite and criticised the government for its oppressive governance 
system, the state countered by introducing POSA and AIPPA aiming to 
silence the independent media. Consequently, press freedom declined. This 
demonstrates that ZANU-PF‟s control of the media empire has threatened 
the core pillars of democracy and freedom of information. 
All interviewees from the media sector and several from CSOs and 
individuals interviewed denounced ZANU PF‟s media dominance as a 
serious attack on the freedom and autonomy of the press. This is described 
by one media owner as an “unsustainable situation that prefigures a 
systematic repression of freedom of information” (cited in Pujas 2004: 98). 
Therefore, the question that arose and one that this study seeks to address 
is: How has the independent media dealt with government media monopoly 
particularly with regard to corruption and whistle blowing? It is interesting to 
note that despite this government monopoly and repression, the independent 
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media has managed to keep the public informed of corruption through 
publications of incidences of corruption such as scandals already mentioned 
and other corrupt activities in the public and private sectors. 
This led to the introduction of a number of restrictive laws; amongst them are 
the AIPPA and POSA as already mentioned. After the introduction of these 
laws the newspapers and journalists were taken to court for slander by the 
government while some, such as The Daily News, were banned and closed 
down in 2002. On the 22nd April 2000 The Daily News offices in Harare were 
bombed by suspected state security agents in an attempt to cripple and de-
capacitate its printing base. The state also used POSA and AIPPA 
legislations as a weapon to clamp down on international journalists, resulting 
in a virtual news blackout outside Zimbabwe. The state used its laws to 
regulate and manipulate public opinion by a policy of banning and silencing  
independent media such as The Weekly Times, The Daily News, The 
Tribune, and The Daily News on Sunday. All these papers had strongly 
castigated the government for its corruption, poor governance, and human 
rights abuses. They were particularly vocal on the undemocratic tendencies 
of the ruling government, the „stolen‟ Parliamentary and the Presidential 
elections of post-2000 (The Daily News 30 June 2000), the corrupt invasions 
of white owned commercial farms from year 2000 to 2005 (Sokwanele 20 
April 2002), and the abuse of the state resources and power by ZANU-PF 
authorities alongside the war veterans (The Standard 11 August 2002). The 
drive to create POSA and AIPPA was motivated by the desire to establish 
communicative sovereignty coloured by the self-interest of the ruling party 
whose aspiration is to maintain power. 
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Zimbabwean law guarantees freedom of speech and media to the public. 
Chapter 4, Part 2 Section 62 of the Constitution (as amended) states that:  
“Except with his own consent ...., no person shall be hindered 
in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say 
freedom to hold opinion and to receive and impart ideas and 
information without interference, and freedom from 
interference with his correspondence” (Constitution of 
Zimbabwe, 2013). 
The government crackdown on independent media shows that the 
Constitution‟s provisions only exist in theory and is not matched in practice. 
This is because the government has put restrictive laws in place that limit the 
freedom of the press, freedom of expression and association against the 
independent media. The state could not ignore the influence of the media 
because of its potential to mould public opinion. One of the media‟s roles that 
inform this study is raising public awareness about corruption, its causes, 
effects, and possible remedies. But current media laws in operation are a 
challenge to the media sector and journalists due to the listed repressive 
laws that criminalise this role. 
Journalists have continued to be charged with criminal defamation when 
material deemed harmful to ZANU-PF authorities is published. Such 
journalists include Mark Chavunduka and Ray Choto editor and journalist for 
The Standard newspaper. In January 1999 they were arrested, tortured and 
charged under the Rhodesia‟s Law and Order Maintenance Act (1960) (The 
Standard, 2001) for publishing reports “likely to cause fear, alarm, and 
despondency” (Interview 39, 10th January 2012). Publications of material 
deemed to undermine public confidence in law enforcement, reflect 
negatively on the Parliament, or to be insulting or engendering feelings of 
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hostility towards the President, are considered a serious crime leading to a 
possible twenty years jail sentence. One independent journalist interviewed, 
a victim of the regime‟s brutality said: 
“I was arrested, detained and tortured for allegedly publishing 
what they called „false statements prejudicial‟ to the state and 
undermining public confidence in the law enforcement agents 
after I had published a story about a corrupt Minister” 
(Interview 17, 18th November 2011). 
Given this situation, it is unsurprising that during the last two decades most 
of professional journalists left Zimbabwe in fear of ZANU-PF‟s attack (Moyo 
2010). Those who remained worked in difficult conditions that hamper their 
work.  
Since 2000, journalists have been arrested, detained, and harassed by 
ZANU-PF government for reporting and/or publishing stories related to 
corrupt activities, human rights abuses and abuse of power by the ruling 
elite. Criminal libel and defamation suits have been brought against the 
independent media and journalists by ZANU-PF authorities such as 
Jonathan Moyo, an MP and former Minister of Information, who in March 
2001 and April 2011 sued The Daily News for defamation damages (Media 
Institute of Southern Africa, 3rd April 2001 and Byo24News, 1st April 2011). 
One journalist interviewed argued that this is a way of intimidating journalists 
to restrict their freedom of expression (Interview 3, 27th November 2011). 
The introduction of POSA and AIPPA and the intimidation of journalists 
weakened the press and put democracy and freedom of expression under 
attack. This is meant to eliminate the critical media from the market. With the 
independent media and a large list of its journalists operating under fear of 
harassment, arrest and jail sentences, their standards of reporting dropped 
 282 
markedly. For instance, some journalists/newspapers such as The Financial 
Gazette even avoided publishing names of corrupt individuals and journalists 
investigating the story. This gave the spectre of corruption a ferti le ground to 
prosper. For example, some corruption incidences such as Ministers taking 
over several white commercial farms each (against a one man one farm 
policy), appeared in papers but without the names of those implicated  
Ministers or the journalist who investigated and wrote the story because they 
feared reprisals (The Financial Gazette, 11th August 2005). 
An effective media is a critical strategy in any country‟s Anti-Corruption 
crusade as it maps out the path to follow in combating corruption. It is 
important to emphasise that despite the difficult conditions of constricted 
democratic space for operations faced by the independent media and other 
CSOs in fighting corruption, they have continued to act as watchdogs in 
society, raising alarm when something is not going right in the country. This 
was supported by numerous respondents from the banned and existing 
independent media sector such as the social commentator and former editor 
with The Daily News (Interview 51, 10th February 2012) who concurred that 
the media have been effective in informing the public of the types of 
corruption within their political, economic and social systems. This has 
proved to be an uncomfortable exercise to the ruling government as this 
interfered and threatened its pattern of political patronage. The respondent 
pointed out that:  
“The media publicise corruption, abuse of power, and human 
rights abuses almost every day putting the government in the 
international spotlight which further unsettles our leaders” 
(Interview 51, 10th February 2012).  
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This has created operational challenges for the media sector, and further 
strained the already fragile state-civil society relations as discussed in 
chapter five. It became a challenge because the media requires a democratic 
government that allows freedom of speech, opinion and expression, and free 
access to its documents and information. One academic and researcher from 
the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) (Interview 50, 
10th February 12) argued that in many developed democracies such as the 
United Kingdom, the media enjoys direct reportage of government actions, 
pronouncements on aspects of corruption, and holding them accountable for 
their actions. This freedom is non-existent in Zimbabwe, and explains 
challenges that many independent media organisations face. Empowering 
the media is both a fundamental and dynamic strategy in holding the national 
leaders accountable for their actions. As argued by a respondent from the 
ZCTU: 
“Zimbabwe is sinking in the pool of corruption, the media have 
been vocal despite working under hash intimidation and 
harassment from the police, up to the Ministers, but the 
investigative arm of the state remains very quiet, watching as 
spectators. We cannot blame the media because they have 
done their best to expose injustices, abuses of office and 
power. Every day newspapers have something to say about 
corrupt activities and human rights abuses. These papers 
have empowered themselves while putting themselves at risk” 
(Interview 17, 11th November 2011). 
The independent media has played a major role in raising public awareness 
about national issues such as good governance discourse particularly on 
corruption despite the state‟s measures to shrink its democratic operational 
space. The provisions of the oppressive laws by the state have failed to deter 
the media from its watchdog role and keeping the public informed of issues 
affecting the development of Zimbabwe. The government‟s project of 
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eliminating the independent media could not be sustained forever as the 
formation of the GNU in 2009 provided a democratic space for the banned 
and those  organisations previously operating underground. This has led to a 
widening of Zimbabwe‟s contracted media space as per provisions of the  
Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed in September 2009 between the 
two MDC formations and ZANU-PF in accordance with Article 19 of the GPA 
which also emphasised the opening up of the airwaves and the operation of 
many media houses. While this is the case, there is sti ll a lot of self-
censorship on the part of state owned media outlets as they remain partisan 
in their coverage of political events. The next section assesses the role of 
state owned media in combating corruption. 
6.3.3 The role of the state-controlled media in combating 
corruption 
 
Works by scholars such as Dumisani Moyo (2010) and Darlington Mutanda 
(2012) on the role played by media in combating corruption in Zimbabwe 
have mainly focused on independent media while neglecting the part the 
state owned media sector has played in this context. This thesis goes further 
by exploring the role played by the state controlled media on issues relating 
to good governance particularly on corruption. A discussion of the role of the 
media in combating corruption without looking at the state controlled sector 
risks giving a one sided view of the role of the media in Zimbabwe. 
While the independent media has been the eyes and ears of society in 
playing a watchdog role specifically on the abuses of human rights, power, 
and corruption in the public and private sectors, the state owned media 
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remained silent on all contentious issues raised by the independent sector. 
This symbolises its allegiance to the ruling government, and also signifies 
corruption within the state owned sector for reasons discussed below. One 
interviewee from the state owned newspaper argued that:  
“To fit in the system, you need to be corrupt as well because if 
you are not corrupt your conscious will not allow you to 
publish some of these stories” (Interview 31, 30 th December 
2012) 
Interviewees from both the state owned and independent media have 
demonstrated that corruption is widespread and pervasive in the government 
controlled media - both broadcast and print. Numerous interviewees pointed 
out that political interference by the ruling government is rife with senior 
government officials dictating what stories should be published and what 
programmes should be produced. For instance, an interview with a 
respondent from the Radio Zimbabwe established that the government has 
total control of what is played on air (Interview 31, 30th December 2012). This 
is set in a way that is meant to indoctrinate the public, particularly on political 
nationalism and the liberation struggle, which aims to portray the political 
opposition as “agents of the West who want to re-colonise the country” 
(Interview 30, 3rd January 2012). This is done through political statements, 
music jingles and videos commissioned by the Ministry of Information and 
Publicity that dominate state owned radio and television. Concrete evidence 
includes the empirical evidence gathered through observation during  
fieldwork research when the researcher had the opportunity to tune to three 
different Radio stations (Radio Zimbabwe, Spot FM, and Star FM) and the 
television station for several hours a day over a period of six months. The 
stations were more revolutionary in their productions, either musically or in 
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the form of discussions, for example, between the 1st of November 2011 and 
the 10th December 2011 Radio Zimbabwe‟s production was on ZANU-PF‟s 
annual Conference held on the 9th December 2011. The programmes were 
about the history of the liberation struggle, land redistribution, and how 
ZANU-PF „won independence and freed the country from the colonial 
masters‟. 42  Revolutionary songs and speeches occupied prime time 
programming on radio and television. A respondent from Radio Zimbabwe 
argued that:  
“You get to the office and find a list of songs to play the whole 
day with instructions that all songs should be played, you 
quickly run through the list and find it‟s all about land, the 
liberation struggle and so on. As a producer, I am not given 
the opportunity to make a selection of what to play, but who 
cares because at the end of the day I am paid for that. I know 
its corruption; but I need to keep my job …” (Interview 22, 12 th 
December 2011). 
This further illustrates how political interference within the state controlled 
media manifests corruption in the sector as politicians, business executives, 
and musicians have continued to bribe journalists and radio producers for 
sustained and positive coverage. For example, The Chronicle (Tuesday, 13 
2008) reported that some musicians bribe presenters to have their songs 
frequently played on air, while The Herald (Thursday, 18 October 2007) 
carried a similar story of the businessman bribing media executives for the 
advertisement of his business. 
                                                                 
 
 
 
42
 This thesis uses this statement loosely to flag out how the state owned media has been used by 
the ruling party. 
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There are reasons explaining why media performance deviates from 
expected social responsibility theory. In the context of Zimbabwe, both the 
political and economic environment has played a leading role in trapping the 
media into corrupt conducts. This has compromised the ethics, values and 
investigative nature of the media. The state owned media‟s role in deterring 
corruption is limited due to its complex relationship with ZANU-PF. In this 
context the presence of corruption in the media has been deliberately 
created and sustained by the corrupt ruling elite to protect their fragile 
interest. Determined to remain in power, ZANU-PF has relied on the state 
media to fight the opposition and shield them from public scrutiny. 
Research findings from document analysis show that there is an ongoing and 
alarming distortion in the state owned publications and broadcasting. One 
example of such distortion includes propaganda stories by The Herald (15 
February 2002 and 28 July 2003) that the British government had military 
training camps for the MDC supporters based in England who would be 
deployed in Zimbabwe to fight the government with the objective of re-
colonising the country. These „military training camps‟ referred to were in fact 
the detention centres where some Zimbabweans claiming political asylum 
were kept before their visas to remain in England were processed.43 This has 
two implications about the state controlled media: firstly, it exposes how 
                                                                 
 
 
 
43
 Detention centres also known as Removal centres are used to hold asylum seekers on their arrival 
in the UK until  the decision is made by Immigration authorities to grant a visa and release them into 
the community, some of them are Brook House in Gatwick airport and Pennine House in 
Manchester. 
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some journalists have been used to publish stories they had not investigated. 
Secondly, it allowed the state owned media, particularly the print media to 
meddle in politics between the MDC and ZANU-PF. The media deliberately 
ignored developmental issues such as the abuse of human rights, abuse of 
power and office, and other corruption related stories, but became very 
active at promoting ZANU-PF‟s agenda of suppressing the opposition 
through „hate speeches‟ and propaganda.  
An interesting and contradictory scenario developing in this study is that the 
state has created Anti-Corruption structures yet the state controlled media 
plays no role in promoting them. While the government has pretended to 
show a reasonable degree of commitment in fighting corruption, the state 
media have not focused on it, nor has it published stories of corrupt activities 
by the ruling party. The researcher expected to find statements about Anti-
Corruption measures or about the ZACC from the state owned media, but 
this study has not come across such statements. This further reinforces the 
argument that there is a lack of political will in the fight against corruption. If 
the state is committed to combating corruption, state media should be the 
nearest point of departure for the Anti-Corruption management. 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
The major aim of this chapter was to examine and analyse roles and 
strategies employed by the state and some CSOs in combating corruption. 
State Anti-Corruption bodies such as the ZACC, Parliament and the ZRP 
were examined. In relation to the ZACC, this thesis argues that the criterion 
of appointing the Commissioners has undermined its integrity and 
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independence because members are perceived by civil society and the 
public to be linked to political parties which make it justly vulnerable to 
criticism. The ZACC has attempted to fight the problem of corruption but has 
been hampered by a lack of support from the relevant state institutions. The 
ZACC lacks a specific legal mandate to arrest and prosecute those found 
guilty of corrupt conducts which has made them ineffective. Conclusions 
established from interviews with the ZRP and the Ministry of Home Affairs 
Minister (Interviews 6, 2nd November 2011; 40, 19th January 2012 and 45, 
30th January 2012) demonstrate that the ZACC is susceptible to political 
interference and manipulation by the „big fish‟. 
The chapter has demonstrated that the Parliament is one of the integral 
pillars that together with other pillars such as the ZRP can effectively work 
towards combating corruption, but they are failing in this regard. The 
research findings have established that rather than combating corruption, 
Parliament has played a major role in manifestations of corruption. As 
legislators and leaders, public expectation is that they ensure that the 
appropriate Anti-Corruption legal policy frameworks as well as the 
institutional mechanisms are put in place and implemented. However, 
despite the existence of such institutional mechanisms, they are poorly 
implemented. 
The chapter has discussed key factors central to explaining the ZRP‟s role in 
combating corruption, how the political environment has influenced 
corruption within the police force as a result of polarisation of the political  
system, the opportunities for corruption presented by the political 
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environment, and the nature and extent of the effort put into controlling 
corruption by the state.  
The chapter discussed numerous challenges faced by civil society in 
combating corruption, the key challenges being the political and legal 
restrictions imposed on them by the ruling government. As a result, civil 
society has remained incapacitated in spite of its expansion in terms of their 
numbers and impact on good governance issues. The oppressive and 
suppressive tendencies by the state have robbed some sections of civil 
society of its operating space, imposing major limitations on their Anti -
Corruption programmes and activities. In spite of these various challenges, 
some CSOs such as TI-Z and some sections of independent media have 
remained resilient against ZANU-PF‟s hegemony as they tackle the problem 
of corruption head-on through playing an influential role in Anti-Corruption 
campaigns and raising awareness. The formation of the GNU in 2009 
widened the democratic and operational space for a growing number of 
CSOs concerned with increasing awareness of corruption issues. Although 
there have been commendable political developments that created fertile 
ground for some CSOs to participate in governance issues, the thesis has 
argued that this is inadequate since ZANU-PF continues to dominate political 
space and criminalise activities of certain key sectors of CSOs considered to 
be „anti-state‟. 
As the government remains firm on maintaining its restrictions to the freedom 
of expression and association, and freedom of the press and access to 
information, its hegemonic approach has limited the strength and robustness 
that characterises civil society by employing its power to emasculate, control 
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and restrict the rights of civil society operations. Consequently, the lack of 
freedom of expression and association and access to information has 
significantly limited the opportunities for CSOs to participate in public debate 
and therefore influence public policies, or advocate for changes whether in 
Anti-Corruption discourse or other related development issues.  
More important for the present thesis is that despite the provision of the 
state‟s Anti-Corruption instruments and certain CSOs‟ attempts to combat 
corruption, corruption continues to increase prompting the thesis to conclude 
that the strategies employed by the state and civil society are not effective as 
a result of a lack of political wi ll on the part of the state  and a restricted policy 
space for CSOs to have any effect. 
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Chapter 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS: THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY IN COMBATING CORRUPTION IN 
ZIMBABWE 
7.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this thesis has been to contribute towards a better understanding 
of the complexities of corruption and institutional roles and challenges in 
managing corruption through examining the roles of the state and civil 
society organisations (CSOs) in combating corruption in Zimbabwe. The 
thesis projected two key objectives. Firstly, to evaluate the state-civi l society 
relations vis-a-vis tackling corruption, and secondly, to examine the 
strategies used by the state and CSO in controlling corruption. In this chapter 
the thesis draws these objectives together and evaluates the implications of 
the overarching themes surfacing from the thesis for an enhanced 
understanding of corruption in Zimbabwe, the state-civil society relations, 
and their roles and strategies in fighting corruption. 
The consensus among those interviewed, document analysis and literature 
assessed is that corruption has put Zimbabwe i nto socio-economic and 
political crisis. Without a doubt, as the thesis argues, this crisis is a result of 
political and economic mismanagement. The thesis argues that politicians 
and bureaucrats are venal and corrupt, and this extends to some sections of 
society. Largely, this crisis is presented here as an outcome of 
maladministration by the state and the bureaucrats who have used and 
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abused power and office for their own ends. It is a problem that arises mainly 
in the interaction between politicians, bureaucrats, private sector and the 
market economy where the government itself is considered endogenous. 
This challenge is underlined by the fact that its data and statistics are difficult 
to collect as the corrupt tend to cover their footprints, and if available, data is 
often soft, masked and unreliable. 
This concluding chapter is divided into four sections that mirror the 
ontological and epistemological themes underpinning the thesis. Section 7.2 
reviews broader perspectives and implications about corruption in Zimbabwe 
as a key challenge for future development. Section 7.3 discusses the 
findings of conflict between the state and certain CSOs and how the relations 
have influenced management of Anti-Corruption programmes. Section 7.4 
outlines key findings and implications of strategies employed by the state 
and CSOs, and main challenges faced by some CSOs in combating 
corruption.  
7.2 Corruption in Zimbabwe: Context, interpretation and key 
challenge for development 
7.2.1 Key findings  
 
The body of theoretical and empirical research on the nature and effects of 
corruption has grown significantly in recent years. To address the socio-
economic and political impact of corruption in Zimbabwe, this thesis has 
employed a political economy theoretical framework, which has helped in 
defining, interpreting, and understanding corruption. The thesis has 
demonstrated that there are multiple definitions of corruption arising from the 
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different standpoints taken by definers. Subsequently, they range from the 
broad terms of misuse of public office, misuse of power and moral decay to 
politics of patronage and clientelism, acts of bribery, nepotism, 
embezzlement of state resources by public officers and a transfer of tangible 
resources. These definitions appear to emphasise, reconcile and in concert 
(support each other) that corruption is about abuse of public office and power 
for pecuniary gains. In light of evidence from fieldwork research, some 
aspects need to be added to the definition of corruption for a more advanced 
understanding and policy oriented perspective of corruption in Zimbabwe. 
Everyone else, including the World Bank have forgotten to discuss corruption 
in the private sector in their definitions, which would make the definition more 
appropriate for focusing government and non-state management of Anti-
Corruption initiatives. Thus, considering that there is inherent corruption 
within the watchdog (CSOs) and the so-called perpetrator of corruption (e.g. 
the state), appropriate definitions need to focus on both public and the 
private sector.  
Nevertheless, the definition and measurement of corruption are flawed. For 
example, the World Bank and its related International Financial Institutions ‟  
(IFIs) definitions tend to focus on abuse of public office and power while 
neglecting the private sector, where corruption is also perceived to be 
endemic (Harrison 2004). This makes their definitions too narrow and 
unreliable. In addition, definitions of corruption are based on corruption in 
Africa, focusing on corrupt conducts by individuals (bureaucrats and heads of 
states) and side-line corporate corruption from the developed world. This 
tendency has led to a fashion of portraying Africa as “suffering from the 
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cancer of corruption” (Harrison 2004: 136). This understanding of corruption 
is impoverished, because one of its striking aspects is to define corruption 
(with the influence of the West) particularly in Africa as a local issue 
(Harrison 2004) while down-playing the fact that Western businesses create 
opportunities for corruption in many ways. For example, Western countries 
protect their African allies by turning a blind-eye to official corruption by ruling 
leaders, or corruption is overlooked to secure business rights.  To a lesser 
extent, Western countries create opportunities for corruption through aid 
given to African states. 
Borrowing this interpretation and analysis has been helpful in analysing and 
understanding the nature and character of corruption in Zimbabwe and 
provides a consistent frame of reference. 
This thesis agrees that corruption is difficult to define (Freille 2007 and 
Devine 2010), as many definitions recognise that it is the use of public office 
or influence for personal or private gain. While corruption is a global 
phenomenon, it appears to be an issue of more concern in Africa where 
poverty and inequality make its presence felt more. Statistics indicate that 
there are huge economic losses (the global loss, African loss, and losses at 
national level) due to corruption. In parts of Latin America and Asia, scholars 
have argued that the hand of corruption has no detrimental effect on the 
economy, (e.g. Suharto‟s Indonesia), but the same cannot be said for most 
of Africa. Losses suffered in development terms include aid diverted to 
private use, sums of money, deterring investment, and increased cost of 
goods and services (Uneke 2010) and hence the failure of development. But 
perhaps this is an unfair assertion in which some donors blame their lack of 
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impact on failure by African leaders to deliver without self-interest. There are 
some scholars such as Onyingo (2012) who argue that for corruption to 
occur there should be two parties, and the other parties involved are Western 
businesses and governments seeking tenders and contracts for business 
ventures in Africa. 
The thesis has argued that corruption in Zimbabwe has grown to be one of 
the most persistent and progressively worsening social, economic and 
political challenges afflicting development. The phenomenon has effectively 
pervaded all state institutions and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). 
Having reached systemic and endemic proportions, corruption has become a 
way of life and a principal method for the accumulation of personal wealth. It 
is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon with many causes and effects, 
as it assumes a range of forms and functions in different contexts. It ranges 
from an act of a payment contradicted by law to an endemic malfunction of 
an economic and political system. The problem of corruption is presented in 
this thesis as a structural problem of politics and economics, and a cultural 
and individual moral problem.  
Zimbabwe‟s economic and political environment has allowed corruption to 
permeate all levels of society; it has become a daily routine and in the 
process become an accepted means of conducting everyday business . 
Rose-Ackerman (1997) has called this „systemic‟ or „entrenched‟ corruption. 
It affects both the public and private sectors with equal measure. It also 
influences the behaviour of individuals at all levels of the socio-economic and 
political system. Given systemic corruption has become a way of conducting 
everyday business, institutions have been conditioned to a corrupt “modus 
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oparandi” (Moyo 2011: 7), where civil service officers, for example, have 
often followed the predatory examples of the corrupt political leadership. 
Both bureaucratic and grand corruption has had negative effects to 
Zimbabweans. Bureaucratic corruption, the paying of additional fees to get a 
service done, is purely one of the rituals of daily business in Zimbabwe. The 
thesis points to several factors that account for this such as: a lack of 
transparency and accountability, low bureaucratic salaries, deep institutional 
weaknesses, and absence of effective regulations as feeding into the 
pervasiveness of bureaucratic corruption. 
While bureaucratic corruption dominates daily public life, this means the 
prime objective of the delivery of the social, welfa re and public programmes 
such as education, health, employment, housing, and the legal system, have 
been thwarted by bribery that determines access to these amenities and the 
allocation of resources and services. This has affected the poor who cannot 
afford to pay or bribe to access services. It has amplified the existing social 
and economic inequalities in the society. This thesis demonstrates that the 
consequences of bureaucratic corruption have been the loss of public 
confidence in the governance system. The public have lost confidence and 
trust in state institutional architecture where bureaucratic corruption has been 
endemic. For example, corruption is endemic in the ZRP, Immigration and 
Customs, the registrar, and education and health sectors. 
Bureaucratic corruption has three characteristic features that make it difficult 
to combat. Firstly, it is organised and difficult to avoid. The corruption circle 
widens as all businesses and service deliveries are carried out through 
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payment of a rent or bribing. This creates opportunities for rent seeking. 
These opportunities are greater when there is a lack of transparency and 
undue administrative discretion.  
Secondly, it is monopolised by the bureaucrats that use state offices or 
positions for private gains. This thesis demonstrates that monopolies lead to 
abuse of power and office breeding different forms of corruption such as 
nepotism that result in systemic corruption. Thirdly, it is embedded in socio-
cultural environments. Bureaucratic corruption incidences vary enormously, 
ranging from rare to widespread and systemic. Where corruption is rare, it 
becomes easy to detect, punish or control, but when it becomes widespread 
and systemic as is in Zimbabwe, the possibility of detecting and punishing it 
decreases. 
At the centre of the problem of bureaucratic corruption is the fact that many 
public bureaucrats are in positions where their actions have considerable 
influence on public services, companies and other organisations. If officials 
are paid illegally for making certain decisions and choices, it is difficult to 
control, even with increased monitoring. 
Thus there is a need to improve the effectiveness and transparency of 
administrative reforms and economic policies which contribute to the 
pervasiveness of systemic and bureaucratic corruption. Smaller and more 
efficient government, fewer discretionary powers in administration, greater 
reliance on diversity and private initiatives, a free press and other media, well 
paid civil servants appointed by merit, democratic processes in political 
parties and supremacy of the rule of law, are all important factors that serve 
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to promote good governance and reduce corruption opportunities. 
Bureaucratic corruption can be controlled and restricted only when there is a 
political will and political ability to implement the necessary regulations. 
As chapter two demonstrates, grand corruption takes place at the high levels 
of the political system when politicians entitled to make and enforce laws use 
authority to sustain their power, status and wealth. Grand corruption perverts 
the manner in which decisions are made and leads to misallocation of 
resources. Laws and regulations are abused by the rulers, side-stepped, 
ignored, or even tailored to fit their interests.  
Whilst corruption is an element and problem of all societies to varying 
degrees, the thesis argues that it has been a particular concern for 
Zimbabwe. It has undermined and caused the meltdown of socio-economic 
and political growth over the last two decades. The problem of corruption is 
inimical to good governance, poverty reduction and sustainable 
development.  The thesis shows that corruption discourages and impedes 
foreign and domestic investments. This happens because bribery elevates 
transaction cost and creates uncertainty in the economy. It distorts economic 
priorities leading to an economic meltdown which has robbed the public of 
their rightful sources for public service, infrastructure and anti-poverty 
programmes. In addition, as the thesis argues, corruption has become a 
major impediment to political and socio-economic development of Zimbabwe. 
It has hindered Zimbabwe‟s administrative development and performance, 
which has impaired political and economic efficiency. The problem of 
corruption has resulted in increased poverty and degradation of the masses 
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amidst the accumulation of immense wealth by bureaucrats and the ruling 
elite. 
While this thesis has argued that corruption is detrimental to human 
development, in a different dimension, it kept the Zimbabwean political and 
economic system going/functioning during the crisis years (between 2000 
and 2009). It allowed the undesirable government to survive as bureaucrats 
went to work knowing they would make extra-cash from bribes against 
dramatically rising inflation. This is a peculiar case because the desire to 
make extra-cash kept many public officials at work, which consequently 
maintained the government‟s rule (a breakdown of the economy would have 
meant the government was forced out of office). Given the low salaries public 
servants received, corruption was used as a way of subsidising the state. If 
public servants were not corrupt, perhaps the country could have collapsed 
totally to a level much worse than was experienced. In this light, corruption 
was perhaps a positive force that was created by policy and economic 
failure, but prevented total economic collapse. Corruption became a coping 
strategy in a peculiar case. This therefore, rejects the notion that all 
corruption is bad as argued in chapter one.  
Whilst this notion supports some researchers such as Nye (1961) who 
argues that corruption has beneficial effects in terms of the relaxation of 
bureaucratic red tape, this thesis shows that corruption has had damaging 
effects on Zimbabwe‟s socio-economic and political development. This is a 
consequence of the absence of democratic institutions that should make the 
engagement in corrupt conducts difficult. The absence of checks and 
balance mechanisms to prevent systemic corruption-funded patronage and 
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limit politicians‟ intervention in economic activities make corruption “a cancer 
eating the society away” (Interview 4, 27th October 2011). 
While corruption has countless causes, the discussion has argued that it is 
strongly interlinked with the discourse of poor governance, weakness of state 
institutions, and greediness by bureaucrats and the ruling elite. These factors 
have contributed in breeding grand, bureaucratic and systemic corruption. 
The failures in economic policy are a result of bad governance, weaknesses 
in institutional arrangements, and greediness of ZANU-PF-led government 
that has generated opportunities for rent seeking through corruption of 
patronage and clientele politics. This has resulted in flaws in the public 
administration, consequently leading to a decline in the integrity of public 
servants and inadequate legislative oversight by government. Thus 
corruption in Zimbabwe that continues to undermine sustainable 
development is a direct outcome of these factors. Good governance, strong 
institutions and political leadership dedicated in serving the nation are basic 
requirements for social, economic and political development in every society 
which should play a major role in monitoring and controlling the spread of 
corruption. 
Corruption features routinely in all sectors of the Zimbabwe society because 
it has been easier for the public officials to elicit rent due to a lack of or 
weaknesses in the prevailing systems of controls and regulations, and the 
absence of institutional mechanisms to deal with corruption as a result of 
poor governance. It is in this context that this thesis argues that corruption is 
a symptom of deep institutional weaknesses. This consequentially reduces 
economic growth, repels long-term foreign and domestic investments while 
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enhancing inflation, distorting the fundamental role of the government, and 
undermining the legitimacy of government and of the market economy. 
These factors have favoured the intensification of corruption as it flourishes 
itself in such environments.  
The role of colonialism in the genesis and sustenance of corruption in 
Zimbabwe is widely discussed in this study. This allowed for the discussion 
of the relationship between post-colonial Zimbabwe and CSOs. Evidence 
from interviews and document analysis demonstrate that the roots of 
corruption in Zimbabwe hinge on the country‟s political and economic 
development, bureaucratic traditions and policies inherited from the colonial 
regime. While colonialism cannot explicitly explain the existing 
manifestations of corruption in Zimbabwe, the colonial government left an 
institutional legacy that the ZANU-PF government adopted and subsequently 
shaped the form and extent of corrupt practices. Thus a debate on corruption 
in Zimbabwe that neglects to factor in the role of colonialism in the genesis 
and nature of corruption risk making superficial conclusions on its causes 
and nature. 
The form which corruption has assumed in the Zimbabwean context has 
depended on how the ZANU-PF-led government, politicians and bureaucrats 
have taken the lead in corrupt practices, and how they have actively applied 
the corruption of patronage and clientelism that this thesis argues to be a 
product of the nation‟s colonial heritage . This reflects a pattern of political 
patronage and client relationship existing between ZANU-PF‟s political ruling 
elite, the state bureaucracy and the electorate who mirror the underlying 
socio-economic and poli tical factors principally determining the pathway 
 303 
taken by corruption and its impact on economic, social and political growth. 
Indeed the importance of patron-client relationships in Zimbabwean society 
cannot be underestimated. While this may appear to be linked to nepotism 
and cronyism, the use of connections to conduct daily activities and public 
business has offered some „stability‟ and „reassurance‟ in a government 
system where the state can yield the arbitrary power of resource and 
economic distribution with impunity. The thesis argues that clientelism has 
been a principal mechanism through which the political elite have built the 
electoral support necessary to ensure their sustainability that gives them 
access to the state‟s resources. Consequently, we have seen the emergence 
of a politics of factional competition over power and resources, “a politics  
obsessed with the division of the political spoils” (Szeftel 2000a: 427) 
particularly with the split of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
party into two factions, as shown in chapter five.  
This study has demonstrated that the system of client-network of the ruling 
government, senior civi l servants and war veterans return various forms of 
patronage payments by means of supporting the ruling party. Furthermore, 
this has provided the war veterans with resources and power to harass and 
intimidate the opposition and certain CSOs in blind and superficial defence of 
the sovereign and nationalist discourse against those they label enemies of 
the state. This has resulted in widespread and entrenched corruption in the 
form of bribery, fraud, embezzlement, nepotism, to mention a few, as well as 
the nature of political patronage and clientelism. The thesis further argues 
that the patronage politics and the clientele system undermine the 
independence of various state structures such as the Zimbabwe Anti -
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Corruption Commission (ZACC) that are supposed to institute and promote 
Anti-Corruption programmes. 
While such Anti-Corruption structures exercise their constitutionally 
mandated functions, political interference overrides the implementation of 
their policies. Despite efforts of putting in place the ZACC and other Anti-
Corruption tools, they remain incapacitated to achieve their mandates. This 
demonstrates a culture of political corruption and the pervasiveness of 
patrimonialism in Zimbabwe.  
While scholars such as Little (1996) argue that certain kinds of authoritarian 
regimes are able to check incidences of corruption through political 
repression and by deploying harsh sanctions, it remains true to a greater 
extent, that the ZANU-PF regime has deployed corruption as a means of 
governing, and distributing state patronage to maintain power. This study has 
presented this more as a functionalist interpretation in which political 
patronage in Zimbabwe serves as a means of maintaining the existing 
ZANU-PF power structures, a tool to capture the electorate support – mostly 
rural, and a system of political control.  
The thesis has discussed the importance of correlations between corruption 
and the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP). The ESAP, 
the neo-liberal policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) was introduced to combat corruption and improve economic 
development and good governance in Zimbabwe through liberalisation of the 
economy. The approach was premised on the hypothesis that economic 
liberalisation has the potential to reduce corruption through a combination of 
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economic reforms designed to deregulate prices, eliminate subsidies, 
customs duties and other trade controls, and structural reforms aimed at 
reducing the size of the state through privatisation. The assumption and 
anticipation by the World Bank and IMF was that by reducing the direct 
involvement of the state in economic activities and reducing the size of the 
public sector, opportunities for rent seeking would lessen. Rather than 
controlling corruption, the economic liberalisation reinforced the bargaining 
power of the business quarter in relation to the government, a situation that 
actually led to the persistence of the institutional opportunities for corruption. 
Liberalisation and privatisation in the absence of effective regulation, poor 
implementation and weak capacity created potential for generating high 
levels of corruption through the private appropriation of public assets using 
illegal means. 
The introduction of the ESAP and their subsequent failure facilitated the birth 
of many CSOs as a result of the deteriorating socio-economic living 
conditions. The Washington consensus of the 1990s, which also created 
pressure on the state to withdraw its influence from economic decisions, led 
to creation of many CSOs that went on to challenge the authoritarian regime 
and shaped the political path taken by the Zimbabwe political elite thereafter. 
These CSOs emerged with a series of development programmes meant to 
benefit various communities in their geographical areas who have been 
adversely affected by the ESAP. Most of them ventured into governance 
issues, environmental projects, and service delivery projects in an attempt to 
relieve pressure on government whose capacity to cater for the people was 
insufficient. These were recommended programmes, particularly so, during 
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the times of socio-economic decay. It was from the evaluation and 
understanding of such civi l society intervention that this thesis came to the 
realisation that civil society as a whole is an indispensable element of the 
socio-economic and political development agenda in Zimbabwe. This 
heralded greater emphasis on civil society as a panacea replacing the state‟ 
social services.  From this perspective, despite that some civil society 
organisations are corrupt, this thesis argues for the involvement of CSOs in 
fighting corruption.  
7.3 Understanding the state and civil society in Zimbabwe  
7.3.1 Ideological context of conflict 
 
This thesis was founded on a major theme of examining the state-civil 
society relations with regards to combating corruption, with the aim of 
contributing to empirical and theoretical literature. Anchoring on this theme 
are the methodological challenges militating how we study and talk about the 
state and civil society, and the role played by CSOs in Zimbabwe, particularly 
on good governance policy formulation and implementation.  
The thesis has argued that the failure to structurally differentiate the state 
from the ruling party is a source of corruption in Zimbabwe. The ruling 
government and public officials have treated the state as a private resource, 
a source of wealth accumulation. Empirical evidence based on interviews 
and document data gathered during fieldwork demonstrates that ZANU-PF 
political elite retain their political positions and their legitimacy through the 
development of personal networks which Szeftel (2000b) called „political 
patronage and clientelism‟. These are structured by considerations of party 
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affiliations, family relations, and tribal lines. The political leaders become “big 
men in return for a distribution of the largesse they are able to divert to 
themselves through occupying state positions” (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 74). 
In chapter two the thesis argues that the Zimbabwean state is large and the 
biggest employer with numerous ministries and structures. The cumbersome 
and unwieldy nature of state bureaucracy serves to facilitate corruption. It is 
seen as a source of wealth accumulation by those within. The state is used 
by the ruling elite not only to maintain their political domination, but also for 
purposes of self-enrichment. 
The study argues that while political and economic powers rest in the hands 
of the ruling ZANU-PF, state power has become more personalised through 
the ruling elite as CSOs became isolated from policy formulation, 
implementation and decision making processes. This thesis has 
demonstrated that without the involvement of civil society in policy making, 
the ruling party has established a set of laws to augment their revenues and 
wealth with the ultimate objective of maximising their rent irrespective of the 
consequences on welfare and the economic efficiency of the country.  
With the ruling government hijacking the formal bureaucratic structures such 
as Parliament, Judiciary, ZRP and civil service, it has continued to interfere 
with the powers and functions of these structures purely for party, individual 
and private gains. The ruling government sees these state organs  as an 
extension of the ruling party, with Parliament simply acting as “a rubber 
stamp for Presidential decrees and actions” (Hope 1997:57). The Parliament 
has not taken action in situations where there is clear evidence of acts of 
corruption among the political and bureaucratic elites because it has 
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succumbed to corrupt conducts. ZANU-PF‟s capture of the bureaucratic 
structures and instruments of law and order has greatly undermined the 
autonomy of the judiciary, making it impossible for the ZACC to challenge 
corrupt practices where the ruling elite are implicated. The thesis‟s findings 
suggest this is the prime reason why fighting corruption in Zimbabwe has 
been so ineffectual. 
Corruption has thrived in Zimbabwe partly because the state was unable to 
develop and sustain independent law enforcement and judicial institutions 
that are germane to the maintenance of the rule of law. Consequently, law 
enforcement agencies and the judiciary that are supposed to implement the 
laws have been tainted by corruption. 
The Zimbabwean ruling government has dominated almost every aspect of 
the state economy and has important consequences for the manifestation of 
corruption. Renoe argues that:  
“In a patriarchal society as Zimbabwe, the government had 
become the ultimate patron. There was no element of the 
economy that was not directly touched by the 
government.....Every point of economic interaction within the 
government was a new opportunity to patronage or 
corruption” (1999: 108). 
The year 2000 witnessed a flow of literature, both academic and journalistic, 
on state-civil society relations vis-a-vis the struggle against ZANU-PF‟s 
repressive and authoritarian politics. The conjecture about civil society and 
its practice in Zimbabwe mirrors the influence of the neo-liberal framework 
that promoted it from the beginning of the 1990s, which portray civil society 
to be anti-state. Thus civil society is theorised in a Weberian institutional 
sense as entities or institutions that oppose the authoritarian state.  This 
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thinking has distanced relations between the state and certain sections of 
civil society. Instead of working to complement the state, CSOs were 
established to monitor and/or oppose it while providing alternative centres of 
political power as seen by the formation of the MDC party by the labour 
movement and the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1999. The 
fierce contest for hegemony that followed between the state and some CSOs 
informs these neo-liberal imprints. The tendency to come out of this contest 
has been to label and counter-label some CSOs such as the Zimbabwe 
National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) as not civi l society. 
The mainstream CSOs rarely recognised the war veterans‟ organisation as 
part of them in the neo-liberal sense due to their link with the ruling party. 
This was also „sponsored‟ by the state discourse on civil society since 1999, 
which became extremely negative viewing certain sections of civil society as 
unpatriotic and anti-ZANU-PF. 
The implications have been that then, and now, the mainstream thinking 
within Zimbabwe scholarship is to conceptualise CSOs monolithically as non-
state actors aligned to the counter-hegemonic movement given that the MDC 
was formed out of civil society groups. When the ZNLWVA (a civil society 
organisation by registration) joined the politics of ZANU-PF, the mainstream 
CSOs stopped recognising it as a civil society organisation in the neo-liberal 
sense. This divided social and political commentators with regard the civic 
status of war veterans. This theorising of civil society risks advancing a one 
dimensional and narrow, but nonetheless dominant understanding of civil 
society as essentially counter-hegemonic or anti-state. This was further 
powered by the war veterans‟ self-exclusion from the rubric of civil society as 
 310 
a result of their political alignment to ZANU-PF. Thus the use of Gramsci‟s 
theory of hegemony in this thesis attempted to offer equilibrium between 
divisions amongst scholars interested in interpreting civil society and those 
interpreting Zimbabwean politics. 
This thesis has argued that civil society is an arena that should be beyond 
state control and influence. The thesis discusses numerous sets of views 
and theories about the role and nature of civil society in a public sphere. It is 
where the public can debate and argue freely about the imperative issues 
and are empowered to negotiate a constantly evolving sense of the common 
or public interest. However, this cannot be said of civil society in Zimbabwe 
because it operates in an arena unlike that of civil society elsewhere. The 
freedom of association, freedom of speech and freedom of representation 
that should characterise the nature of civil society has been alienated by the 
state structures denying some of CSOs necessary operational space to 
promote policy. This alienation makes Zimbabwe‟s civil society different from 
other civil societies in some parts of the world who are “rooted in the Western 
political philosophy” (Harbeson, et al 1994: 25). Since independence the 
Zimbabwean state has suppressed some CSOs and their activities. The 
state has demarcated boundaries of political legitimacy that have eventually 
curtailed the political pathway followed by certain CSOs to be practically and 
inevitably confined to the jurisdiction of political legitimacy. 
At independence ZANU-PF settled comfortably into the state structures and 
political system built by the colonial powers. The legacy of colonial 
oppression characterised by the suppression of vocal organisations 
remained dominant within the ZANU-PF government. The government 
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assumed the position of the sole representative of Zimbabweans, and 
discouraged organisations outside ZANU-PF‟s sphere of influence from 
representing popular opinion. This way the state gained leverage over civil 
society and frustrated the development of the organisations that hoped for 
recognition in policy formation and implementation when Zimbabwe attained 
independence. It is from this perspective that theorising civil society in 
Zimbabwe is different from the rest of the world. This enables us to 
understand more clearly the nature of interface and interdependence 
between the state and civil society in Zimbabwe. 
The state inherited a Constitution (at the Lancaster House negotiations) that 
augmented the emergence of very powerful ruling elite able to exercise 
boundless economic and political power and reigning supreme over civil 
society. Closely linked to the existence of the excessively authoritative state 
is the politicisation of bureaucracies frequently accompanied by the 
entrenchment of political patronage and clientelism. This allowed the state to 
become more oppressive, tyrannical and devoid of transparency, 
accountability and irresponsible as corruption manifested itself in every state 
institution and the private sector. 
This thesis aptly concludes that corruption and ZANU-PF‟s detestation and 
violence against certain CSOs was inherited through state institutions, laws 
and policies established by the colonial government, with control over the 
economy, political power and space, with greediness being the main cause. 
Then and now, the unequal wealth distribution and desire for wealth 
accumulation remain a contentious factor drawing a thin line between the 
state and those CSOs advocating for democratic economic policy changes 
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and implementation of transparent Anti-Corruption policies. This feeds to the 
state‟s continued promotion of legislation that circumscribes and criminalises 
the activities of influential CSOs. In particular, Zimbabwe has seen the 
criminalisation of civic leaders involved in education, human rights 
monitoring, public outreach and service provision, labelling them as 
unpatriotic and devoid of national interest as well as threatening the stability 
of society and endangering state security. This reflects the nature of state-
civil society relations dictated by the state through the discourse of 
nationalistic politics and rhetoric.  
The state and civil society in Zimbabwe form two dichotomous ensembles. 
While their respective practices, institutions and ideologies may clash, they 
are meant to complement each other on development issues as the following 
section demonstrates.  
7.4 The state and civil society Anti-Corruption strategies 
7.4.1 Main Findings and Policy Implications 
 
This thesis has shown that a host of national, regional and international Anti -
Corruption initiatives have been pursued by the state and some CSOs aimed 
at controlling corruption. State initiatives include the national instruments 
such as the ZACC of 2004 and 2011, the formation of the Ministry of State 
Enterprises, Anti-Monopolies and Anti-Corruption in 2006, and various Anti-
Corruption committees within ministries. Regional Anti-Corruption tools in 
which Zimbabwe is signatory include the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Protocol Against Corruption of 2001, and the African 
Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption adopted in 2003. 
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While internationally, Zimbabwe is signatory to the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).  
Although the state has sanctioned several Anti-Corruption laws, and ratified 
a number of regional and international protocols against corruption, the y are 
a rhetorical gesture, only existing on paper because corruption continues in 
all sectors. The Anti-Corruption discourse has often merely involved the 
government paying lip service due to increasing media attention and activism 
of some CSOs, as well as from actions taken by other regional and 
international agencies to fight corruption. 
High levels of corruption prevail despite the presence of the ZACC and 
establishments of various Anti-Corruption institutions within different 
ministries. The fault clearly rests with the government. The thesis has 
demonstrated that the government‟s project of combating corruption is 
skewed. The establishment of Anti-Corruption structures has proven to be a 
failure because their strategies focus on dealing with symptoms rather than 
causes. Corruption has demonstrated durability and flexibility by mutating 
and adapting to new environments. The state has to concentrate on the root 
causes rather than on symptoms of corruption. 
However, throughout the study, it is argued that eradicating the problem of 
corruption completely is impossible to envisage without the full commitment 
of the state, the involvement of CSOs, and the participation of the public.  
This is based on the premise that a holistic participation in Anti -Corruption 
programmes instils a sense of national ownership of the agenda and gives all 
stakeholders confidence and trust in the Anti-Corruption approaches. While 
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this research acknowledges that the problem of corruption is global, 
initiatives to fight it have to be anchored at the individual state level. This is 
reflected in Article 60 of UNCAC which provides that: 
“Each state party shall, to the extent necessary, initiate, 
develop or improve specific training programmes for its 
personnel responsible for preventing and combating  
corruption” (cited in Nichols et al, 2006: 487).  
There can hardly be fruitful and effective programmes against corruption 
without a clear sense of national ownership of the Anti-Corruption strategies. 
The state has been able to take advantage of the proliferation of institutions 
to combat corruption. In essence, research findings from interviews and 
document analysis demonstrate that the state has failed to accommodate the 
public as key participants in the fight against corruption. Involving the public 
through public education campaigns by the state Anti-Corruption structures 
would have the effect of enhancing the credibility of Anti-Corruption efforts 
through a greater understanding of the existing laws. This would narrow the 
gap in the perception of corruption between the general public and the state 
Anti-Corruption institutions and political leadership. This approach has 
worked elsewhere in the region in countries such as Botswana, Namibia and 
South Africa (Sibudubudu 2002). 
The overarching and recurring findings of this thesis are a lack of political will 
by the state to combat corruption. While it is unrealistic to expect the state to 
immediately and totally eliminate corruption, the principle of „zero tolerance‟ 
as advocated by the President in his ZACC inaugural speech in 2011, should 
be adopted by the state, politicians and legislators. It is argued in this thesis 
that the success of the „zero tolerance‟ approach depends on this 
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fundamental political commitment. Research findings from fieldwork 
demonstrate that state structures such as Parliament, the ZRP, and the 
judicial system have been unenthusiastic in tackling corruption. An important 
step and departure point in combating corruption at national level should 
begin with all government structures, (particularly Parliament, the ZRP and 
the Judicial system) demonstrating their willingness in supporting Anti-
Corruption initiatives. 
This study argues that Anti-Corruption initiatives anchored on the creation of 
democratic institutions such as an independent ZACC, a committed 
Parliament, and watchdog structures such as CSOs (that are not corrupt) are 
fundamental to the success of efforts to combat corruption. Political reforms 
can contribute towards an environment that is more favourable to reduced 
corruption because “they can increase the responsiveness of political elite to 
the will of the people” (Little 1996: 6). 
While it is the responsibility of every sector of the society (including the 
government, private sector, civil society, media, and the public) to combat 
corruption, the state has the mandate to guide and direct the process by 
establishing an adequate legal framework, providing political will and 
leadership that coordinates the national effort, and providing adequate 
resources and operating space to Anti-Corruption institutions. 
The state‟s efforts in combating corruption have been very minimal due to 
interference in various programmes by senior government officials who have 
been involved in corrupt practices (see Figure 6.2). The single biggest 
impediment to the Anti-Corruption movement is the domineering ruling party. 
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Research findings from fieldwork established that strong Anti-Corruption 
programmes would shake the pillars of power and stability of the dominant 
ruling government whose survival is built on political patronage and clientele 
system. Effective Anti-Corruption programmes would undoubtedly interfere 
with patterns of political patronage and private accumulation, and threaten 
the privileges that state office confers on the political elite and their 
supporters. This explains exactly why the Anti-Corruption initiatives are 
bitterly resented and resisted by some of the ruling elite. It reflects why 
CSOs‟ efforts have been limited due to the state‟s restrictive laws that have 
isolated them from policy formulation and implementation, and participation 
in governance issues including the Anti-Corruption movements. Nonetheless, 
this does not necessarily negate or ignore some notable efforts, however 
limited, by a few civil society constituents and some state structures in the 
work of Anti-Corruption. TI-Z and the independent media are cited in this 
thesis as active participants in the Anti-Corruption crusade despite the state‟s 
clear antipathy. 
TI-Z is a CSO devoted to combating corruption and strives for a society in 
which government, politics, business, civil society and the daily lives of 
people are free of corruption and instead guided by core values of 
transparency, accountability, integrity, justice and democracy. The TI-Z has 
been particularly active in Anti-Corruption campaigns, exposing corrupt 
practices by both public and the private sectors through its varied 
programmes and strategies such as publication of the Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI), reports and research publications, and their public education 
programmes. Its policy formulation, implementation and developments have 
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been informed and strengthened by a rising academic literature focusing  on 
the causes and effects of corruption on socio-economic development, and 
this thesis contributes to this good cause. 
It is therefore unsurprising that this has attracted the attention of many 
researchers, economists, political analysts and the public alike in 
condemning the state for its lack of political wi ll in dealing with the problem of 
corruption decisively. Academic and journalistic consensus is that the state 
lacks a strong will to combat corruption. As the media heightens this 
attention, there is a widespread perception by researchers and scholars, the 
public, and some parts of CSOs that corruption is on the increase in 
Zimbabwe. The media has demanded effective action to eliminate corrupt 
practices that have become one of the most profound disappointments of the 
period of development. 
Political corruption is posing possibly the greatest hazard to the credibility 
and stability of the Anti-Corruption agenda. As was argued by one 
respondent, “political corruption perpetuates double standards inimical to the 
development of an Anti-Corruption culture” (Interview 57, 21st December 
2012). Thus there is need to eradicate high level political corruption that has 
undermined and interfered with the Anti-Corruption instruments. For the Anti-
Corruption apparatus to succeed there is a need to eliminate corrupt 
politicians who discourage or block the implementation of effective Anti-
Corruption programmes. This should extend to some CSOs that have 
created and amplified the socio-economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe in 
order to sustain a „crisis industry‟ for donor funding, which also promoted 
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corruption within some CSOs.  Such CSOs have been part of the problem; 
however, they may also be part of the solution.  
Corruption is a multifaceted problem requiring a wide range of legal and non-
legal strategies. The national, regional and international Anti-Corruption 
instruments present a comprehensive set of standards designed to combat 
corrupt practices. Nationally, the ZACC and the TI-Z have put in place 
several Anti-Corruption strategies although varying in the implementation 
process. Both structures merge at objectives level where they identify 
prevention, public education programmes and punishment as three 
imperative pillars necessary in combating corruption. Unlike the ZACC, the 
TI-Z has developed and taken Anti-Corruption activities to the public through 
education programmes via the media and public lectures, seminars and road 
shows. This has further increased public awareness of corruption while the 
ZACC has relied on investigations as its active strategy. This has not 
produced the required results as none of those investigated have been 
prosecuted; the ZACC is not effective and does not work for Zimbabwe. The 
ZACC‟s strategy of investigation can only be effective if the judicial system 
and the investigative organs such as the ZRP are genuinely free from 
political influence. The ZACC needs to shift its approach and strategy from 
investigation to other intervention strategies such as public education 
programmes. 
Chapter six discusses the ZRP as an ineffective institution in terms of 
combating corruption. Zimbabwe has a strong police force whose 
establishment is provided under its respective Constitutional mandate and 
exclusively through Police Standing Orders. The ZRP powers include 
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investigating, arresting, search and seizure with respect to crime, including 
corrupt practices. They are trained in the general crime detection, which is 
centred on criminal law. This study argues that the traditional role of the ZRP 
is the maintenance of law and order, yet corruption does not readily fall 
under this category. In its traditional role, the police force works on the basis 
of a complaint. With corruption cases, there may be no complaint as 
corruption tends to be a consensual crime where both parties may be willing 
to participate, unless one of them reports the matter. This is what makes 
corruption cases involving the ZRP complex and difficult to untangle. 
The ZRP‟s lack of credibility is discussed extensively in this thesis. The TI-
Z‟s Global Corruption Barometer (2012) cited the ZRP as the most corrupt 
state institution in Zimbabwe. The findings of this thesis demonstrate that the 
ZRP is a flawed institution due to political interference by the ruling 
government. 
Literature on corruption and its control in Zimbabwe has documented the 
numerous social, economic and political evils of corruption with most 
focusing on its causes, nature, and effects and how the state has worked to 
combat it. However, researchers have seemingly failed to incorporate the 
role of civil society in the fight against corruption. Studies have accentuated 
the state Anti-Corruption initiatives by detailing the role played by the state 
without examining the role of other stakeholders like CSOs. This thesis has 
attempted to fill this gap. While acknowledging that some CSOs are 
themselves corrupt, this thesis argues that isolating civil society from 
designing and implementation of Anti-Corruption programmes is as 
dangerous as corruption is to the society.  
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This thesis draws on John and Comaroff (1993), Mbembe (2002) and Fratton 
(2002) who argue that a strong and free civi l society is a crucial condition of 
strong democracy, strong economic and social development, and the thesis 
therefore argues that empowering civil society is a fundamental prerequisite 
for the project of Anti-Corruption. If the state could work with civil society in 
designing and implementing Anti-Corruption policies, they may both serve as 
watchdogs for each other. There is nothing new for civil society in working 
alongside the state structures in implementing Anti-Corruption policies since 
they have once worked together since independence. The state should 
acknowledge and accept civil society as an independent and creative partner 
in the development of effective coalitions to improve governance. 
The main intriguing results of this thesis are that the state has no clear-cut 
strategies to combat corruption despite having Anti-Corruption organs in 
various government ministries including institutions such as the Parliament 
and ZRP. In particular, the overarching and recurring conclusion is that the 
state lacks political wi ll to formulate real strategies for fighting corruption. 
Consequently, the ZACC is fragmented and not sincerely supported and 
integrated by other state institutions responsible for combating corruption. As 
a result, this fragmentation leaves the ZACC vulnerable to public criticism as 
it fails to meet public expectations. 
Thus, the effective methodology to combat corruption in Zimbabwe is to 
make and effectively enforce constitutional provisions for the accountability 
of public officials, and to guarantee participatory democracy to encourage 
popular participation of the public and civil society (despite that some of them 
are corrupt themselves) to ensure accountability and transparency of 
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governance. This is possible through the initiation of institutional reforms and  
public policies grounded in genuine democratic principles and public 
accountability that Zimbabwe can realistically wage a sustained and 
successful attack on the entrenched bastions of corruption that handicap its 
development. 
The state‟s approaches and strategies have not been helpful in controlling 
corruption as they tend to rely on the traditional methods of punishment that 
do not have the effect and impact to eradicate corruption. What Zimbabwe 
needs is a proper analysis planning and implementation of the Anti-
Corruption policies that can create a corruption-free society. These should all 
focus on interventions to change the paradigm at the heart of the entire 
culture of corruption from political leaders to bureaucrats and the public. The 
project of combating corruption requires bringing about change in politicians, 
bureaucrats and within the public‟s consciousness. This entails the 
augmentation of ethical values and moral development at an individual level 
and the reformation of political, social and economic administrative structures 
at systemic levels. Ethical behaviour has to be inculcated in the civi l servants 
to generate self-awareness which places the responsibility of fighting  
corruption on all parts of the system. Society is the source of bureaucrats, 
thus there is a need to infuse ethical behaviour throughout society, from the 
family to the school and to the job market. Unless the state and other Anti-
Corruption actors focus more on the causes of corruption, efforts at a later 
stage will be too late and more costly. The overall interest in ethics education 
is one of the drivers in Anti-Corruption programmes. 
 322 
Anti-Corruption initiatives need to focus on all sectors and levels of 
administration and society. Its skewed focus on the public sector means that 
most of its efforts are concentrated on controlling the demand side of 
corruption (inducement by public officials). This imbalance of focus in fighting 
corruption creates an environment of instability in the Anti-Corruption system. 
To balance the equation, the supply side (private sector) must also be 
controlled. Consequently, this imbalance on Anti-Corruption programmes 
means corruption in the private sector is ignored. This creates an 
environment conducive for corruption to flourish within a wider scale in 
society. 
Current initiatives often lack credibility, autonomy and public trust and 
confidence because there is a missing link in the form of political support as 
the political structures such as the Parliament cannot legally enforce 
investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes. Key characteristics of 
Zimbabwe‟s political context take account of the dearth of vibrant public 
institutions, weak legislatures and a politically manipulated judicial system, 
coupled with the unwarranted influence of the political leaders in public 
affairs. The Anti-Corruption programmes require a high degree of political 
commitment, administrative and legal capacity to implement development 
and good governance policies. Zimbabwe lacks credible and demonstrable 
commitment to reform. 
The ruling government needs to allow some CSOs to participate in policy 
formulation and implementation that will see them playing a stronger role in 
national efforts including combating corruption as evidenced by TI-Z and 
some independent media. While the thesis argues that TI-Z and the 
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independent media have been proactive in exposing cases of corruption 
under restrictive laws and harsh political environment, on the one hand, 
interviewees felt that ZANU-PF should abandon its restrictive draconian laws 
such as the POSA and its evil twin the AIPPA. These were meanly created to 
target the opposition supporters, the human rights activists and independent 
media, and specifically restrict the rights to criticise the government and the 
President, block free engagement in advocacy issues or to organise acts of 
peaceful civil demonstrations. Disbanding these laws would give some CSOs 
the opportunity to play a more active role in developing and implementing 
Anti-Corruption programmes. The hostile legal system, including defamation 
laws, compromises the role of the independent media in exposing corruption. 
Consequently, this has resulted in some form of self-censorship by 
journalists who fear harassment and persecution (Interview 3, 27th October 
2011). 
There is a need to attend to, and strengthen the pre-conditions for free and 
independent civil society by attacking all forms of oppression and repression 
of some CSOs by the ruling government. This will give them the means and 
the platform to be active organisations in national policy formulation and 
implementation, guaranteeing the freedom of associations, freedom of 
expression, access to government information and structures of 
communication, and build a strong foundation for institutional coalitions, 
alliances and partnerships. 
This thesis argues that a free and competent press is necessary and 
indispensable to the success of fighting corruption. Freedom of press  calls 
for access to information and the absence of government censorship. 
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Transparency and accountability require information to be available freely in 
the public domain.  
Since political will is argued here to be critical to effective Anti-Corruption 
strategies, this gap in perspective is an area of concern. Political wi ll should 
be demonstrated through adequate funding of Anti-Corruption agencies, 
visible and tangible action taken against corrupt individuals , and leadership 
must truly align itself with Anti-Corruption institutions. 
This thesis views whistle blowing as an Anti-Corruption strategy that links the 
state with civil society, the state with the public, and civil society with the 
public. It has a significance that lies in the fact that it creates communication 
links between CSOs and state organs dealing with corruption, between the 
public and the state institutions, and the public with civil society.  
While Zimbabwe is a signatory to both regional and international Anti -
Corruption conventions and protocols, it still remains without a clear whistle 
blowing policy. The lack of laws protecting whistle blowers is one area of 
concern with those involved in Zimbabwe‟s Anti-Corruption initiatives. Many 
countries in Southern Africa have adopted the SADC, AU and the UN‟s 
Whistle blowers Protection Act, but years after ratifying the protocols, 
Zimbabwe has not yet adopted the policy. Protecting whistle blowers, notably 
employees, the public and CSOs such as the independent media, is an 
essential step towards combating corruption in Zimbabwe. Combating 
corruption entails enacting laws that guarantee access to information giving 
succour to whistle blowers while protecting both the public and the media 
who bravely raise concerns and accusations.  
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Without legal protection, civil society, the public, workers and individuals are 
often afraid to report corrupt activities observed in their everyday 
experiences. Lack of whistle blower policy is an impediment to the Anti -
Corruption initiatives. 
Both the fundamental strength of civil society and the overall balance 
between it and the state are critical aspects of any reform strategy. Where 
the groups, interests and organisations of civil society are vigorous, they can 
serve as political and communication links (both upward and downward) 
between government and the people. They can monitor the conduct of 
officials, and of each other, and through conflict and competition can reach 
settlements regarding acceptable political practice that engage in the 
reduction of public corruption. This is a critical development. While Anti-
Corruption campaigns are obviously important, institutionalising  reform 
means linking it to enduring incentives. The same interests that had 
previously contributed to corruption, either as instigators or as paying victims, 
can come to inhibit it to the extent that they are numerous and well 
organised, experience a healthy competitive balance among them, and 
become better able to insist upon less exploitative treatment by officials. 
A strong civil society can be a check upon official conduct, and cri tical to 
accountability, because transparent and accountability procedures mean little 
if no one outside the state can demand a meaningful accounting backed up 
by credible threats of political or legal sanctions. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Sample letter requesting interviews sent to 
respondents 
 
12th September 2011 
________________________  
________________________  
________________________  
Dear Sir/Madam,  
Ref: Request for Interviews  
My name is Stephen Moyo, a PhD (Doctoral) research candidate of the 
University of Central Lancashire (UCLAN) in England in the School of 
Education and Social Sciences. I am currently conducting a research on ‘The 
Roles of the state and civil society in combating corruption in Zimbabwe’. In 
light of this, I have few questions that I would like to ask in order to answer 
the research questions. I am therefore writing this letter to request your 
permission to conduct face-to-face interviews with you with regards to this 
research. 
I would be much thankful if my request is given the best of your favourable 
consideration. Find attached introductory letters from my University and 
Transparency International-Zimbabwe (TI-Z) which is housing me during this 
fieldwork. You will also find attached a copy of interview topic guide for your 
perusal and consideration.  
Thanking you in anticipation of your favourable support. Should you want to 
contact me do not hesitate contact me (email address and mobile number 
provided). 
Yours faithfully 
Stephen Moyo 
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Appendix 2: UCLAN Official introduction letter 
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Appendix 3: TI-Z introduction letter 
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Appendix 4: Matrix of table of interviewees and organisations 
affiliation 
 
Name of 
Interviewee  
 
 
Name of 
Organisation 
Position of 
Interviewee 
Date of 
Interview 
Interview 1 Transparency 
international-
Zimbabwe (TI-Z) 
Project Officer 24th October 
2011 
Interview 2 TI-Z Advocacy and 
Legal Advice 
Centre (ALAC) 
Legal Advice 
Officer 
26th October 
2011 
Interview 3 Independent Media 
(newspaper) 
Editor 27th October 
2011 
Interview 4 Anti-Corruption 
Trust of Southern 
Africa (ACTSA) 
Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) 
27th October 
2011 
Interview 5  University of 
Zimbabwe (UZ) 
Lecturer 28th October 
2011 
Interview 6 Zimbabwe 
Republic Police 
(ZRP) 
ZRP spokesperson 2nd November 
2011 
Interview 7 TI-Z Executive Director 4th November 
2011 
Interview 8 Zimbabwe Anti-
Corruption 
Commission 
(ZACC) 
Commissioner 4th November 
2011 
Interview 9 ZACC Commissioner 4th November 
2011 
Interview 10 Radio Voice of the 
people (VOP) 
Director 7th November 
2011 
Interview 12 Ministry of Public 
service 
Minister 9th November 
2011 
Interview 15 Catholic 
Commission of 
Justice and peace 
(CCJP) 
Chairperson 11th November 
2011 
Interview 16 Ministry of Local 
Government, Rural 
and Urban 
Development 
Deputy Minister 14th November 
2011 
Interview 17 Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade 
Union (ZCTU) 
Secretary General 18th November 
2011 
Interview 18 UZ 
(Dept. of Political 
Lecturer and 
former Board Of 
21st November 
2011 
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and 
Administrative 
Studies)  
 
Trustees with TI-Z 
Interview 19 Ministry of Home 
Affairs 
Minister 23rd November 
2011 
Interview 20 National 
Constitutional 
Assembly (NCA) 
Executive Director 7th December 
2011 
Interview 21 Zimbabwe 
Commercial 
Farmers Union 
(ZCFU) 
Union President 7th December 
2011 
Interview 22 Zimbabwe 
Broadcasting 
Corporation (ZBC) 
Radio Presenter 12th December 
2011 
Interview 23 Organisation of 
Rural Associations 
for Progress 
(ORAP) 
Chairperson of the 
Executive Board 
14th December 
2011 
Interview 24 Movement for 
Democratic change 
(MDC-Tsvangirai) 
Member of 
Parliament (MP) 
16th December 
2011 
Interview 25  Zimbabwe Human 
Rights Association 
(ZIMRIGHTS) 
National 
Chairperson 
16th December 
2011 
Interview 26 Ministry of justice 
and Legal Affairs 
State Prosecutor  20th December 
2011 
Interview 27 European Union Head of Delegation 21st December 
2011 
Interview 28 Crisis Coalition of 
Zimbabwe 
National 
Coordinator 
23 December 
2011 
Interview 29 
 
Interview 30 
Independent Media 
 
Zimbabwe National 
Liberation War 
Veterans 
association 
(ZNLWVA) 
Deputy Editor 
 
War Veterans 
Chairman 
30th December 
2011 
 
3rd January 
2012 
 
Interview 31 State Media (The 
Chronicle) 
Journalist 30th December 
2012 
Interview 33 Ministry of Justice 
Legal and 
Parliamentary 
Affairs  
Minister 5th January 
2012 
Interview 36 National 
Association of Non-
Governmental 
Organisations 
(NANGO) 
Executive Officer 9th January 
2012 
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Interview 37 NANGO Programme 
Director 
9th January 
2012 
Interview 39 Media Institute for 
Southern Africa 
(MISA) 
Acting Executive 
Officer 
 
10th January 
2012 
Interview 40 Ministry of Home 
Affairs 
Representative  19th January 
2012 
Interview 41 Local Government 
Authority 
(Bulawayo) 
Mayor 25th January 
2012 
Interview 42 Zimbabwe Human 
Rights Association 
(ZIMRIGHTS) 
Programme 
Coordinator 
25th January 
2012 
Interview 43 Ministry of Justice 
and Legal Affairs 
Judge 27th January 
2012 
Interview 44 MDC-N MP 30th January 
2012 
Interview 45 ZRP Police 
Commissioner 
30th January 
2012 
Interview 46 Office of 
Comptroller 
Auditor-General 
(CAG) 
Chief Auditor 2nd February 
2012 
Interview 47 Ministry of Higher 
and Tertiary 
Education 
Deputy Director 
Discipline 
3rd February 
2012 
Interview 48 State Media 
(Umthunywa) 
Acting Editor 6th February 
2012 
Interview 49 Ministry of 
Education, Sports 
and Culture 
Historian and 
Social 
Commentator 
7th February 
2012 
Interview 50 National University 
of Science and 
Technology 
(NUST) 
Researcher 10th February 
2012 
Interview 51 Former Editor (with 
both the state and 
independent 
newspapers) 
Social 
Commentator 
10th February 
2012 
Interview 54 Patriotic Front-
Zimbabwe African 
People‟s Union 
(PF-ZAPU) 
President 14th February 
2012 
Interview 55 Ministry of Finance Minister 7th December 
2012 
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Interview 56  ZACC Chairperson 10th December 
2012 
Interview 57  UZ (Institute of 
Development 
Studies) 
Research fellow 21st December 
2012 
Interview 58 ZRP Police Officer 21st December 
2012 
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Appendix 5: Sample of interview topic guide  
 
A. Civil society 
Topic Area 1: Civil society and state relations 
1) How state-civil society relations are perceived by the organisation 
2) The nature of state-civi l society interface in Anti-Corruption policy 
formulation and implementation 
3) How relations influence Anti-Corruption programmes 
4) Existing civil society organisations‟ legislations 
5) Requirements for civil society registration 
6) State monopoly over political space and policy influence 
7) Civil society autonomy from state interference 
8) Terms of engagement with the state 
9) Do you engage the state in Anti-Corruption issues 
10) Means and channels of communicating with the state 
11) Assistance from the state 
Topic Area 2: Civil society‟s role and strategies of combating 
corruption 
1) Organisation‟s major activities 
2) Organisation‟s understanding of corruption, causes, nature and effects 
3) What role is played by the organisation in combating corruption 
4) Organisation‟s influence on Anti-Corruption initiatives 
5) Strategies used to influence Anti-Corruption policy 
6) Strategies employed to fight corruption 
7) Successes and failures of these strategies 
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8) Barriers and major challenges in policy engagement and combating 
corruption 
9) Factors affecting policy advocacy activities 
10) Where political space is limited what strategies are employed to 
improve impact 
11) What needs to be done to fight the spread of corruption 
Topic Area 3: Civil society structural and organisational factors 
1) Composition of civil society 
2) Civil society membership 
3) Level and nature of organisation 
4) Civil society relations and interface 
5) Civil society competition for turf and donations/funding 
6) Civil society participation in other organisations‟ activities 
7) Effective coordination 
8) Linkages with international organisations 
9) Civil society and donors relations 
B. State actors 
Topic Area 1: State-Civil society relations 
1) State‟s understanding of civil society 
2) How the state-civil society relations are perceived and described by 
the state 
3) Opinions about current legislations regulating civil society operations 
4) Engaging civil society in policy processes 
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5) Types of civil society organisations (CSOs) engaged by the state in 
policy issues 
6) State-civil society interface in Anti-Corruption management 
7) How do state-civil society relations affect socio-economic and political 
development of the country 
8) Challenges met working with CSOs 
9) Foreign organisations‟ influence and/or affect state‟s relations with 
civil society 
10) Is civi l society considered to be a necessary partner in policy 
formulation and implementation 
11) What needs to be done to strengthen state-civil society relations 
Topic Area 2: Strategies of combating corruption 
1) State‟s understanding of corruption, its causes, nature and effects 
2) State‟s response to increasing corruption 
3) Anti-Corruption strategies employed by the state 
4) Description of Anti-Corruption policy 
5) Current priority Anti-Corruption policies 
6) Anti-Corruption structures 
7) State‟s support for the Anti-Corruption structures 
8) Non state partners in combating corruption 
9) Involvement of CSOs in Anti-Corruption policy formulation and 
implementation 
10) Problems, barriers and challenges in combating corruption 
11) Steps needed to be taken to combat corruption 
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